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JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C.
2 I 3 N. 4rhStreet
Coeur dxlene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax; (208) 664-2240
IS&#6083

i
I

1

1
/
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JqDlClAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CipUNV OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
SASE NO, CV-03-04621
VS.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. IAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

3RDER ON DEFENDANTS'
JtOTlON TO STRIKE

Defendants.

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Bre a J. Lawrence, Motion for
Enlargement came regularly before the Court on tAugust 7, 2007. John P.
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Wee s appeared for Pla4nti.Ff.
,

Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence,
the Court denied Defendants' motion to strike in'

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE

-1

Dated:

7

doh? fl Mitchell

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE - 2

0 9 , / 1 0 1 2 0 0 7 1 4 22 F?,%

John

CC42240

P

Whelan, P C
i

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

4~

SERVICE

I

e
i

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day f September, 2007, 1 caused to
be served a true and correct copy of the forego!-ng by the method indicated
below, and addressed as indicated below:

I

John P. Whelan
21 3 N. 4ehStreet
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Fax to (208) 664-2240

$

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

1/_

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

OY,'lU/Z00 7 1 4 . 2 2 FA::;

6642240

J%pPz
W
' ,.

'Vhelan, P C

John P

*, :p&;
g.'g;2*
\9+zz

s<g+g*;.

@
fQ
$
&
;i

qggjy

c&?$

$<?.*

>

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4th Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8361 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240

iSB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEMAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff",

CASE NO. CV-03-0462 I

/

VS.

D O U G W P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. M R E N C E , Husband and Wife,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS7
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTfCE

Defendants.

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenidaj. Lawrence, Motion for
Enlargement came regularly before the Court on August 7, 2007. John P.
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. wee& appeared for Plaintiff.
Having heard the argument of counsel andi having reviewed the evidence,
the Court granted Defendanr's request regarding, taking notice o f the Court files.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE- 1

Having heard rhe argument of counsel anb having reviewed rhe evidence,
the Court took notice that Metsker maps have been relied upo

p

for many decades.
Dated:

~ ~ 7 7

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE- 2

d /3 "\

09/10/200;

14 2 2 F A X

John P
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%Ihelan, P C
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 2007, 1 caused to
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated
below, and addressed as indicated below:
john P. Whelan
21 3 N. 4'h Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Fax to (208) 664-2240

$i

I
I

I

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
V Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

I

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

JOHN P. WHEUN, P.C.
2 1 3 N, 4chStreet
G s e u r d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240

lSB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUE INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT

Defendants.

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion for
Enlargement came regularly before the Court on August 7, 2007. John P.
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P, Weeks appeared for Plaintiff.
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence,
the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Enlargement, and Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment was continued t o the date of September 24, 2007.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT- 1

/Cp

&A

B

Dated:

(
r

2.2?0j7

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT- 2

CLERK'S SCERTlFfCATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of September, 2007, 1 caused to
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated
below, and addressed as indicated below:
John P. Whelan
2 1 3 N. 4th Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
$- Fax to (208) 664-2240
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
% Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

JOHN P, WHEMN, P,C.
2 1 3 N. 4'h Street

Coeur diAlene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-03-04621

/

vs.
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J, LAWRENCE, I-iusband and Wife,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

Defendants,

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda f , Lawrence, Motion for
Enlargement came regularly before the Court on August 7, 2007, John P.
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for Plaintifl.
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence,
the Court: denied Defendants' motion for reconsideration.

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 1

Dated:

l'/

&337

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 2

OY:10]2001

1 4 27

FAX

6642240

JOhn

P

Whelan,

!

P C

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of September, 2007, 1 caused ro
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated
below, and addressed as indicated below:
John P. Whelan
2 1 3 N. 4thStreet
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Fax t o (208) 664-2240

yi

Susan P. Weeks

James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at: Law

1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
)!, Facsimile: (208)664-1 684

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N.L a k e ~ ~ o oDr.
d Ste. 200
Goeur d'Alene, ID 838 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 663- 1683
1SB #4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-4621
MOTION TO CORRECT
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
VS.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

I

Plaintiff hereby stipulates to the enlargement of time requested by Defendants in this
matter. Due to a family tragedy, counsel's normal contact with plaintiff has been out of the
office for an extended period of time. Thus, it is fair that Defendants' motion for enlargement be
granted.
DATED this 17t" day of September, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

4
.
-

@

SUSAN P. WEEKS

MOTION TO CORIUZCT JUDGMENT: 1

'--%PA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 17"' daj of September, 2007, 1 caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

U.S. Mail

d

Wand Delivered

John P. Wbelan
2 13 4"' Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240
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C1

Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

STATE OF IDAHO
COU?l?"J0;- K?GTENA!

) ss

;:i!-c:i.
--

SUSAN I?. WGEKS
JAMES, VERNON cY: WEEKS, P.i?c
1875 M.Lakcwood Dr. Ste. 200
Coeur d'Alene. ID 838 1 4
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1684
ISB #4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IX THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-462 1
STIPULATION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

1

Plaintiff hereby stipulates to the enlargement of time requested by Defendants in this
matter. Due to a family tragedy, counsel's normal contact with plaintiff has been out of the
office for an extended period of time. Thus, it is fair that Defendants7 motion for enlargement be
granted.
DATED this 17'" day of September, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
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CERTIFICATE: OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that oon the 17"' day of September. 2007.1 caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

U.S. Mail

Overnight Mail

Hand Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

John P. Whelan
21 3 4t" Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

STIPULATION FOR ENLARGMENT OF TIME: 2

SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS. P.A.
1875 N. Lakewood Dr. Stc. 200
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
'I'elepl-tone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (308) 664- 1684
1SB #4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-4621

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO STRIKJ3 PORTIONS
OF AFFIDAVIT AND
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUG LAWRENCE FILED
SEPTEMBER 10,2007

VS.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

1

COMES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
hereby moves to strike portions of the affidavit of Douglas Lawrence for the reasons enumerated
herein.
Regarding affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment, Posey v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 1 1 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement that evidence
submitted by affidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein the court noted:
Posey argues that nearly the entire affidavit is inadmissible because it does not
show that the matters averred to are based on personal knowledge, contains
conclusory assertions, contains inadmissible hearsay and provides no foundation
for introduction of attached exhibits. Posey's position is well taken.
Affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made on
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). These requirements "are not satisfied
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER If),2007: 1

A)

, 0

:
"

LL

by an aftidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by
personal Imowledge." (Cites omitted.)
;Z/l>forC ' I - L ' LC'O.
~ ~ ~court further noted:
The P O S L v. ~FOI*LI

Eight documents are attaclied to the affidavit. No foundation is provided
concerning who prepared the documents. several of which, on their face, indicate
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Caldtvell dealership. The affidavit
purports to identify the documents without demonstration of the requisite personal
lu~owledgefor authentication of the documents pursuant to I.R.E. 90 1 and
includes arguments as to the documei~ts'legal effect, none of which is admissible.
(Cite omitted.) To the extent that the documents are offered to show the truth of
assertiosis contained within them, the documents are hearsay for which no hearsay
rule exception has been established by the Griffith affidavit. In State v Hill, 140
Idaho 625, 97 P.3d 1014 (Ct.App. 2004), we described the foundational
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hearsay rule for
business records:
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to the hearsay
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to
make the report or record. See Henderson v. Smith, 128
Idaho 444, 450, 91 5 P.2d 6, 12 (1996); In the Interest qf
S.K , 127 Idaho 5 13,520,903 P.2d 102, 109 (Ct.App.
1995). These foundational requirements must be shown
through "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified
witness." I.R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be
authenticated by someone "who has custody of the record
as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision
of its creation." Henderson, 128 Idaho at 450, 915 P.2d at
12. A document is not admissible under I.R.E. 803(6)
unless the person testifying has a personal knowledge of
the record-keeping system used by the business which
created the document. Id. ; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho
293,297,900 P.2d 201,205 (Ct.App. 1995).
Hill, 140 Idaho at 628, 97 P.3d at 1017. The mere receipt and
retention by a business entity of a document that was created
elsewhere does not transform the document into a business record
of the receiving entity for purposes of I.R.E. 803(6). Id.; In
the Interest of S. W , 127 Idaho 5 13, 520, 903 P.2d 102, 109
(Ct.App. 1995). Griffith's affidavit does not comply with the
requirements of Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records
attached to his affidavit.
Posey at 483-484.
The following portions of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit should be stricken:
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
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1.

I%ragraapl~5, sentences 3 and 3 are hearsay and not admissible.

2.

Paragraph 6, sentences 3 and 4 are l-rearsay and not admissible.

3.

'7

Paragraph 7, sentences 2, 3 and 4 are hearsay and not a d ~ ~ ~ i s s i b l e .

4.

Paragraph 8 is hearsay and not admissible.

5.

Paragraph 9, sentences 3.4. 5, 6 and 7 are hearsay and not admissible.

6.

Paragraph 10, 11 and 12 contain argument. not testimony and references a

document that is not attached to the affidavit.
7.

Paragraph 20, sentences 2 is not based on personal knowledge and lacks

foundation.
8.

Paragraph 22, sentence 2 is hearsay and not admissible.

9.

Paragraph 23, setences 2, 3 , 4 and 5 are hearsay and not admissible.

10.

Paragraph 28, sentences 2,4, 5, 6, and 7 is argument, and not admissible

evidence.
11.

Paragraph 29 is argument and not admissible evidence.

12.

Paragraph 3 1, sentence2 is argument and not admissible evidence.

13.

Paragraph 32, sentence 2 is argument and not admissible evidence.

14.

Paragraph 33 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

15.

Paragraph 34 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

16.

Paragraph 35 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

17.

Paragraph 36 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

18.

Paragraph 37 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

19.

Paragraph 38 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

20.

Paragraph 39 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

21.

Paragraph 41 is argument and opinion, and not admissible evidence.

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
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23.

Paragrap/i32 is argtimeiit and iiot admissible evidei~ce.

23.

Paragraph 43 is argument, and iiot admissible evidence.

24.

Paragraph 44, sentence 3 is hearsay and is not based upon personal knowledge
and co~itradictsthe affidavit of John Mack filed in this matter.

25.

Paragraph 45 is argument, and not admissible evidence.

26.

Paragraph 46 is not based on personal kliowledge. The exhibit, previously
submitted, is admissible.

27.

Paragraph 47 is argument based upon a previously submitted exhibit and not
admissible evidence.

28.

Paragraph 48 is argument not based upon personal knowledge but rather a
previously submitted judgment in the record and does not constitute admissible
evidence.

29.

Paragraphs 50 and 5 1 are argument. not based upon personal knowledge but
rather documents previously submitted in the record and does not constitute
admissible evidence.

30.

Paragraphs 52 and 53 lacks foundation. Mr. Lawrence lays no foundation that he
is a surveyor capable of interpreting the 1910 viewer's report, ort he 1959
Metsker map or relating them to the satellite imagery that lie pulled from Google
Earth and therefore such evidence is inadmissible.

3 1.

Paragraph 56 lacks foundation or any personal knowledge that the road depicted
is within the 1910 viewer's report for Mellick Road.

32.

Paragraph 60 lacks foundation. Mr. Lawrence has no personal knowledge
regarding who constructed the gate depicted in Image 14.

33.

Paragraph 61, sentences 2 and 3 are impermissible hearsay.

34.

Paragraph 64 is argument, not admissible evidence.

35.

Paragraph 65 is argument not based upon personal knowledge. Some is based
upon documents previously submitted herein.

36.

Paragraph 66 is argument not based upon personal knowledge as it occurred prior
to Lawrences' ownership.

37.

Paragraph 67 is argument not based upon personal knowledge.

38.

Paragraph 68 is argument not based upon personal knowledge.

39.

Paragraph 69 and Exhibit "T" are not admissible evidence. Mr. Wilbur's affidavit
is not p;operly authenticated or prepared.

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
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40,

f'aragraph 70 is argumc11t not based upon persorlal knoivledge of facts adniissibe
as evidence.

4 1.

Paragraph 7 1 is arg~rrrte~lt
not based upon personal ktlocvledge of facts.

42.

Paragraph 72 is z~rgumentnot bascct upon personal knowledge.

43.

Paragraph 74. sentence 4 is hearsay.

44.

Paragraph75 is hearsay.

45.

Paragraph 77 is argument, not admissible facts.

46.

Paragraph 78 and 79 are argument, not admissible facts.

47.

Paragraph 80, sentences 4, 5, 6 and 7 are argument. not admissible facts.

48.

Paragraph 8 1 is argument, not admissible facts.

49.

Paragraph 83 is argument, not admissible facts of which Mr. Lawrence has
personal knowledge.

50.

Paragraphs 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, and 90 are argument, not admissible facts of
which Mr. Lawrence has personal knowledge.

Turning to the supplemental affidavit of Doug Lawrence filed September 10,2007,
plaintiff moves to strike on the following grounds:
1.

Paragraph 4 is a legal conclusion with argument referenced to other individuals'

affidavits and depositions.
2.

Paragraph 5 is argument, and not based on defendant's personal knowledge.

3.

Paragraph 6 is argument and not based on defendant's personal knowledge.

4.

Paragraph 7 is argument based upon the deposition of Harold Funk, not

defendant's personal knowledge.
5.

Paragraph 8 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's

personal knowlege.
6.

Paragraph 9 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's

personal knowledge.
7.

Paragraph 10 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
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8.

I'aragrapli 1 1 is argument. and not based upon defendant's personal knotvledge.

9.

Paragraph 12 is argument, and not based upon dcfcndant's personal knowledge.

10.

Paragrap11 13 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

I I.

Paragraph 14 is argument, asid not based upoil defendant's personal knowledge.

12.

Paragraph15isargurnent.

13.

Paragraph 16, sentences 2,3, 5 and 7 are argument, and not based upon personal

knowledge. Further, there is no foundation for tlie summary contained on Exhibit 1 regarding
intersections.

14.

Paragraph 18 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

15.

Paragraph 19 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

16.

Paragraph 20 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

17.

Paragraph 21 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge.

DATED this 17"' day of September, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & W E K S , P.A.

BY:
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MOTION TO STRIJCE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT
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CERTIFICATE OF SEIIVICE
I hereby certify that on the

-e!3

r-

day of

,I

caused to be served a tr~te

and correct copy of the foregoing document by tl-te method indicated below. and addressed to the
following:

d

U.S. Mail

Overnight Mail

Wand Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

John P. Whelm
2 13 4"' Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240
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SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VEIII'U'ON & WEEKS. P.A.
1875 N. Lali-ewood Dr, Ste. 200
Coeur d'Aletle, ID 838 14
Telephone: (308) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
ISB 154255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Case No. CV 03-462 1
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS
LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,
2007

Defendants.
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence came before
the Court for hearing on August 7,2007. The court heard argument of counsel, reviewed the
affidavits, and made its findings of record at the hearing, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is granted in
part and denied in part.
1.

The last sentence of paragraph 3 of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit is stricken. The

objection is overruled with respect to the remainder of paragraph 3.
2.

Paragraphs 4, 5 , and 6 are stricken.

3.

Paragraph 8 is sustained on foundation grounds, but overruled as to the

identification of Exhibit E, Metsker's map.
4.

The motion to strike the first sentence of Paragraph 9 is overruled and granted on

the second sentence and the third sentence. The Exhibit remains as evidence.
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,2007: 1

'The motion to strike Paragraph I0 is denied.
T11e motion is granted with respect to tlie second sentence of Paragraph I 1.
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 14.
The motion is denied with respect to Paragrap11 15.
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 17.
The motion is granted with respect to the third, fourth and fifth sentences only of
Paragraph 18.
The motion is granted with respect to the second and third sentences of Paragraph

The motion is granted as to the second sentence of Paragraphs 20.
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 22.
Paragraph 23 is stricken.
Paragraph 24 is stricken.
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 40.
The motion is granted as to the second, fourth and fifth sentences of Paragraph 44.
Paragraph 47 is stricken.
The motion is granted as to the last sentence of Paragraph 48.
Paragraph 49 is stricken.
Paragraph 5 1 is stricken.
Paragraph 52 is stricken.
Paragraph 54 is stricken.
The motion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of Paragraph 57.
The motion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of Paragraph 58.
The fifth, seventh, eight and tenth sentence are stricken of Paragraph 59
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,2007: 2

77.

'The ob-jection is overruled as to t)aragrapl~60.

28.

Paragraph 61 is striclten.

29.

Paragraph 67 is stricken.

30.

Paragraph 68 is striken.

33.

Paragraph 69 is stricken.

DATED this

/ rkday

of September, 2007.

&strid Judge

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,2007: 3

CERTIFICATE, OF SERVICE
1 hereby certify that on the

day of September, 2007. I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

k

Overi~ightMail
Telecopy (FAX)

Susan P. Weeks
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200
Coe~trd' Alene, ID 838 14
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684~'
John P. Whelan
2 13 4t" Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 /
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SUSAN P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.11.
1875 N. Laliewood Dr. Ste. 200
Coeur d'ixlene, ID 8381 4
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (205) 664- 1684
ISB #4255

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-462 1
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME

Plaintiff,
VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

1

Plaintiffs moved to strike: ( I ) Defendants' Motion to Strike portions of certain affidavit
filed by Plaintiff in support of its summary judgment, ( 2 ) Defendants' opposition response to
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits, (3) Defendants' Motion for
Enlargement of Time, and (4) Request for Judicial Notice because they were not timely. In the
alternative, Plaintiffs moved for an enlargement of time to respond to the above pleadings. The
Court having heard argument of counsel on August 7,2007, and enunciated its findings of
record,
NOW THEREFORE, the Court grants the motion for enlargement of time to respond and

$78
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME: 1

denies the motion to strike as being moot
DATED this

1'-"+
b ';lay

of September. 2007.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

1g

day of September. 200'7,I caused to be served a true

and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
U.S. Mail

Overnight Mail

Hand Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

Susan P. Weeks
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200
Goeur d' Alene, ID 838 14
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 v"
John P. Whelan
2 13 4t'' Street
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 16
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 /

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR IN THE
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SUSAN P. WEEKS
J
S, VERPjON & VE,EICIS, P.A.
I875 N. Lakewood Dr. Ste. 200
Coeur dtAlene. ID 838 1 4
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
ISB #4255
Attorneys for PlaintiR

IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDJCIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF LDAMO, TN ArCD FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Dclaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-4621

AMENDED MOTION TO
CORRECT JUDGh4ENT

Plaintiff;

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE m d BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff and hereby files this Amended Motion to replace tlte motion

filed September 17,2007. Pursuant to Rule 60(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff
moves the Court to enter the judgment entered September 11,2007 regarding judicial notice of
the b f e ~ k emap.
r
The Court did not nrle that the Mctsker map was accurate. It ruled that it

would take notice that it was a Merskr map.
DA'JXD this 2 1st day of September, 2007.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

BY

SUSAN P. WEEKS

"R
AMENDED MOTIOH TO COFZRl2CT JUDGMENT: 1

:
"
l
t,j

1J

PAGE

I hcrcby certify that on the 21"'day of September, 2007,T caused to be senred a true and
concct copy of the foregoing document by d ~ method
e
indicated below, and addressed to the

U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered

Oveni&t hkil

d

John P. me1m
2 13 4thStreet
Coeur d7Alene, ID 838 16
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

AMENDED MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGhENT: 2

Telccopy (FA4X)

E33ii37

SUSAN P. W E K S
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.
1875 N. Lakernrood Dr. Stc. 200
Cocur d'Alene, JD 838 14
"Telephone: (268) 667-0655
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684
TSB M255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FRST J m I C L C DISTRICT OF THE
S T A 4 EOF IDAHO, I
N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT

TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-4621
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

vs.

DOUGLAS.LAWRENCE md BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, Itusband and wife,
Defendants.
COMES NOW the above named PlaintiE, and herein moves the Court for an order
shortening the time for Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Correct Judgment.

T h i s Motion is based on the fact that Plaintiff filcd the motion 0x1 September 17,2007, but d u to
~

an oversight, t11e Notice of Hearing was not served or filed at that time. Further, the notion
language was subsequently replaced by the amended motion due to a clericaI error,

DATED this 21%day of September, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & WEKS, P.A.

BY

l"GAd

SUSAN P.

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME: 1
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CERTImGATE: OF SERVICE

I hcreby cedi@ that on the 21St day of September, 2007, I ca~tsedto be served a tme and
correct copy of the foregoing docment by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following.
U.S. Mail

Hand Delivered
John P. Wlelan
2 13 4" street
Coeur d' Alene, TI> 838 16

Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

Overnight MaiI
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JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

2 1 3 N. 4'h Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Teie.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
IS&#6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TW E COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV-03-04621
vs.

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

ORDER ON MOTION
TO AMEND ANSWER

FOR LEAVE

Defendants.
Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion for
Leave to Amend Answer came regularly before the Court on September 24,
2007. John P. Whetan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for
Plaintiff.
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence,
the Court hereby grants the request of Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence
for leave to file an amended answer raising the additional defense of laches.
The Lawrences shall not be required to physically file an amended answer as this

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER - 1

09/25/2007 14.27 F A X

John P

6S42240

Whelan, P C

#$$$@%

&f-z$;**

tk3@$fl

%&gy

Y
i*
d
,-'ri-$@4

\.I
#
."
&
*
A

order shall serve to authorize the amendment of the Lawrences' answer ta raise
the defense of laches.

Dated:

c==7

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER
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Whelan,
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the $b' day of
, 2007, 1
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method
indicated below, and addressed as ind icared below:
,

John P. Whelan
21 3 N. 4rhStreet
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Nail, postage prepaid
Fax to (208) 664-2240
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Facsimile: (208) 664-1684

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:
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JOHN P. WHECAN, P.C.

27 3 N, 4'hStreet
Coeur d'Alene, It3 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240

IS&# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-03-04621
VS.

ORDER ON MOTION TO
COMPEL
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,
Defendants.

I

Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion to
Compel came regularly before the Court on September 24, 2007. John P.
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for Plaintifi.
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence,
the Court hereby orders Plaintiff, Tower Asset Sub Inc., in accordance with
I.R.C.P. Rule 30(b)(6), to produce a person or persons having knowledge of the
case at hand for a deposition to occur within fourteen (14) days, to be noticed
by Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence. The Plaintiff shall pay
to Defendants the cost of the Court Reporter non-appearance fee of $85.00,
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL - 1
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CLERK" CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY xhat on the
day of
, 2007,i
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method
indicated below, and addressed as indicated below:
John P. Whelan
21 3 PI. 4'h street
Coeur dl Alene, 10 8381 4
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Via:
Fax to (208) 664-2240

%
-

Susan P, Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
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JOHN 8. WHELAN, P.C.
21 3 N. 4thStreet
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240

Ise# 6063
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1
VS.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
ENLARGEMENT

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,
Defendants.

1

Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and BrendaJ. Lawrence, Motion for
Enlargement came regularly before the Coun on September 24, 2007. John P.
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for Plaintiff.
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence,
the Court hereby grants the Lawrences' Motion for Enlargement of time in which
to file their opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The
summary judgment hearing is continued to the date of November 28, 2007 at
3:00 p.m.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day o f
, 2007,l
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method
indicated below, and addressed as indicated below:
John P. Whelan
2 13 N. 4thStreet
Coeur dl Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Fax t o (208) 664-2240

$

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Goeur dl Alene, ID 83814
Via:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

$'

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:

dOl-tN P. WHELAN, P,&.
2 1 3 N. 4" Street
Coeur dxafenp, 1D $387 4

Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (2538) 664-2240
lSB# 6083
IN THE D15TRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TW E COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB f N C . , a Delaware

Corporation,

CASE NO. CV-03-462 1
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN
IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED
MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE

Plaintiff,

VS

.

DOUGLAS P, LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

HEARING DATE:

TIME:
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO

1
)

County of Kootenai

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

ss.

1

I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OFJQHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR

CAUSE - 1

1,

1 am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda

Lawrence in the above-entitled rase and the case of Capstar Radio Operating

Company v, Lawrence (CV-02-7671)'

I have personal knowledge of the

following facts and could competently testify.

2.

I have previously filed the Affidavit of John P. Whelan filed on June 5 ,

2007 in support of the Defendant's initial Notion for Disqualification for Cause
and I incorporate herein by reference the factual allegations recited therein.

3.

1 also filed the Amended Supplemenral Affidavit of John P. Whelan

(with Exhibit Attached) in support of the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration
on July 24, 2007 and I incorporate herein the factual allegations contained
therein by reference.

4.

1 submit this affidavitin support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to

Disqualify the Honorable John T. Mitchell for Cause pursuant' to 1-R-C.P. Rule

40(d)(2).

5.

Since the filing of Defendant's motion for reconsideration of

Defendants' initial motion for disqualification for cause, the following additional
events have occurred in the herein case:

6.

1 have filed a complaint with the Idaho Judicial Council alleging rhar

Judge John T. Mitchell has engaged in conduct in the herein action that violates

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR

CAUSE - 2

the ldahaii Code of$udiciat Conduct, specifically Canan 1 , Canon 2A, Canon 28,
Canon 3E(I )(a), Cannon 318(1), Canan 38(2), 3B(4), 38(5), and Canan 5C(2),

7.

During a public hearing in his couaroom on October 31, 2007, in

the Capstar case, Judge Mitchell accused me of lying to the Court. He made this
allegation while my son, Kellen Whelan, was the sole spectator in the courtroom,
The Judge was on the bench when I walked into the csunroorn with my son and
the fudge had a clear view of the persans walking in to the courtroom.

The

fudge accused me of' lying to the court in response to a statement t had made in
the course of argumentthat the Idaho Supreme Court had vacated the injunction
that Judge Mitchell had issued in this case when he entered summary judgment
in the case against my ciient (See Tower Asset Sub /nc. v. Lawrence, 143 ldaho
71 0 , 1 5 2 P.3d 581 (2007)).' 1 correctly and truthfully represented the facts to

Judge Mitchell: the injunction was, in fact, vacated when the Supreme Court
vacated the order that created the permanent injunction,

Judge Mirchelt's

accusation (in front of my son) that I was a liar was a gross breach of decorum
and clearly inappropriate. The accusation i s evidence of the Judge's bias and
prejudice against me and, therefore, my clients.

Judge Mitchell granted summary judgment to Plaintiff in this action by an order dated
Nay 27, 2007. The same order quieted title in favor of Plaintiff and created a permanent
injunction restraining Defendant from inrefiering with Plainriff's use of Defendants' land.
Additionally, the order specifically recited that "any bond posted in conjunction with the
temporary restraining order entered herein is hereby released." This order was appealed to the
ldaho Supreme Court, The ldaho Supreme Coun vacated the order granring summary
judgment. By vacating the order granting summary Judgment, the ldaho Supreme Court
vacated the permanent injunction recited therein.

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUAUFICATION FOR
CAUSE - 3

8.

Three days prior to the October 3 1 , 2007 hearing where Judge

Mitchell called me a tiar, counsel for Ptaintiff, Susan Weeks, filed an application
for an order shortening time and a Motion for Sixth Access [sic]. Neither motion
was supparted by an affidavit and neither motion referenced a rule basis for t h e

motion as required by 1.R.C.P Rule 7(b)(l). At the hearing, I objected to the
"application" and the "motion" on the grounds t h a t no supporting affidavit was

filed and no rule basis was cited.

I argued that Plaintiff had failed to

demonstrate grounds for a order shortening rime.

My objections were

summarily overruled. I further argued that the bond that had been ordered and
posred for the temporary restraining order issued early on in this case had been
exonerated by the Court's June 7, 2005 order granting summary judgment,
therefore no bond was in place (as Plaintiff had recovered the bond on May 3,
2006). 1 funher argued that, at a minimum, a bond should be ordered posted

by Plaintiff to replace the bond exonerated.

The argument was summarily

dismissed by Judge Mitchell even though I.R.C.P. 65(c) mandates that "no
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of
security by the applicant. Judge Mitchell has seemingly refused to follow the

law.'

The findings requlred by I.R.C.P. Rule 65(d) also were

not in the order granting sixth

access, which was essentially a mandatory injunction. The Rule 65(d) findings were nor in the
original preliminary injunction order either.
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR
CAUSE - 4

9,

1"h.s abundanely clear

rkar Judge Mitchell applies a rdjfllFerenit: standard

of conduct to Plaintiff's scclunsei than he applies to your affiant,3 as bath the

Application For Order Shortening Time and the Motion for Sixth Access [sic) was

granted without citing any rule basis.

10.

On October 31, 2007, Plaintiff's counsel submitted an order to

Judge Mitchell entitled "Order Granting Requesr For Sixth Access."

The order

referenced that "the Court having reviewed t h e application of Plaintiff and the

affidavit in sutclnort: thereof ..." (emphasis added). In fact, no affidavit had been
filed in support of Plaintiff's application, a point argued by your affiant. When
your affiant received the signed order, an "Objection to Form of Order Granting
Sixth Access" was filed on November 2 , 2007, the very day that your affiant first

saw rhe signed order. Apparently, no action has been taken to correct the false

reference in the Court order, Again, it would appear that Judge Mitchell applies

a double standard when it comes to misrepresentations to the Caurt made by
Plaintiff's counsel. A true and correct copy of the order i s attached as Exhibit A . ~

' S e e Affidavit of John P. Whelan filed June 5 , 2007, In the case of Srraub v. Smith.
(CV-04-5437), Judge Mitchell denied J o h n P. Whelan's prevailing client attorney Pees pursuant
to a standard real esrare purchase conrract conraining an arrorney fee clause because John P.
Whelan had allegedly failed to reference a rule (1.R.C.P) basis for his motion. In fact, a rule basis
was sited and Judge Mitchell apparenrly did not read the motlon before denying it.

The Court is requested to take naclce of the Judicial records referred to herein as well
as the Court Clerk records regarding the exoneration of rhe bond posted by Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WMELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR
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'I 1

Lastly, Judge Mitchell scheduaed bath the Capstar case (CV-02-

7671) and the Tower Asset case (GV-03-4621)
scheduling asder.

It is my understanding that

for trial w i t h ~ ~issuing
t
a

& of the Judges in the

First

District roi~tinelyissue scheduling orders in every civil case. The absence of
scheduling orders in the cases at hand seemingly benefits the Plaintiffs, and

Plaintiff's counsel, in each case in that Plaintiff doeti not have t o disclose the
witness and evidence disclosures required in all other civil cases in the First
District, thus the Defendants in this case are placed at a distinct disadvantage.
None ofthe time deadlines established by the routine scheduling order utilized

by Judge Mitchell apply to the Plaintiff in this case,

12.

I believe that Judge Mitchell is biased and prejudiced against

Defendanrs's counsel, your affiant, and that disqualification for cause i s
warranted by I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(2). I also believe that the Judge's impartiality is
reasonably questioned in this case and that the Judge has failed to follow
accepted rules of decorum. I also believe that the following Judicial Canons have
been violated by Judge Mitchell: Canon 1, Canon 2A, Canon ZB, Canon 3€(1)(a),
Cannon 3B(1), Canon

DATED this

3B(2), 3B/4),3B(S), and Canon 5C(2).
day of November, 2007.

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

y for Defendanrs
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. W H E U N IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR
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-

Subscribed and sworn before me this

day of November, 2007
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I HEREBY CERTIFY rhaf on the T7'day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be
served a t r u e and correcr COPPOI:

the foregoing by the method indicated below,

and addressed to the following:
Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks

Attorneys at Law
1 875 N, Lakewood Drive
Suite 200

Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
U,S. Maif, postage prepaid

7

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

Personally served
Judge John T. Mitchell
3 2 4 W.

Garden Ave.

Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

J Facsimile: (208)446-1 132
-Personally served

SUSAN P, m E K S
JAMES, =WON & WEEKS, f .A.

Cmur d'Alae, ID 83X X 4
TeIe$ane: (288) 667-W83
Fa~simda:(20g) 664-1684
TSB W4Z5
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE RTST.RICT COURT OF E I E FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE:
STATE3 OF IDAHO, IN A1?TT)FOR l7.E G O W Y OF K O Q m A I
CAPSTAR. EkDIO OFERAnNG COMPANY,
a Delaware corporation,

Case No.

CV 02-7671

ORDER G m r j l EQ'UEST
FOR SIXTI3 ACCESS

Plaintiff',
VS,

DOUC3LAS LAW'RENCE and BRENDA 3.
LAWRENCE, hu~bandand sift,

The Courk having mi-d
tl-e

the appiicaiidn of PlaimEF and thr Afidaqr filed in support

and it apparhg that Plaintiff has utilizrd the four (4) accesses granted by &e Corut, and a

sixth access being ~quizsted:
IT IS W.WBY ORDERED b
t Plaintiff may mak n sixth access to tbc: prop-

p m ~ t

to th8 uxiginal I
E
c
I
.
m
frljunctian. Order atered[ .hcreh PIainW is r q u h d to fdc a Notice o f
Acc&s of the date of the sjxth access.

DATZD this ,?I $'day

of

b

k- 2007.

&
I

day o f

G L ' ~ ~2007,
/ I cauxd lo bc imd

true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indkared below, and addressed

U.S. Mail

0ve.mjght Mail

Hand Deli9erc;d
S~~ P.W&s
James, V m o n gE. We&, P A .
1874 N, Lakewoad Dr.,Suite 200
Coeur dFA1ene,I
D 838 14
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684

1

7

i

J8HN P, WMEldfN, P,C.
2 1.3 N. 4rhstreet
Coeor dxlene, iD 8381 4
Tele.: (2081 664-5893
Fax: (288)664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND

FOR THE COUNTY OF KQOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
CASE NO, CV-03-0462 1

Plaintiff,
RENEWED MOTION FOR
DfSQUALlFlCATlClN FOR CAUSE

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

DATE:

TINE:

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by
and through their attorney of record. john P. Whelan, and hereby motions this
court for an Order for Disqualification for Cause against rhe Honorable John T.

Mitchell, presiding judge in the above-entitled action, This motion i s made on

the ground that Defendants believe the Honorable John T. Mitchell is biased or

RENEWED MOTION FOR DiSQUALlFlCATlON FOR CAUSE - 1

prejudiced againsf them or their case in this action. This rnotisar Is made on the
ground of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule %O(d)(2).

Defendants request oral argument.
DATED f his

ay of November, 2007.
Respectfully Submitted,

ey for Defendants

RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the YHday of November, 2007, 1 caused ro be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,

and addressed to the following:
Susan P, Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 208

Coeur d A l e n e , ID 8381 4
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Via:
i/

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
Personally served

Judge John T, Mitchell
3 2 4 W, Garden Ave.
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

Via:

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Facsimile; (208) 446- 1 1 32

-Personally served

lC$m

STATE '2:
CQUNTi Ci: vC<FEbJj

FiEC

JOHN P, WHELAN, P.C.
2 a 3 N. 4''' Srreer
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8385 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5897
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T OF THE

STATE QF IDAHO,

1N AND

FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF KQQTEMAI

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

1
CASE NO. CV-83-04621

Plaintiff,
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT HALL
DATE: November 28, 2007
DOUGLAS P- LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J, LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

TIME:

3:00 p.m.

JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL
Defendants

Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by and through their
anorney of record, John P, Whelan, hereby move the court further object to the
Affidavit of Robert Hall, identified herein, which affidavit was offered in support
to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as follows:

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONSTO AFFIDAVIT OF

ROBERT HALL

-1

1.

Paragraph 7, pg. 3 , Second

back of foundation for Hall's
claimed knowledge of the access
allegedly used by Switzer.

Sentence

2,

LackofFoundationregarding
Hall's claim that. the road was
clearly in view and being used at
the rime of Terms Corp's purchase
of the property from Switzer.

Paragraph7,pg,3,lastSentence

DATED this

1

day of November, 2007.

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

By:

1.

{oh4 P. Whelan

w
n
e
y
for Defendants

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT HALL
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on the 13&day of November, 2007, I caused to be
served a rrue and correct copy of rhe foregoing by r h e mexhod indicated below,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that

and addressed to the folfawing:
Susan P, Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1875 N. Lakcwood Drive
Suite 200
Coeur d ' Alene, ID 8381 4

lJ.5. Mail, postage prepaid

Via:

/

Facsimile: (208)664-1 684
Personally served

JOHN P. WMELAN, P.C.

2 f 3 N. 4" hTreer

Caeur d x l e n e , !D 8 3 8 1 4
l e l e , : ( 2 0 8 ) 664-5891

fax: {SOB) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
O
N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAi
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

CASE NO. CV-03-8462 1
Plaintiff,
RENEWED NOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM

AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

Defendants.

DATE;

November 27, 2007

TIME:

3130 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

COMES NOW rhe Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by

and through their attorney of record, John P, Whelan, and hereby motions this
court, pursuant to Rules 1 Z(a) and 12(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules for an

Order for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. Defendants request

an Order granting them permission to appeal if Defendants' Renewed Motion for
Disqualification for Cause is denied,
RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

-1

This motion i s made on the grounds that. gaod cause was shown for the

renewed ma"cion for disqualification, and Defendants1believe t h a t they cannot
obtain a fair trial f r o m Judge fohn 7". Mitchell, The matter i s scheduled f o r trial
on December 10, 2007,therefore Defendants request is an urgent request.

Defendants request oral argument.
DATED this

day of November, 2007.
Respectfully Submitted,

u

ttorn y for Defendants

RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPlEAt FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SlERrdlCE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

1 ~ ' day of November, 2007, 1 caused

to be

sewed a true and correct copy of the faregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to t h e following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon Bi Weeks

Attorneys at Law

1 875 N. Lakewood Drive
Suite 200
Goeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4
U.S, Mail, postage prepaid

Via:

d

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

-Personally sewed

JOHN P. WHEWN, P,C,
2 1 3 N. 4t"~reer

Coeur d%Alene, 19 8381 4
Tele,: (288) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NO. CV-03-4627

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS
LAWRENCE IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

DATE: November 28, 2007
TIME:

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

I

Defendants,

STATE OF IDAHO

3;00p.m,

1
) ss,

County of Kootenai

1

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S

-

RENEWED MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1

I, Douglas Lawrence, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1,

I am a Defendant named in the above entitled action.

I have

personal knowledge of the following facts and could competently testify.

2.

My wife and I own 80 acres of land on the top of Blossom Mountain

in Post Falls, Idaho. The land is legally described as follows: The Northeast

Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; the East half of the Northwest Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter; and the East half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian,
Kootenai County, Idaho. We purchased the land in 1996.

3.

Over the years, I have become familiar with the identities of other

landowners in the vicinity of our 80 acres, I have also performed extensive
research on the titles of the properties that surround my 80 acres by reviewing
records at the County Recorder's Office and by reviewing my own chain of title.

4,

1 am familiar with the parcel of land in which the Plaintiff in this

action claims an interest.

The parcel is roughly a one-acre parcel that i s

landlocked by a much larger parcel. There is a tower on the location. The land
surrounding the parcel is presently owned by John Mack.

5,

Over the years, 1 have walked my 80 acre parcel many, many times,

I have also walked and driven over many of the parcels of' land that surround

my

parcel, including the Mack parcel and the parcel in which the Plaintiff claims an
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
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31.

interest, which I will hereafter refer ta as the l o w e r parcel.

I am familiar,

therefart;, with the access to rhe Tower parcel,

6,
There are two ways to access the Tower parcel. There is a gated,
private access raad that crosses a portion of my property that was initially
created by GTC (General Teiephone Company), CTC has an easement to cross
my parcel that was created in 1966. GTE also has an easement ta cross all of
the other parcels of land over which the access road crosses. My wife and I also
have an easement to use the private road. I tao have the right to legally cross
the parcels of land surrounding the private access road. To my knowledge, no
one else has a deeded right to use the private access road. However, I have
granted some entities the right to cross my parcel pursuant to various access
agreements,

7,
The other access to the Tower parcel is by way of Mellick Road, a
public road. The road is paved up to a point where it becomes a gravel road.
Over the years, Mellick Road has not been maintained as well as rhe GTC private
access road. Portions of Mellick Road in the vicinity of John Mack's property
were in rough condition and in need of repair. Mr. Mack recently refurnished the
road.
For many years, the property to the immediate south of my parcel
(Section 28) was owned by ldaho Forest Industries ("fFI"). IF1 granted one of my
predecessors in t i t l e (john McWugh), an easement to cross Section 28 via the
private access road described herein (See Exhibit A attached hereto). GTC had
obtained a similar easement (See Affidavit of Weeks-Exhibits "V", "W", and "X"),
Harold Funk never obtained the right to cross Section 28 (See Affidavit of John P.
Whelan and deposition transcript of Harold Funk-pg. 54-56, pg 59:9; pg.
66;l5).

8,

Tower has no express easement to cross my land (See Supreme
Court decision in this case). Nevertheless, Tower seeks to establish a right to
cross my land after many years of permissive use,

9.

AFFIDAVIT OF DOUCIAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PIAINTIFF'SF;
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i

4

On as about November 3, 1997, 1 enrered into an Access License
Agreement wldh Nextel West Carp (a copy of which is artached as Exhiltpit B), The
Agreement permitted N e x t e l t a cross my land in exchange far a monthly
10.

payment: of $7,000.00, The agreement could not: be assigned withour my
express written permission. However, assignment was permixred to a company
acquiring a fifty-one percent (51% or more interest in Nextel. Accordingly,
Nexrel assigned ro Specrracire (see
and Spectracite assigned to
American Tower (see Exhibit 9).1 received both Exhibit 6: and Exhibit C) in the
regular course sf business and the exhibits are part of my business records,
The monthly payments were made regularly until June of 200'7, when the
payments ceased altogether. Plaintiff, or i t s parent company, had made the
monrhty lease payments to me far many years before rhe payments stapped. I
permitted Plaintiff to use the private access road across my land s o long as it
made the $1,000.00 a month payments. This has been the arrangement since I
war notified that American Tower merged with Spectracite.
11.
Gares have limited access ta the private access road ar all rimes
since I purchased my 80 acre parcel. A gate exists at the spot where the private

access road enters my property and one exists where the private access road
leaves my property.
1 2 , Harold Funk did not reserve an easement to access my land when he
sold the land to my predecessor in title, Human Synergistics, Inc. in 1975 (See

Human Synergistics sold the land to
Affidavit of Susan Weeks-Exhibits €/I).
John McHugh and Don Johnston in 1977. (See Affidavit af Weeks-Exhibits F/H).
That same year, John McWugh obtained an easement: from IF1 to cross Section 2 8
via the private access road described herein (See Exhibit A). The Tower parcel
did not exist until 1977, as it was merely a part of a much larger parcel owned
by Funk (See Affidavit of Weeks-Exhibit Q-U), My parcel was sold to Human
Synergistics two (2) years before the Tower parcel was conveyed to Hall's
predecessor in title, Harold Funk did not use my land for access to his larger
parcel of land, a portion of which eventually became the Tower parcel. (See
Affidavit of John P. Whelan and deposition transcript of Funk).
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S

RENEWED MOTiON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

13, 1 did not create the Tower parcel. The Tower parcel was never a part
of my SO acre parcel. The Tower parcel was created long after my 80 acres had
been conveyed to my predecessor Human Synergistics, 16: Tower has problems
with i t s access, those problems are. between Harold Funk, Robert Mall and
Tower. I had no hand in the dealings which created the Tower parcel. As such, 1
was not privy to any of the warranties, i f any, made by Funk regarding access to
the Tower parcel, However, Tawer has sought fit to include me in the instant
action, and i am forced to defend against a claim that Tower should be pursuing
against others, A claim that goes back to 7977-30 years ago. I was a bona
fide purchaser for value when I bought my parcel, and there was no indication
that Tower, Hall or anyone other than GTC had the right to use the private,
gated access that crosses my parcel. I have been prejudiced and placed at a
huge disadvantage in having to defend against Tower's claim due to the fact
that the claim was first raised in 2003-twenty-six (26) years after the Tower
parcel was initially created,

----.
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DATED this L3 day of November, 2007.

Subscribed and sworn before me this

PT4day of November, 2007.
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FOR VALUABLE CCOSSDERAT'LOP. t h a r e c e i p t vtraraof i s h e r e b y noknouladyad,
TD:DbW WREST XMIUSTRTES.

con,

g r ~ t bargain,
~ ~ ,
transfer

DON E. JOHNSTON a n d FEW A . JOWSMN,

harein cho G r n r r t o r , doom h a r e b y

I

heirs, successor*, s d r n i n i a t r e t o r s and a s s i g n s , h e r e i n t h e G r a n t e e s , an
a a e a B e n t o r r i g h t of wry f o r t h e l u l l and f r e e r i g h t and l i b e r c y t o r them,

t h e i r teuanco, s e r v n n c a . v i s i t o r e , end 1 L c a n s e s s , i n common wr!l 611 orharm
hpving t h e likc r i g h c , Ear e l l p u r p o s e 6 connec.cecl u 1 ~ i 1
t h e u s e End e n j o p s n t

!fG\$:,,','
'

4, (:, .,
,

.

.

.oh the f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y , t o - w i t :

,

Government Lor 3 i n S e c t i o n 1 5 , Township 50 North. Reage 5 U.B-M..
C ~ F~ ~ - 1 /o f4 S e c c i o n 21, Tcnmahip 50 North. Ranga 5 W . E . M . ,
Gavarnrnont Lot h and t h e S W - 1 1 4 of che W-1 4 of S a c r i o n 2 2 .
errm ma hip 5 0 North, Rang= f f l . B . H . , all Koetcnei Couuty, Idaho.

TO pas* a n d repass e b n y rhe e x l e c l n g roadrey approxlrneceiy

40

feet

In

v i d c h l o c a t e d i n tho Noreh h a l f of che HE-I/& o f S a c t i o n 2 8 . T o v n s h i p 50
N o r t h , Range 5 W.B.H., Xo?t*nal Councy, S t a t o of I d a h o .

S a i d $ondvny

aaaement jaina the SE-1/4 oe S e c c i o n 2 1 , Tovnship 50 Worth, Renga 5 U . B . M . .
in che SW c o r n e r s n d t h e SE-1IL t h e r e o f .

DATED t h l s

11th

day of

JUIV

,

1377.

5,WW FOREST INDUBTRIOS , INC ,

a Xdal~o corporation
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STATE OF IDAHO
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Cuunry a £ K o o t ~ n a d
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8.3,

1 9 t h day o f

O n tho

Saptamhgr1977, before me, o Nocery p t j b l k

in and lor said Stat%. p e r s o n 8 1 B eppe*rad

, know to
WE

me co

-

Mike C. Wailing

be tha

th0 ~ o c ~ o ~ a t~h ia to m
n ecuua m e

R e ~ ~ 0 -Wmn a a a r
foragolng Irutrumenr, and a c k n a l e d g e d

t o me t h a t such c o r p o r a t i o n executed t h e same.
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STATE OF IDAHO

1

C O U N T OF R O O E N A i

1

) 5s.

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PREfEiulS:

That the undersigned, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda 3. Lawrence, husband and wife (he~inafter
called "Licensor"), for and in conslderat~onas specified herem. by thee presents do bargain. convey, rleIiver, transfer,
warrant and grant unto Nextel West Carp., a Delaware corporation, d.b.a. Nextel Commudcations, its successor
and assigns (herc~nafkrcalled '21censce"), a non-exclusive license (the 'Y.,iccnsc"), over lhaf portion of Llcet~sor's
Property (descr~bedherein) generally described as an access road apptoximateiy fifteen (15) feet wlde ("Licensed
Aroi~")over Ltcensar's Properly, upon whzch Licensee. 1r.s omployces, ergetlts or i n v i ~ e s who
,
we reasonably engaged
in the construction, maintenance or operation of Licensee's communicat~onsfacilittes located on the lands nE Roben:
A. Hall and Brenda M Ha11 and Mark E! Hall and Anne C.Half (collectively, "Hall") on Blossom Mounta~n,may
egress and ingress and maintain said access road lo tts requlrernenxs 'The leased area ("'Leased Area") and access and
parking easement ("Access and Parking: Easement") located on the lands of Hall on Blossom Mountain are more
specifically described and depicted in Exhlb~lB to this Lrcense.
Consideration. Licensee shall pay to Licensor as consideration for use of the Licensed Area, Lhe sum of Twelve
Thousand Dollars ($12,000) per annum, payable to Lessor as Escrow Account No. 14426, in equal monthly
instullments of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) ench, due and payable in advance on the first day of each monrl~
and continuing during the Term of the License. The first monthly payment will commence effective the first day of
November. 1997. Licensor's address for paylrtent purposes is in care of Gridley's Escrow Service. Escrow Account
Number: 14426, 'I919 North m i r d Street. PO Box G, Coeur dlAlene, Idaho 83816-03 18.
Notice. Any notice or demand recluirecl to be given herein shall be made by certified or regisrcrcd mail, return
receipt requested, or reliable overnighr courier co the address of the respective parties set forth below:
Licensee;
Nex&l West Corp.
dba Nextel C o r n m i c a t i o n s
1750 112&Avenue NE,Skre C-100
Bellevue, WA 98004
Am.: ProperQ Manager

With a copy to:

At&:

Licensor:
Douglas or Brenda Lawrence
PO BOX 1027
Coeur dVAlene,Idatlo 83816-1027

Nextel Comm~nications,Znc.
1505 Farm Credit Drive
McLem, VA 22102
Legal Dept.. Contracts Manager

Licensed Area (the access road) is shown on a trketch attached ax Exhibit A to chi$ License.
A description of
Licensor and Licensee hereby agree that the Licensed Area may bc surveyed, at Licensee's sole option and cost. by a
licensed surveyor, and such survey shall then supplement Exhibit A and become a pay hereof and shall control to
describe the Licensed Area in the event of any discrepancy between such survey and the description of the boundary
of the Licensed Area conwined herein.

n ~ Lcense
s
is granted specificdly far the purpose of ingress, egress, msintanrng, altering, repairing and/or
raylacing an exisling and_paasuublc uccess road approximattfy S~flecn(151 feet w d e to provade unrestricted access
(Lrcensec acknawlerigcs that pasage &rough a lucked .date on Licensor's property may be required) from Signal
Pornt Road m Llccnsee's Leased Area and Access and Parking Essement located on the lands of Hall on Hiusom
Mounta~n In thxs context "hltertnrr, repalring andlor re~lacing,'"shaIl kc: Yirnrted to those actions r~~tsnnably
reqtlired
to maincailn the existing fi%ir?r,n(15) foot wine dirrClgravel access r o d 3n a safe md passable condit~on.
Term of Llcense. This License shall be irrevocable unless tetmlnared as provlded herein, for an lnilaal term of five (5)
years commsnctng an November 1, 1997 (the "'Xnirial Term"). Licenser?.sttali have the riphr to extend the rrrevocable
L~censebeyond the Initial Term for five ( 5 ) successive five (5) year per~ods(each a "Rencwal Term") pursuant to the
same terms and condlrions contained herein, except that the mounl of ~ o n ~ i d e r a t ishall
~ n be increased at the
beginning of each Renewal T e r n by an amount equal to fifteen percent (15%) of thc consideration of thc prevlnus
Term (or Renewal Term) Thts License shall automatically be extended for each successwe Renewal Term unless
Licensee n ~ h f i e Licensor
s
of its intentjon not to renew prlor to the commencement of the succesd~ngRenewal Term.
Warranties and Covcnimts of Licensee. Liccnsce warrants and covenants that througha~~r
Ehc term of this ticcnse,
Licensee shall maintain comprehensive tiability insurance, naming Licensor as an additional insured, protecting and
indemnifying Lice~lsorand Licensee against. claims and liabilities for injury, damage to persons or properry, Or fctr the
loss of life or of property occurring upon the. Licensed Area resulting from any act or arnission of Licensee. Such
insurance shall afford minimum protection of not less than One Million Dollars (%1.000.000.00) per occurrence and
Two Million Dollars f%2,000,000.00) aggregate. Licensee shall prcvide to Licensor u certificate indicating t h ~
applicable coverage, upon request.
Licensee further warrants and covenants that Licensee, its employees, agenrs or invitees will (i) not cut or rernave any
trees except as provided hcrcin: (ii) promptly repair and restore any damilge to Licensor's P~.opcrtycuuved by ia
w~llfulor negligent acts; (iii) use Licensed Area only for travel lo and from its Leased Area; (iv) nor discharge
firearms or ocher weapons bxcept to protect life or property; (v) not w~llfullyin~ureor destroy animals or wildlife on
Licensor's Property; (vi) not discharge hazardous materials, toxic substances or dump any forcign material onto
L~censor'sProperty in violation of any law or regulation; (vii) not sublet, assign, or grant ingress and egress across
Licensed Area to any person or entity not reasonstbly involved with the operation, maintennnce, or ropiiir of Licensee's
comunication facility.
Liability and Indemnification, Licensee shald at all times comply with all laws and ordinances and all rules and
regulations of municipal, state and federal governmental aurhoriries rclacing to the installation, maintenance, use.
operation, and removal of improvements authorized herein, and shall fully indemnify Licensor against any loss, cost
or expense which may be susmined or incurred by Licensor as a result of Licensee's failure to comply with such laws,
ordinances, rules or regulations while traveling across or performing maintenance in Licensed Area.
This License may be llerrninnted without panalty on thirty (30) days prior written notice by either party up011 defnult of
any covenant or term hereof by the other party, which default is not cured within (60) days of receipt of written notice
of default. Licensee may terminacs: this License wirhour further liabi1il.y for any reason, or no reason upon the giving
of thirty (30) days written notice to Licensor, provided Licensee is not then in material breach of its warrantics or
cuvenmts.

Licensee shall also have the right from time to time to cul: and remove irees that have fallen or are at risk to fall, which
may injure, endangor or interfere with the access over rhe Licensed Arcu. Licensee shall also have she right from rime
to rime to C ~ andfor
E
remove undergrowth and other obsttuccions. whether on said Licensed Area or that are
reasonably adjacent thereto not to extend beyond twenty feet from the ccnncr of the road, which may injure, cndangm
or interfere with the access over the Licenmd Area. In any case a11 wood remains the property of rhe Licensor and
shall be left at side of road where cur.
Norwithstanding the foregoing. this License shall not restrict or consuain the Licensor from constructing any gate,
cap-gate, entrance pillars, or other construction or ins~rurnentcapable of limiting or prevent in^ road access to any
person not covered by this License. Additionally, this License shall nor resuicr the Licensor from changing any lock

Slrc

Numc Bins!ifliv, Wo~nWnlUull
St* Nn: lfZ~H?ib'-3

or lockrng device st any ilme as the L~~c;e;n%or
sees fit. Licensor agrees lo prevade Licensee with any keys,
cnmbinucrons, or other gale-openmg devices as requlrcd t'or 24 hour, scven (7) day a week access and passage across
said raad. Licensee agrees to des~gnate3 person or other single palnt sf cantact w i ~ hwhr~nlthe Licensor wrll m:lke
such devices avavuiiublc. Licensor shall not use or occupy the Licensed Area In any manner. which 1~filreasonakly
tn~edereswith Licensee" fxd1 ~nlrsyncnt:nf the r~ghrsh.-,z~bygrantell
~ s s i g n m e n t L~censdcmay not assign or otherwise transfer 811 or &try p u t of its Interest In this 1,tcense 01- In the
Llcensed Area without the prior written consent of Licensor; provided, however, chat L~censeemay assrgn rts Inrerest
to 11s parent company, any strbsidiwy or dfilia~ear to any successor-ln-interest or entity acqulrlng fifty-one percent
(51%) or more of its stock ot assets, subject to any financ~ngentity's Interest, if any. rn thts License and Licens~cmay
assign, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate or orherwise transfer without consent its ~ ~ E ~~r lthis
S ~License
S K to ally
financing endty, or agent on behalf of any financing enuty to whom I,icensee (i) has obligations for borrowed moncy
or in respect of guaranties &ereof, (11) bas obligations evidenced by hunds, debncures, notes or sim~larinstruments, or
(lit) has oblrgations under or with respect to lettcrs af med~t,bankers acceptances and sinllar facilities or in respect of
guaranties thereof. Licensar may assign this License upon wntten notice to Licensee subject to the asslgnee assurnlng
all af Licensor's ohl~gationsherein
This License is nor to be considered an easeltlttnr appurtenant to Licensee's interest in Licensee's Leiwed Area and
Access and Parking Easement on th:: lands of Hall on BIossam Mountain and creates no easement or other interest in

Licensed Area upon termination.
U\T TESTIMONY WHEREOF.Chis insrrument is executed an this the

LC

J ~ W

.. 2997.

day of

Licensee:

Licensor:

Nexrel West Corp.,
a Delaware corporation.

Douglas P. Lawrence
Brenda J. Lawrence

Federal Tax ID N O ~ ~5C .
WITNES

3 fS '

sLkgb.-bb-

WITNESS :

ALL SIGNATURES MUST BE A C W O W E D O E D

On this
day of
,l
a before me. personally appeared Perry Sntterlee. known ra
me to be the president, of the corporabon that executed the insrmmenr or rhe pwson who executed the Instrument on
behaif al' s a d coporation and acknowleriged to me that such covorstxon executed the s m e .

W I m S S my hrrnd and

STAIE OF IDAHO
) ss.

County of Kootenai

3d

1

m&

/M

On this
day of
, l 9 n b e f o r e me,
j
J
k
'
the undersigned Nordry Public, personalty appemd Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, husband and wife
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within ins~ument,and acknowledged to me they
executed the same.

Commission expiras:

&&-&

EXHIBIT A

B
to the Access License Agreement dated
I. Lawrence, husband and wife
Communications (Licensee).

1997, by and beween Douglas P. Lawrcncc and Brenda
West Corp.. a Delaware corporation, d.b.a. Nextel

The Licensed Area (Access Road) is described and/or depicted as follows:

UQtK
I.

This Exhibir may be replaced by a land survey upon the receipt and approval of survey by Licensor and Licensee.

The Leased Area m d Access and P a k ~ n gEasement locared on the lands of Ha11 on Bl
spec~ticailydescribed and depicted in Exhibit B to the Access License Agreement dated
and between Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, husband and wife (Licens
Delaware corporation, d.b.n. Nexrel Comunt;cahons(Licensee).
The Leased Area and Access and Parking Eascrncnt is described andfor depicted as follows:
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Mt' and Mrs t)ori~lat.l..,
I,awrcncr:
p.r;j, L ) ~ X1027
Coeur d%Aiene. tdattu 838 16- I027

Access ticcrlsc Agrccmcr~lritlted November.3, 1 997, (rhe "Agraament")
cxccuted by k i d berween Do~tglnsP. I,ow~.c~ice
~indBrenda J , L&wrc~rcc.
Iicisbitnsl and w i k , i t . "l.,iccr~sor",and Nextel West C:orp., w Dolawa~~e
cor'parnti~n,d.13.~.Ncxtel Co~nmunications"Licens~a"{-'N~x~x~~l'');

Rc;

Spnctl-~r.S;ire
Tnwcr ln Nnlnbsl. IU-t 008, tjlossolr~Mctilnrair~

r>asrl*Mr. and Mrs.

L~rwrci!cc:end Mr. Muck:

I'lease find ~ h crrclnsr,d
c
letter dated Ja~~uary
9, 2003 Fraln Ncxrcl crrnfiruvring SpttctraSirr:
C o i n m t ~ n i ~ n t ~i ~I I~Ci ~. (s'Sp~~tr~Site'')
', ~
rights it1 and to the Licenuw Ad;rs&vcnrrcfcrcr.rcedabove.
'I'heassignment oftha Agrc~rrrcrrrto SpkctenSitc and the co~.raspo~~ding
pityntant of tt\c 1.iceosc
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c to correct the above problem.
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Ypactm.Sitc hareby reqtrcsh imrnccli&lcacccss to thtc site to ndclrass tha FAA i s u t t t . Plc~accontact
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the &%ay

of November, 2007. 1 caused ta be

served a true and correct copy of t h e foregoing by the method iadicared below,
and addressed trs the ffoiiowing:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d ' Alene, ID 8381 4
Via:

U.5, Mail, postage prepaid

\/ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
Personally sewed

jOWN P. YVMEMN, P,C,
2 1 3 N, 4" Street
Coeur d'Ailene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KQOTENAl
CASE NO. CV-03-4621

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P, WHEIAN
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S

Plaint iff,

WENWED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

DATE:

November 28, 2007

TIME:

3:00 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

Defendants,

STATE OF IDAHO

1
)

County of Koore nai

ss,

1

I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHElAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO
RENEWED MOTION F O R SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1

PlAINTIFF'S

1.

Lawrence.

t am f h e attorney Par Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda
I have personal knawledge of the following facts and cauld

competently testify.

This affidavir is oflereeil in support of Defendants'

oppositirczra t o PlaintifFs renewed matican for summary judgment,

2.

Attached ro this Affidavit as Exhibit A are true and correct copies of

a portion of the deposition of Harold Funk.

DATED this

I T d a y of November, 2007.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P,C,

JOuhe'
A tarne for Defendants

Subscribed and sworn before me this -&day of November, 2007,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION T O PLAINTIFF'S
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

-2

IN

THE

T H E DISTRICT COURT OF

F I R S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT,

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, T N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Plaintiff,

1

,

.

'

vs .

... . , ,
,

DOUGLAS

',,.'
'

,
,

,

.

I

.

,

I

.

,

,

.

I . ~ a s e : . N o .C V - 0 3 - 4 6 2 1

. .
,

P . 'LAWRENCE"a n d 'BRENDA J.
,

.

)

,

LAWRENCE, h u s b a n d and wife,

,,

REPORTED B Y ;

E-xblbif
CSR do. 2 3 6 , .P P R

TAUNA K. TONKS,

,.

.

Notaky Public

Court
Reporting
Service, Inc.

'

. SOUTHERN ,

NORTHERN

,

1-800-23Q.8BI f
.. POCATELLO, ID.',,
E'E~OISE.
200-3?S-Mll
ID
'
200-232-6601,'

.

TWIN FALL$ ID
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,

'

200-734-1700.
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503-861-1700
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1-80043781700

,
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Sisce 1970

Registered ~tofessionalReporters

,

8

,

..&EuR. D'ALENE, ID
208-785-17W

,

,.

SPOKANE,WA
508-455-45 15

I

do ir and just ask you if I'm doing it right.
?
I've marked the S i g a l Point Road m
3 yellow -1

'

:

A. U r n - b .

Q , -- okay? And J sroppcd marking; it
5 where the road forked in the vicinity of Blossom
Mowmain. This orher iogglng road I'd like to
1 mark and identifjr it as being in blue: okay?
1
'4- l h n - b .
I
Q marking) Now. did I properly mark the
logging toad in blue ink?
A Xt looks to be,
Q. Okay. When you bought the property,
how many rlmes were you at the propem before
you closed a deal on it?
A. Maybe 10. As f s as Synergsics'

1 one gate'
A. Urn-

j 2

4

I 5

)

. Wil, bere was only one gate.

3 That's right herc on this corner (indicating).

I 67
i8
9

Q- W s that the gare &at was on she ad
p r o p e q l Do you remember -A.Yes.
Q. -- Wilbur Mead?
A. yes, urn-hmm
Q- Okay. A n d that was the anly gate you

1 la encountered in drivmp to Blossom Mom-in?
A. Yes.

11

1 12
! 15
'

Imd?

16
I17

Q. Na, no. I'm raIking about when you m d
Mrs. Funk bought the land in the first place in

'

1 18

1969, did you go up and look at the land before
you bought it?
A. Yes. X djd, yes.
Q. How many times did you go up and take a
look ar it?
2 2 1 P t-~lr;,tr~dtnr

Q*

I take it, was lhat gate opened

13 with he key that the realtor had?
14
A. Yes,

19

Q. And then you continued driving on -A, Yes.

Q -- to the property?
A. Yes.
Q,Okay. And did you park and walk around

20 the property?
21
A. WeI1, we paxked on top and looked over

1

22 the property. It was -- you know, it's steep
23 and ...
24
Q. Okay. Were you able to get a pretty
--

Page 20
Q. And the realtor took you up there?
A. Urn-hmm.

1
2

A. Ycs.
Q. So you parked pretty high up, then?

Q. Is rhar yes?
A. Yes.
Q. And did the realtor dnve up there?

3
4

A. U r n - h .
Q. Is that yes?

5

Yes
Q. And the realtor was this young guy, who

6

A. Yes.
Q-Was that close to the CTE -A. Yes.

A.

brought you this investment opportunity?
A. Ycs.

Q. Do you recall, as you dmve up the
rnounain, what route did you take; do you recd?
Was iz: the GTE route?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, Naw, as I understand it, there
were gates on that route.
A. Yes.
Q, Were there gates here rhc firsr lime
you drove up to the mountain?
A. Yes, but it seems like he had a key.
Q. The realtor?
A. Yeah.
Q.Okay. So you remember coming to some
gates as you're driving up towards the mowtajn.

7

j 8

/

1

9

12

;6

Q. -- facility?
A. Yes.
Q. You parked right there.
A. Urn-hmm. Yes.
Q.Okay. A;nd that GTE facility is still

13 up there, as I understand?
14
A, Yes,
15
Q. And it's still in the same location?
16
A. It was the last time X kncw about it,

, 17
/ 18
/

19

I

23

21
,2
202

A. Yes.

24

Q. And the realtor had a key to at least

25

yes.

Q. Okay. So they didn't build anything
new or anythrng. X haven't been up &ere lately.
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Okay. How long did you walk around the
property when you drove up before you b o d t the
property?
A. 15 minutes.
Q. Okay. So after you looked at the

M Lfi M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, N C .

(208)345-8800 (fax)
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Page 25 1
1 regarding the transaction, sa 1'11 ga though
2 t h i s and you can tell me if this is your
3 recoiiection

1 ,Mountain access road? Is that the letter you're
rer"efing to?
A. Well, could we hold a minute?

2
3
4
5

4

The first payment was received from
5 Human Synergistics July 1st, 1976; does rhiat
6 sound absut right?
7
: It does to me, yes.
a
SS; f he would h o w ,
3
b4R. %WLAN. Okay. So E can take that
10 up wkh her. Okay.
a1
Q. (BYb4R. W L A h 3 Now, betwem the time
12 you bought the property and Lhe time you sold it
13 to Human Synergist~cs,how many tlmes did you go
14 up to the property?
15
A. Well, we'd always go up and pick
16 hucklebenics and stuff, and 'rarget practice
17 and -- X don't know. 1 woutd have to guess
18 maybe. I don't know, 29,30 times.
19
Q. In the two-year period? Well, three
20 years since 1969. I'm sorry. Six-year period,
21 from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on
22 top of the mountain?
23
A. I would suppose, yeah.
24
Q. Okay. And how did you get up there
-24 p a w ? Wac: it T ~ P
Page 26
1 initially?
2
A. Yes.
3
Q. You took the
4
A. Yes.

5

7
8

9

10
11

12
23
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

A

Ypc

Page 28

GTE road?

Q. Did you have a key?

8
MRS. FUNK. There's a letter here
9 float~ngaround on the table.

IMR. WHET;&':

6

Q. Sure.
(A discussion was held oR the record
between the wjtness and Mrs. Funk.)
MR.
LAN: Let's go back on the
record, then.
Q. (BY MI?., M L A h y Okay. Do you think
you initidly obtained a key from GTE to access
that gate?
A. Yes, very definitely.
Q. Okay. And was that right when you
bought the property?
A. Yes.
Q. And then at some point, someone changed
the lock.
A. Yes.
Q. And was that GTE?
A. Yes.
Q. So GTE sent you a new key?
A.Yes.
Q. And that new key was sent to you with
h s July 13tb, 1992 letter?

1
Q. And you used that key to open the gate
2 to arrsrr your property.

6:
A. Ycs.Ith~nk1hadmyownlockwithmy
7 own key And yet they did send me a key.

10
11

Page 27

3

I

Okay.

THE WITNE3S: Maybe I did use thas key.

A,Yes.

4
Q. Okay. Now, after you sold the property
5 to Human Synergistics in 1975, did you continue
6 to go up to the propercy?
7
A. Yes.
a
Q. And how many times did you go up to the
9 properjl between 1975 and, say, 19807
10
A. Well, not many, because we moved back
11 here in the: fall of -- you &Mt,but 1 came
12 downaad -13
MRS. FUNK: '75, wasn't it?
THE WITNESS: iwas going to build a
15
house
here for the famiIy; we were moving back.
l4
Q. (BY MR. WHELAN) Here in American
17 Falls?

12 But however ~twas, I've had other properties,
13 and we cut the chams and put on a padlock, see.
14
Q.(BYMR.WHELAN)Okay. Soyouthink
15 you had a key to the gate?
16
A. We must have used that one, because I
17 got it (indicating).
10
Q. Okay. You're refemng to the key
18
A. L'm-&.
l6
' 19
Q. Yes?
19 that's taped to the letter that's an .the table
20 from GTE?
20
M R S . FUNK: Aberdeen, you mean.
21
A Yes.
21
THE WETNESS: Well, we ended up in
22
22 Aberdeen first, yeah, because my dad's business
Q. Now, I'm going to pull out that letter
23 and just refer to that. Xow, is what you're
23 was over there.
24
Q. (BY MR. W L A N ) So you moved fiom
24 referring to is there's a key taped to a July
25 13th. 1992 letter from GTE regarding the Blossom
25 Spokane to Aberdeen in 1977?
(205) 345-8800 ( f a )
(208) 345-96 1 1
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Page 31

I

i.

2
3 gaduated

--

e daw.
Ye&. After the girls

I

1 moved down here. you wcre able to get up to the
2. top o f the nomtain t w or
~ t h e e times in the

I 3 next five years'?

4

THE WTTN-ESS: Yeah, you came down. I
5 moved you down in '75,yeah. I bought Bad out,
6 yeah. in the fall of '75.
7
Q.(BY;Mft.
d you moved
8 to American Fail
9
A. Yes.
10
Q. Thefaliof1976?
11
A. Well, the spring, after school was aut.
12
Q. Okay. Sprlng 19'76 you moved to
13 Aberdeen.
14
MRS. FUNK: Aberdeen,
15
Q. (BY MR. M L A N ) Okay. And how long
16 after did Mrs.Funk move down here as well,
17 assuming that she -18
A. Well, that's when I moved her down,
19 after school let out.
20
Q. So you had come down -21
A. I came down in the fall of '75.
22
Q. Fall of '75. Okay. And then you moved
23 IW.Funk to the property in the spring of 1976.
24
A. Yeah.

,
/

A. Yeah. Urn-hmm, that rounds about nght.
Q. And that would put us to, Like, 1981 or

I 4

j

'I

5
6

7
8

9

' 10

/ 11

I

14
15
16
17
10

19
20

21
22
i 23

24

so?
MRS. FUNK: U r n - h .
Q. (BY MR. W L A N ) Okay. Kow. afier
1981, did you visit the property very much?
bfRS. FmK: No. That's when he got
cancer, in '82.
THE W I N S S : Yeah, I was pretty sick.
I didn't know whether I would make it or not.
bfRS. FlJNK: So he never made it back.
Q. @Y MR. !MEIEw Okay. So after 1981,
you didn't go back to the top of the mountain?
A. No.
Q. Okay, What business did you IUII here
in Aberdeen?
A. Irrigation.
Q. Irrigation. So -A. Yeah, pumps and irrigation, machine and
fabrication. I had three businesses. 1990 1 was
the man o f the year for the Idaho h g a t i o n
n

Page 32
1

MR. W L A N ; June. Okay.

1

2

2
Q. (BYMR, WI-EEL,4iN) Now, after you moved
3 down to Aberdeen, did you continue to visit the
4

5

6
7
0
9

10
11
12

13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22

23
24

top of the mountain frequently?
A. Oh, God, I was so busy -MRS. FUNK; No, you didn't.
THE WI'TNESS: -- I knew X shouldn't.
But we went our two or three times, and we went
out on the property. But in the business I had,
I couldn't do much traveling or -- I r ~ a stuck
s
liere.
Q. (BY MR. W L A N ) Okay. So you stated
that you visited the property two or three times
after you moved down here?
A. Yes,
Q. Now, over what period of time, though?
The next 10 years or so7
A. I remember I sold the Spokane house to
Mall, and I went up there for that reason on part
of the trips.
TEE \;L?.TNESS: But five years, within
five years?

6

7
8

9
10

I

11
1 12

I

13
14

1 :56
I

17

18
I

19
20
21
22

23
' 24 t h ?
1 25
A. 1 didn't, no.
M & M COURT RBPORTING SERVICE, NC.

MRS. FUNK: Withn.
TKE WITN5SS: Yeah.
Q. (BY MR. WLm Okay. So after you

25
(208) 345-961 1

3
4
5

Q. Congratulations.
A, So 1cvas busy.
Q, Okay. And I've never been down to
this -- well, the last time I was down in this
part of f W o was 30 yeas ago, and I notice it's
a lot of agricultural use down here.
A. Yes.
Q. So you supplled the local fanners with
irrigation equipment and the like?
A.Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. And if you've ever noticed these pivots
with the drop nozzles? We started that.
Q. Oh, really?
A. Yeah. We had Bart Nelson irom Wdla
Walla come down and I told him what I wanted.
And we picked up 7 percent efficiency by holding
the water down when it was up on top, because a
Lot of it -MR. LAWRENCE: Would blow away.
THE W1;NESS: Yes.
MR. LAWRENCE: h4akes sense.
Q. (BY MR. WHELAN) So you got a patent an

551
(208) 345-8800 ( f ~ )
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a
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Page 41
Was hat a dawn payment on the Imd7
A. Tnat must have bcen just a iittlc, so
3 mmy feel by so many k e t or does ~r sav how
4 much?
5
Q Ir says an acre
6
A. Acre. Yeah, that must have been just
1 one paymcnt. I don't h o w .
8
Q , Now, Rasmussen was the doc~ar?
9
A. KO.No.
10
LANe M a t was the doctor's
11 n m e ?
12
CE: Someland.
13
MR.
: Sonnelmd.
14
TME W m S S : Right.
15
Q. (BY MR. YvWELAV Is ~ arhe
r doctor you
16 were referring fa?
17
A. Right. And he's right next to the
18 tower.
1
2

Page 43

Q.Okay. And that's bow you did the
j 1
j 2 trmsactions?

--

4

19

Q. Right next to the tower. Okay.
A. On the east side.

0.NOW,does the name John Rook rlng a
bell? D o you ranember m w n g a b ~ uRook?
t
: He w with Idaho

TNESS: She says I&o

m.
a

20

AYeah

3

11

1

12
13

i 14

//

15
16
17
18

119
' 20

LAN) Okay, that was
Mr. Rook. And then I think Idaho Broadcutins
became Kootenai Braiadcasting?
IvIRS, FUNK: Yeah, they changed the name
so many rimes, ir's hard to keep mck.
MR. WHELAN: Okay. But it started as
Idaho Broadcasting, and then wcnt to Koolenai
Broadcasting, and then I think to something else.
& R S . FLaW: Yes
Q. (BY MR. WEELAN) Okay. And that party
bought rhe five-acre parcel, as 1understand it.
A. I bclicvc that's conect.

Page 4 2 !

-

Electric paid you at least a $500 deposit
A. U r n - h .
Q. -- on the sale of a one-acre parcel, it
looks like from this.
A. That might have been full price on rhar
one. Bur rhere was a parcel that atas about five
acres.
Q. Yeah, that was tlze one, I think, you
said was sold to Kootenai Broadcasting.
M R S . F W : Here, this is where that
Mr. Rook comes from (handing document).
MR. WHELAN; Okay. T l a d you, ma'am,
And Mrs. Funk has been kind enough ro
hand me a copy of a warranty deed to Idaho

Broadcasting. And that is a deed dated September
22, 1989.
Q. (BY MR. WITELAN) Mr. Funk, when you
sold off these smaller parcels, did you take any
of those people out to the top of the mouatain?
A. Well, when I got busy, no, I didn't,
after bur I scc a Notary Public in Aberdeen

--

that signed this.
Q. Okay.
A. And so the paperwork was sent back and

forth.
(208) 345-96 1 1
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I

1 Wj tbur Mead; da you remember that7
2
A, Yes.
3
Q, W a t do you rcmcmbcr about that?
4
A. The realtor got him to -- t h s was a
5 check ro Wilbur.
6
Q. T h s was a check lo Wilbur. Okay.
7
A. And there was some description of what
8 it covered, but that was to pay far the ingress
9 and egress.
10
Q. You purchased 3x1 easement from Mr. Mead
11. to cross his land?
12
13

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And why did you do that?

14
A. Because I wanted to make sure that 1
15 had ingress and egress to the land, so I wasn't
16 landlocked.
17
Q. Okay. Now, before 1972, did Mr. Mead
18 just let you drive across h s property; is that
19 how it went? And then hc stoppcd you at some
20 point, or what happened?
21

A. NO, he never stopped us, no. No.

22
Q..But you decided to purchase an easement
23 from h m . There was nothng that caused that to
24 happen; you just decided to do it?

25

A. Yes. IwantedtobesureIhadan

M & M COURT S P O R T M G SERVICE, INC.
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on kii;propeq, too?
A No, there w a s no gate here. The a d y
3 gate there .was i s right here ( g o i n ~ a ) .

Page 51

i

1
2

1
A. I: believe that's correct.
2
Q. Okay. And X'm going to mark that in
3 blue h d I'd like to stop where the gate is. so

0. hdyou'repointingtori&there~
5
A. It was p i n g up to the telephone
6 company.
7
Q. Up to the -- okay. So it was around
8 here someplace? Someplace around here was a

4

4

5
6
7

8

gate.
A. Well, right there, as I remember
il (indicating).
Q Oh, T see. So this road here -- okay,
!2
3 here, we've got a clean copy, so we'll be able to
.4 mark this for t!ne rccord.
5
(Exhibit 2 was marked.)
,6
*MR.W L A N : Qkay. HopefiIly this wll
7 be a linXe easier.
8
Q. (BY MR. W L & 7 Mr. Funk, I'd like to
9 show you a copy of the -- a clean copy of the
?O document we were just referring to. I've marked
?1 this as Exhibit 2. This is a blowup of a portion
!2 of Exktbit X that -- a p~rtionshowing Blossom
!3 Mountain, okay?
!4
A Urn-hmm.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

9
10

17
18
19
20
21
22

23

24

n ,% t h ! ~-v?

j

if you could -A. Rjght whcrc the M is on.,*

Q Right where the I( -- right here
(indicatung)?
A. Yeah.
Q. So the gate stops right where the -A. Whenever it meets the -Q. Right at the point, Now, what I'm
going to do i s I'mgoing to put a stat thcrc;
okay? (Makng) There's a star.
A. U ~ - ~ T I D I .
Q. And that's where the gate wa.s?
A. Urn-hmm.
Q. Is that yes?
A. YES.
Q. O b y . So I've marked in blue t h e route
that you took up to the mountain.
A. U r n - h .
Q. And I placed a srar next to the gate
that was on -- was that on Wilbur Mead's
property?

25

A

YE?r:

Page 50
A. Urn-hmm.
Q. And these are the roads that go wound
3 Blossom Mountain, apparent1y.
4
A. U r n - h .
5
Q. You've idtntificd h i s road to rhe east

Page 52

1
2

I:

5

6 as being the logging road rhat you remember; is

6

7 that true?
A, Yeah. It was in pretty poor shape, but
9 it was a road. yes.
0
Q. And then we have Signal Point Road
1 corning in, and rhcn it forks;okay?
2
A. Urn-hmm.
3
Q. Now, what I'd like to try to do is, if
4 you could, could you mark on blue the road that
5 you used to use to get to the mountain, just so X
6 could know which way you went? Or I can mark it
7 if you just tell me haw to do it.

7

a

9

A. It had to be t h s one (indicating).
Q. This lictlc part right here?

Yc&,
Q. Okay. So what I'm going to do, for rhe
'2 record. is I'mgoing to draw in blue ink, and you
3 tell me if I'mtmng the right road that you
4 would take to get to the mauntain, AJX I doing it
5 right?

'0

A.

'1

OR) 345-9611

M Bc

M

Q. Okay Well, that clarifies things s

1

2 little bit.

8

9
10
' 11

i

12
13
14
15
10
19

20
21

22
23

Now, do you rcmember any othcr gates?
A.No.No.
Q. And &.is gate w located right where
the blue
stops on this Exhibit 2 ; is that
true?
A. Yes. that's true.
Q. Okay. Now,you see down here how the
road dips into this other section?
A. Urn-hrun.

Q. And this is Section 28; okay?
A. Urn-hmm.
Q. Did you ever dnve across Section 28?
A. I'm sure X did, yes.
Q. Okay. Now,28 I don't think was owned
,,Mead.
A. No,
Q. Does the name Ulrieh sound fkmiliar;
XFX, Idaho Forest Industries? Any of that sotnld
familiar?
TEE3 WITNESS: Does it to you?
M R S . FUNK: I don't recall that.
Q. (BYMR. WkELAN) Okay. Well, let me
ask you ths now. When you drive up to the top

1 ::
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1 of rhe mounrain, you drive up ard you pass
2 though the gate.
-,

.Y

A,

6

A. Yen

Yes.
4
Q And thar's the gate that had the key
5 thar yoti recerved from GTE.
Q. Okay. Now, when you passed through
rhar. gate, would you ~ontinueto drive, or would
9 you jusr park?
10
'4. Continued to drive.
Q Okay. Now, where would you dnve to?
11
A, l i p to the where their tower was.
12
13
Q 0ka.y h d you were following the CTE
7

8

--

14 road?
15
.A Gm-hnm.

18
19
20
21 typically
22
A.Um-h.
23
Q , Is that yes?
24
A , Yes.
23
n nkav nid.yipr w a r

1 Section 28,

who owned the property in Section 28,

2 abour an easement to cross their property as
3 well?
4
A. His name was what again?
5
Q. I think it w a s -- oh, there it is right
5 thcrc. Ulrich. It's on this old Metsker map.
7 ,+ad I think that's U-L-R-I-C-H. William maybe,
0 Willlam, Bill Ulrich7
9
A. 1 don't think so.

aci

MRS. FIIMK: Doesn't sound familiar.

11
Q. (BY MR. WEELAN") Okay. So you never
12 approached Mr. Wlrich to obtain a n easement?
13
A. No I figured that while I hsd the
14 easement here (indicating)
15
Q. From Mead?
16
A. I could cut over.

--

--

17
18
19
20 to

21

Q. Because you had the Mead easement?
A, Yeah.
Q And you thought that gave you the right
drive as fw as you wanted on that road?
A. Sure. Absolutely.

25

hat?
A,

Yeah.

(208) 3A5-9611

/

1

A. So it would just go from there. Ir was
a little squiggly, as I remember, but it wasn't
3 just a straight line, as 1remember. It comes
4 kind of straight and then up, lund of up.
5
Q. Can you draw it in for me, or do you
1
2

6 \van7 me to do it?
7
A, fMarking)Thatwillwork.
6
Q. 0%. So for thc record, on Exhibit 2
9 you've drawn in a blue line going ro rhe rop of
10 the mountain.

11
12

A. U r n - b .
Q. Is that yes?

13

A. Yes.
14
Q. And that blue line represents the road
15 that you would take to t h e tog o f the mountain?
16
A. Yes.
17

Q. 'Okay. So you passed rhrough

rhe gate,

18 and thm you'd take %heroad to the top of the

19 mountain.
20
A. Yes.
21
Q. So you weren't passing across Section

22 28?
23
A. Not then. I continued on here m d went
24 around there a numbcr of times, but like 1 say, 1
25 assumed rhar we could build a road through there
(205) 345-8800 (fax)
M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC.

22
Q. And you thought that that wsu s grant
23 Porn Mr. Mead, that gavc you the righr to do
24

2

!

Q Is that yes?
A. It was even gravel.
Q. It was even gravel.
A. I think, Rock and everything.
Q Okay. And then you parked at the top,

16
17

Q. h d 3au paid the thousand dollass.
A But ir was my Imd then.
3
Q Yes Bur you didn't o w Section 26;
4 right? You didn't own any land in Secuon 28?
5
A. KO.
I
6
0. And you see how this road goes into
7 Section 7.8'7
' 8
A. Y e s .
9
Q. Okay. So you were passing through
/ 10 Section 28 whcn you would use this road and you
ii would park ai ihe top of the mountain?
12
A. Yes. Well, now 1 didn't cone in t h s
13 way. I[ came in this way (pointing).
14
Q. Let me see if X c m explain that.
15
A Because there was no road going from
I 16 here up,
17
Q. Okay.
16
A. I cornc in and park~dthcrc.
39
Q. Okay. I'd like to mark xhar: in blue
20 where you would come up. And if you can jusr
1 23. tell me haw to mark it, where do I start? Or you
22 canmark it.
23
A. Well, the telephone company must be
1

I
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1 if we had to, rftfus turned out to be
2 itnavailable (indicating).
3
Q. You're r e f e ~ n gto the road

1.

2 kind of told me I couldn't do that, but ...
3
Q. Okay. Now, just to refresh your
"iemory, tlGs. X ?kink,i s G o v e m e n r Lot 3, right
5 here,
6
A. Yeah.
7
g, So this road went over ecross your
8 Govement Lat 3; is that true?

on Section

4 2X?
5
A, Yeah,
6
Q, Okay. But there must have been some
7 kind o f a road here &at you drove to the top of
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17
18
19

20

21
22
23

24
25

the momtain on. That's the road you rode in?
A. Yeah.
Q. And that was there when you drove up to
the properties?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And just to be clear, this other
road, which is -- get my bearings. This other
road, which would be to the west -- wait a
minute, I'm messed up, too, here. I've got to
get my bearings.
A. Which one now7
Q. Okay. Yeah, now I've got it. I've got
to flip ir -- no, you've got it,
This road to the east, that would be
the -A. That's to the east, J X s is to the
south.

n Riohf%ntit

A. I'm thinking that somebody down here

9

10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

A. Yeah.
Q. And it was just in rough shape, though.
A. Yeah.
Q. h d historically, somebody had logged
the top of that mountain, right?
A. Yes.
Q,They were cutting trees up there?
A. Yeah.
Q. And they were hauling on that road,
that logging road?
A. Yes. But this was a number of years
before I bought it.
Q. Okay. So somebody had cut it over
f i s t and then sold it to you?
A. (Witness nodding head.)
Q. Okay.
AhT.

clkpv
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1
So this road to the east, this was the
2 logging road; right?

a

A.Yes,

4

Q. Now, I'm going to write that on this
5 Exhibit 2; okay?
6
A. Yeah.
7
Q, Write that right over the road:
8 "Logging road "
9
Now, did I mark that correctly?
10
A Yes.
11
Q. And where I wrote "logging road" in
12 blue ink along this road on the east side ofthe
13
14
15

16
17
18
19
20
21

22

23
24

25

(208) 345-96 1 1
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I

3

4

1

5
6
7
8

9

seG0*7THE WTNESS: That would be great.
MR. W L A N : Fair enough.
(A brief recess was taken.)
(Exhibit Nos. 3 through 10
were marked )
MR. VERNOK: h4i.Funk, 1just have a
few questions for you.
THE WITNESS: Okay.

10

11

ExfllwUNATION

12 QUESTIONS BY MR. VEEUSiON:
13
Q. I'mshowing you what's been marked as
14 Exhibits 3 and 4 to your deposition. And I think

--

mountain
A. Yeah.
Q. -- that was the road that you refemd
to previously?
A Yes.
Q. Okay,
A. I looked at this mountain here, and I
had thought maybe on opening this up and using
it. It was, like I say, overgown a little
and -- but X thought maybe I would take a
bulldozer and go in and open that up again and
come in that way, bur ...
Q. But you never did?

fnr

15 we have already talked about Exbibit 3. That
16 describes the property that you putchased in
17 1969; is that correct?

A. Yes.
Q, Okay. And just to make it clear for
20 the record, Exhibit 4 that we have highlighted -21 do you see tl?e portions in highlight here in
22 Exhibit 4?
23
A, This?
24
Q,Yes.
25
A. Now, wait a minute. Tk;s ' 2 1. Oh,
d3 3
4 7
M & M COURT REPORTlNG SERVICE, INC.
(208) 245-8800 (fax)
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1
4. Yes.
2
O. Okay, h d where w s it &at it started
3 being real rough. if you recall?
4
A. Xt was X know rkts was rough here; I
5 h o w it was rough (indlc&ing), They didn't
6 clean it ap.
7
Q. Well, let me ask you ths: From -- and
8 I'll draw this in later, but you can see where
9 I'm pobtinl;. From right in this area as the

1
Q,-- the top of lhe m o u n t ~ n ?
.?
A, Yes. Best o f my recollection, yes, 9
3 believe rhat is it.
4
Q, Okay. M e r e on EMbit 5 would the

5 gate be that we've talked about prior?
6
A. Rrght there (indicating). 1believe it
7 actually was at an angle, as I recollect. It was
8 at an angle.
9
Q. Okay. I'm going to draw a circle -lo
A, Yes.
11
Q. -- and I'm going to draw an m o w with
12 a11 X , h d what I've circled, is rhat the gate
13 that we have been discussing in this deposition?
14
A. Yes.
15
Q. Okay,
16
A. X believe it was actually set in just a
17 few feet, and it was at that angle, as I recall
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

5
2

(marking),
Q- Okay. So let's do this. I'm going to
draw an arrow to the line you just drew, and E'II
put M. Funk, Is that what you just drew in
tight there?
A Yes
Q. Okay. h d then after that gate, do you
thi q

--

--

lo road~comesback into Section 21, was it well
11 maintained as it came back into Section 2 l ?
12
A. Wow, let's see. I wish 1 co~Ad
13 remember exactly.
14
Q. Ibis is what I want to get to,
15 Na.Funk. If we: look at: Exhibit 2 -- do you see
16 Exhibit 2?
17
A. Urn--.
18
Q. Okay. On Exhibit 2, didn't you say
19 where the st= was, was where the gate was?
20
A. Yes.
21
Q, Now, on Exhibit 6, do you see where you
22 drew in the gate?
23
A. Urn-hmm.
24
Q. Okay. You drew in the gate over here.
?
'
t
s
-
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A. Yes.
A. IS this the section line?
2
Q. --rotid?
Q. Yes, I believe that is the section
3
A. Absolutely, yes. Very well maintained
line.
4 road.
A. What's this other line?
5
Q. I guess what I'mgetting at is -- Ids
Q. I am not sure. Do you feel comfortable
6 go back to Exhibit 2 , Do you recall Exhibit 2?
on Ehibit 6 that you drew the gate in at the
correct place?
7
A. Urn-hmnt.
8
Q. Yes?
A. It was on the edge of that land, I know
9
A. Yes.
that, !that 669. When it was there or there, I
10
don't!know which represents the border, but it
Q. Okay. And I guess what I'm getting at
11 is: You say this is a very we11 maintained road;
looks like that ww.
12 is that correct?
Q,Let's go back to Exhibit 2. This road
13
A. Well, I'm nor -- it was, yes. This
that you drew in here, do you agree with me that
14 continued, as X remember, but not very -- I don't
Exhibit 2, it doesn't show on the exhibit itself
15 know. This was pretty bad, I h a w that I just
a road drawn bn; that you just drew that road in
16 never used it much. I always went in here
with a pen?
17 (pointing).
A, Yes. Now, you have to understand that
18
the
telephone
company built that road.
MR. WLm: Let rhe record reflect
19 that the wtness was pointing to the portion o f
Q Okay.
A. So if it was crooked here, they might
20 the road in Section 28 that goes around the
21 mountain.
have ,straightenedit. See what I mean?
22
Q. (BY Mli. VERNON) Let's talk about this
Q. Right,
23 section o f road right here. You indicated that
A. Because h t was a built road. I mean,
24 you did drive on that section from time to time;
they had a road grader up there and graded it.
25 is that correct?
Q, And when you're talking "that was a
6 (208)345-8800(fax)
(208) 345-96 11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIALDISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND
BRENDA LAWRENCE TO
RENEWED MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF
PLAlNTlFF

VS"

,

CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,
DATE: November 28, 2007
Defendants.

TIME:

3:00 p.m.

JUDGE: John T. Mitchell

Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through

their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, submit the following opposition to
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment:

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Tower Assets Sub, Inc.'s unveriiriedillomplaint alleges that it "has a vested
leasehold interest in certain real property leased from Robert and Brenda Hall."'
As the alleged holder of a leasehold interest, Plaintiff seeks to establish that it
has a right to cross the land of Defendants under theories of easement by
necessity, by implication or by prescriptive use.* Plaintiff has previously alleged
that it had an express easement, but that theory was rejested on appeal.
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ruled in this case that Tower
would not have standing to seek to quiet title to the land owned by Lawrence or
~ a 1 1 ,Ye.t
~ Tower persists in its efforts to esrablish an easement for the Ha//

Page 1, paragraph I, of Plaintiff's Complaint. No evidence has been offered in support
of this allegation, The statute of frauds requires leaseholds i n duration of one year or more to
be in writing. [Idaho Code 9-503).

Second, third and fourth Causes of Action of Plaintiffs Complaint, No admissible
evidence has been offered that Plaintiffhas been granted any interest whatsoever in the land at
issue in Plaintiff's Complaint. Ar best, Plaintiff has established that it may have a leasehold
interest in land owned by Hall. The deed to Hall (marked as Exhibit U ta the Affidavit of Weeks)
makes no mention of the Lawrence parcel. If Hall has no right to use the Lawrence parcel, Hall's
leaseholders would have no rights either. Hall is not a party t o this action.
The Supreme Coun ruled as follows: "Tower will have standing t o seek iniunstive
relief if It can establish it has an alleged legal right t o benefit from the Blossom Mountain road
easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives Its right to use the alleged
easemenr from i t s lessor, Hall*. (Emphasis Added). Tower Asser Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 143
ldaho 71 0 (2007).

-

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF
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5.11

parcelunder theories of casement: by necessity or implication. That is, Tower
attempts to quiet t i t l e to the Hall and Lawrence parcels, as opposed to merely

seeking an injunction t o enjoin an inte~erencewith a demonstrated access. Hall
has no established easement by necessity or by implication. Therefore, he

cannor lease or assign those rights to others, and Tower has no standing to
create such rights.
Accordingly, the only theory of easement that can be advanced by Tower
would be a theory based on prescriptive use.
The opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence is based on this
memorandum, the court records and the affidavits that have been filed on behalf

of Defendants in this action.

PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED "UNDISPUTED FACTS"
Many of the facts alleged by Plaintiff as being "undisputed" are not
supported by the record in this action. However, rather than addressing each

erroneous fact here, Defendants would invite the Court's attention to the
admissih/e partions of t h e affidavits

and the competent and admissible evidence

In this action.

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA WWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF
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PEFEFSDANTHARTIAL STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS;_

1.

Since 1966, General Telephone has had a deeded right to use an

access road that crosses the Lawrence parcel rn section 21. (See Affidavit of
Weeks-Exhibits

2.

V, W and X).

General Telephone has a legal right to cross sections 21 and 28 (see

Exhibit "X"-Affidavit

of Weeks); whereas Funk has never had the right to cross

section 28, (See Affidavit of John P. Whelan and Funk deposition pgs. 54-56, 59

and 66).

3.

There i s no evidence that Section 2 8 was ever owned by Funk,

therefore there i s no unity of title in this case.
4.

The owner of Section 28 i s not a party to this action.

5.

Contrary to the allegations made, Funk has always had access to his

lands from Mellick Road.

6.

Funk is not a party to this action.

7.

No clear and convincing evidence has been offered to establish a

prescriptive easement.

8.

Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the Lawrences land and obtain a

judgment that it has the right to cross section 28 and the Lawrence parcel via
the road used by CTE.

9.

In 1975, Funk moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls,

Idaho, where he has resided since. (Funk Deposition, hereinafter "FD" 28:20 to
29:24);
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA W R E N C E TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 4

47

10.

After moving to American Fails, Funk visited his land an Glossom

Mountain only two or three times

1 1,

(FD 3 8 : 2 5 to 31 :4);

Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land since 1981 (FC)

31 - 1 7)

1 2.

Funk acknowledged that the access road was gared (FD 1 8: 1 4 ro

1 3.

Funk obtained a key from GTC to use t h e access road (FD26:3 to

194).

28:12).
14.

Mead gave Funk permission as well (FD 44:17 t o 44:2 1).

15.

Funk identified the portion of t h e access road u s e d (FD 51 : 1 1 to

5 1 :25).
16.

Funk never talked to Ullrich about the use of Section 28; Funk did

not own land in Section 28; and Funk did not cross section 2 8 for his access (FD

54:1 1 to 54:21; S S : 4 to 55:s; S9:Q to 56:23).

17,

Funk did not use the portion of the access road crossing the

Lawrence parcel (FD 66:15 to 66:Zl).

STANDARD

FOR SUMMARY lUDCMENT

Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable people could
reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference from the evidence, as
summary judgment is proper where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of

OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF
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material fact. Farm Credit ofSpokane v, Sl;tvenron, 1 2 5 Idaha 2 70, 869 P.2d

1365; Rule SbS(c), ldaho R. Civ. P.
Summav judgment is only proper if the pleadings, depositions,

and

admission on the file together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter sf law, 1.R.C.P 56(c).
If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court

should grant rhe motion 'for summary judgment. Farm Cfedif Bank v, Stevenson,
1 25 ldaho 270, 272, 896 P.2d 1 365, 1 367 (1 994).

STANDINe(l

The issue of standing is jurisdictional.

Van Walkenburgh v. Citizens for

Term Limits, 135 ldaho 121, 124, 1 5 P.3d 1 1 2 9 , 1 1 3 2 (2000). T h e issue of
standing may be raised ar any time. Hoppe v, McDonald, 103 ldaho 33, 35, 644
P.2d 3 5 5 , 3 5 7 (1 982). Only the owner of the dominant estate has standing to

quiet rille to aur easement appurtenant to thar estate. Beach Larefa/ Waref Users
Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 ldaho 600, I 30 P.3d 1 1 3 8 (2006).
There are but two types of easements:

(1)

Easements in gross; and

(2)

Appurtenant easements.

OPPOSITION OF DOUGUS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PlAINTlFF
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An

easemenr in gross, is persanal Po t h e easement holder. King v* Laogt 1 2 5

Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 695 ( 2 0 0 2 ) . There is no evidence that the Lawrences ar

anyone else created such an easement in favor of Tower.
"An easement appurtenant i s a right to use a certain parcel, the servient
estate, for the

benefit of another parcel the dorninanr estate, Essentially, an

easement appurtenant serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that
cannot: be separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins v, Sales, 1 39 ldaho

225, 230, 76 P.3d 969 (2003).
Accordingly, in light of Tower's allegation that: it i s a lessee of Hall, Tower

lacks standing to assert claims of easement by necessity or by implication.
As alluded to by the ldaho Supreme Court in i t s opinion pertaining to the
matter at hand, Tower has standing to seek injunctive relief if it can demonstrate
that it has an existing right to use the subject easement. Since Hall has
established no easement by implication or necessity, Tower lacks standing to

pursue those theories.
If Tower can esrablish a prescriptive easement, it would have sranding ro
enjoin the interference with such a right.

OPPOSlTlON OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENRNED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF

-7

STATUTE Of: LIMIITAT30m

Idaho Code 5-203'

recites t h e fallowing:

No action for the recovery of real praperty, or far the
recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained,
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor,
predecessor or grantor, was seized or possessed of the
property in question within five (5)years before the

commencement of the action; and this section includes
p o s s e s s o r y rights to lands and mining claims.
Idaho Code 5 - 2 0 4 ~recites the following:
No cause of action, or defense to an action, arising out
o f the. title to real property, or to rents or profits out o f
the same, can be effectual unless il: appears rhat the
person prosecuting the action, or making the defense,
or under whose tltle was se~zedor possessed of the
premises in question within twenty ( 2 0 ) years before
the commencement of the act in respect to which such
action i s prosecuted or defense made.
Plaintif's complaint makes no reference to i t s predecessors interest. Yet
Plaintiff seemingly alleges that i t s predecessors in interest acquired rights to use
the Lawrence parcel and that those rights somehow inure to the beneflt of
Plaintiff. Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to be
perfecred. Plaintiff has offered no evidence on the subject.

4

This statute was amended

In 2006, after the instanr acrion

was filed.

* See prior footnote.
OPPOSITION OF DOUGlAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Plainriff's present claims are barred by the applicable statute of timitation.
If Plainriff's predecessors had a n y rights to use the L;rvvrenh;e parcel, those
claims are now stale and barred by the statute of limitations.

MCHES
Whether

or not a party i s guilty of

laches is ordinarily a question of fact.

Osrerloh v. State o f /d&ho, 1 00 Idaho 702, 604 P.2d 7 1 6. It i s beyond question

that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged stale claims which
Plaintiff now sieeks to enforce. If Plaintiff: and i t s predecessors truly enjoyed

easements by implication, necessity and/or by prescriptive use, those claims
should have been perfected through litigation. The failure to pursue the claims
by Plaintiff's predecessors has clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and

theirpredecessors to defend against the claims.

TOWER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A LESSEE OR ASSIGNEE O F T H E HALL

,LEAS-C
The only factual allegations in the record regarding Tower's status are

conralned In the unverifiedcomplaint of T o w e r and in the Affidavit of Robert
Hall (filed Sept. 13. 2004) offered by Plaintiff in support of irs first morion for
summary judgment.

OPPOSITION OF DOUCIAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Hall does nal state that Tower is his lessee, he merefy states that the land
was leased to Mextel West Carp. and that "we received notice that rtris lease was

assigned ta Tower Parent Corp. and Tower Asset Sub, ~ n c . " ~
Hall goes on to state 'Tower Asset Sub, Inc, continues to lease the site
from us.' A copy af the Nextell lease is atrached to Hal!'s affidavir

as Exhibit "A".

The lease prohibits the assignment of the lease by Nextel without Hall's prior
written ~ o n s e n t .Mall's
~
affidavit does not: recite that he provided the written

consent or that he otherwise agreed to the assignment.
Accordingly, T o w e r has failed to

establish that it i s even a lessee.'

Tower's status is certainly a genuine issue of fact.

TOWER'S OWN AFFIDAVIT IREBOR) ESTABLIStjES THAT TOWER'S USE HAS BEEN

PERMISSIVE

As stated by the affidavit of Daniel Rebor offered by Plaintiff in support of
its motion for summary judgment, Nextel obtained an access license from the

See Hall Affidavit, pg. 2, paragraph 4.

See Hall affidavit, Exhibit "A", paragraph 14.
This issue has been raised previously and Tower has offered no additional proof on
the issue- The inference therefore, is that Tower has no proof,
9
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iawrences.'"~ower

took an assignment of that access agreement and "[Slince

May of 1399 Plaintiff has c o n t i n u o u s l y paid the monthly licensing fee by check

which identifies Specrra Site as payee."
For t h e lasr eight (8) years, t h r o u g h its own aiffidavit, Tower's use of the
Lavvrence easement has been permissive. Permissive use negates any c l a m far
an easement by prescriptian. Mefendez V. Hi/7tzI 1 1 1 Idaho 401, 724 P.2d 137
( I 986).

ELEMENTS OF EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION NOT SATISFIED

F u n k severed the Lawrence parcel from his remaining land in 197'5 when
he entered into the Sale Agreement with Human Synerqistics.'' In 1972, Funk

acquired the right to crass the Mead property in Section 21 but Funk had no

righr to cross Section 28 to access his lands in Sections 2 1 and 2 2 .
The parcel at issue in this litigation was not created (or severed) from
Funk's other lands until 1977 when Funk conveyed to ~asmussen/ChamberIain.'~

I V e e affidavir of Rebor, filed Seprember 1 3, 2004,paragraphs 3-5.

11

Id, paragraph 6.
5ee affidavir of weeks filed Seprember 1 3 , 2004, pg. 2 , paragraph "e" and Exhibit "E"

thereto.
Id, page 4, paragraph 3(a)-(el.
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Clearly, then, until the 1977 conveyance to Rasrnussen/ChamberSaioa, the
land allegedly leased by Tower was but an undivided pur-tion of t h e act-eaye held
by Funk in Section 22, Funk had access to that, section via Mellick Road.
There is absolutely no evidence in the record rhar suggests that there was

an existing access road to the land that would eventually become rhe
Rasmussen/Chamberlain parcel in 1975when Funk severed what would become
the Lawrence parcel (the servient estate) from Funk's other holdings (the
dorninant estate),
Therefore, the easement claimed by Tower did not exist in 1975 when the
servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, i.e, there was no prior use.
Furthermore, Funk never had the legal right to cross Section 28 from
Section 21 to access his land in Section 22. Funk cannot create by implication

that which did not exist in fact in 1975. There was no access road to the land at
issue in this action in 1975. Thus, the key element to establish an easement by

implication i s lacking in t h e instant action.
The Idaho Supreme Caurt stated In the case of Bearfsland WaterAssoc.,
Id.,

that:

To establish an easement by implication from prior use,
the party seeking t o establish the easement must
demonstrare three essent~alelements: ( 1 ) unlry of t ~ t l eor
ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the
dominant estate; ( 2 ) apparent continuous use long
enough before conveyance ~ fthe
. dominant estate t o
show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3)
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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the easement must be reasonably necessary t o the
proper enjayment of rhe dominant estate. Cfose v.
&ensinkt 995 Idaho 72, 7 6 , 501 P.Zd 1383, 7 387; Davis v.
Gswn, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 369 P.2d 403, 406-07
(1 96 1 >. (Emphasis added).
The third element recited above requires proof that a disputed access is
reasonably necessary t o the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. As stated

in the affidavits af Douglas Lawrence and Bruce Anderson, Funk has always had
access to his Section 22 property via Mellick Road. Funk or his successors can,
and should, provide access to Tower.

EASEMENT BY NECESSIlY

An easement by necessity is founded on the following legal theory:
"A way of necessity is an easement arising from an
implied grant or implied reservation; it is of common law
origin and i s supported by the rule of sound public
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for
occupancy or successful cultivation ... It i s a universallv
established p r i n c i ~ l ethat where a tract of land i s
conveved which is se~aratedfrom the hishwav bv other
lands of the qranror or surrounded bv his lands or by his
and those of third oersons, there arises, by implication,
in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across the
premises of the rJrantor to the highway." (Emphasis
added).
BurfeyBrick andSand CQ,v. Cofer, 102 ldaho 333, 335, 629 P.2d 11 6, 1 7 68
(1 98l)(quoting 17A Am. Jur. Easements

3

58 (1 957));see 2 5 Am. Jur. 2d

OPPOSITION OF DOUGlAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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Easements and Licenses 5 5 30-03 1 (2005). One who claims an easement by
necessity across another's land

must prove "(1) unity sf title and subsequenr

separation of the dominant and servient estates; ( 2 ) necessity of the easement at:
the rime of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." e a r

Island W;3rerA~s%?,
fnc. V, Brown, I 2 5 Idaho 71 7 , 7 2 5 , 874 P.Zd 528, 5 3 6 (1 994).

In the matter at hand, Tower cannot demonstrate that there was a
necessity for the access across the Lawrence parcel far the benefit o f rhe parce/

allegedly leased by T o w r when the Lawrence parcel was severed from the other
land retained by Funk.

Funk obviously had access to his other lands when he

severed the parcel sold ro Wurnan Synergistics in 197'5,otherwise Funk would
have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human
Synergistics in 1 975.
It should be noted that the parcels of land at issue sit on top of a
mountain. The lands are not suited for farming or residential development. The
land is suitable only for t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of radia and phone towers. Nothing in

the record establishes that anything but infrequent access to these sites is
commonplace.

5
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must establish by clear

and convincing evidence all of the elements necessary for a prescrlptlve
easement

Hodgins v. Sa/es, 139 Idaho 225, 2 2 9 ; Abbot v. NampaSchoolDist.

OPPOSITION OF OOUCLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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DATED this

13

day of November, 2007Respecrfu!ly submitted,

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
n

for Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SEWVlCE
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15

day of November. 2007, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by rhe method indicated below,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

and addressed t o the fallowing.

Susan P, Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law

1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Via:

7

Facsimile: (LOB) 664-1 684
Personally served

SUSAN P WEEKS
JAMES. VERNON & WEEKS, PA..
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur &illme. fD 83 8 14
Telephone: (208) 667-0683
Fax: (205) 664-1 654
TSB #A255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IX THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, XN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT
T O W R ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV

d-%

i

AFFIDAVIT OF KAYMOND W.
GOOBWN IN SUPPORT OF
SUBSTTnJTION OF REAL
PARTY IN I N E R E S T

vs.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA .T.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife.
Defendants.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA )
County of Wake

1
f

ss.

1, Raymond W. Goodwin, first being duly sworn upon oath depose and

say:

1.

The information contained herein i s based upon my own information

and is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, I am over the age of 18,and
I am competent to testify thereto.
2.

I was the attorney-in-fact for the above listed Plaintiff in the above

matter. I am cumntly the attorney-in-fact for Spectra Site Communications,
LLC .

AFFIDAVJT OF &%YMONa W. COODWTN IN SUPPORT OF SUBSTTTUTION OF
PARTY IN INTEREST: 1

iiii3/ZBM!

13:?3

,J ,,) 1,')

r"HiJt

k b ; 3";

On or about March 2006, Tawer: Asset Sub, Tnc., pursumt to

3,

Delaware law, converted its legal form from a Delaware corporation to a Delaware
limited 1iabSit.ycompmy.

8 n or about F e b m q 23, 2007, 'lbwca Asset Sub, LLC merged into

4.

1

SpectraSite Communications, inc. On or about March 31, 2007, pursuant to

Delaware law, Spectrasite Communications, Inc. converted its legal form from a
i

Ddawme corlporabon to a Delaware limited 1iabilitr-Jcompany.
The above entities were all issued certificates of authority by the

4.

Idaho Secretary of State t o do business in Idaho during the relevant time periods

I

I

of their existence.

True and correct copies of the relevant filings with the

secretary of state are attached hereto as Exhibit "An.
is 13&day of Novemb

/

SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this

/a $& day

of November,

AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND W. GOODWIN IN SUPPORT OF SUBSXTUXON OF REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST: 2

I

I hereby certify that on the /3?day o f Nu'ovembcr, 2007, I caused to bc served a truc and
correct copy ofthe foregoing document by the m ~ t h o dindicated below, and addressed to the

followiq:

0

U.S. Mail

Overni&t Mail

61

Hand Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

John P, Whclan
2 13 4LhStreet
Coeur d'hlene, TD 5382 6
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND W. GOODWI'N M SUPPORT OF SUBSTITUTION OF REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST: 3

l d : 1 2 FAX '318 861 0 7 8 6

'02/14/2003
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THORITY (Fur Proflt)

: ) . !r.2 I L

jlfi

2: 2 9

(tnstructlons on €lack of Applfcatlon)

The name of the a~rporeucmIs:

1

Tawcr Aeeet Sub, Inc.
2. The name whtch it ahall use In Idaho Is: ,
3. 11 Is incorporated under tho lewa of:

DciawE*

4. Its dsite af Incorporation Is: 0SPZ111998
5. The address ofIts prlnclpal olllce Is.

100 Regency Fotwt Dnvc. Suitc I60, Cary. NC 275 1 1

6.

The ~ d d r e ta
e ~which

carnmpandbnce should be sddm3aed, If dlPlb+antfrom ltsm 5 , Is:

OY

and izs reglstercd agent h Idaho r# that addteee is: C T m o r a t l l m -8

8. The names and respeclivebusiness addresses af Its dlrectars and nfflcers are:

Oflice

Address

SEE A Z7ACHiWEM

-u

..

T

N

Gn

e- Sp i v a ~

Ta-EBERLE

BERL lN

PWC'

oaz

I

Dirbsctars and 63S;ficemRepa&
Tovvssa Asset Sub, Inc.

SIephen

Dimetar

CfWk

EEeEtjm: Tuesday, Aprjl20, 1999

Primary Addnn6:

100 Regency Fame!:Drtve

Suite 160
Gary, NC 2751 I

Camrnenc

OFFICERS

Dstt A. Carny

Prealdent-Lasing Dlvlslorr
EfEmlve: Wednesday, Janu~ry0 1.2063
Primary Address:
f 80 Fkggency F~rmDriee
Suite! 160
Gary, NC 275 1 1

Comment:

Unlimited OPfrccr

Senior Vise P r d e n t - S I I Iend
~ Msrkrthg
Effective: Wednesday, January 01,2003
Prlmary Address:
100 Regency Fofrsri Drive

Robert Clamaa

Cantncnt:

Suits t 60
Cary, NC 275 I t
Ljmircd Officer

G s b r b h Gaazllez
Senior 'blica Praeida~tand Contralhr
Effective: Wednesday. January CJI ,2O1)3
100 Regency Forcrt brivc
P n m w Address:

Sulrs I60

Cay,NC 175 1 t

Comment:

Llmlted CEtlcet

-

-w.

,. .

Vice Prealrient Sa Ies
Dsnlel A v a
Eflerctive: Wednesday. January 0 1.2OU3
Primary Address:
100 Regency F u m Drive
Suite 160
Cary, NC 275 11
Camrncnr:
Limited Ofl~ccr

-

Vice Prullidtnl; Property Management
Effeccivt: Wed~resduy,Janumy 01,2003
100 Regency Farcsc Drive
Primary Addrcsr;:

Brian Dietrich

Suite t 60
Cary, NC 275 11

Limited Officcr

Comment:

I

Vice Prerldent-Qusiity, Admlnktmtion end Reld Smicizi
Dutlnc C. MacEntee
Effactive: Wtdnmdey, January 01,2005
1OD Regency Fnrexr. Drive
Primary Addman:
Suite 160
C~ry,NG27511
Cammtnt:
Limited Offirser

Rwe l ved

02-1 4-2003

12 :14

F r m 4 1 9 851 0795

To-EBERLE BERL l N

P ~ p e 1103
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T m ~ oA
r ~ t i eSub,
l
kc.
Vice Prrcldent-Bujiness Q~nrclbpmenr
CIan P. Spiwak
Effirtive: Wednesday, lmuary 01,2303
2 8 0 Ragcncy Fnw-9c Drive
Primary Addmris:
Suite 160
Cnry, NC 275 1 1

Cornmcnr:
*''

.

'

Ltmlted O ~ I C C :

Gerard Ains8t.eia

Vice President-Qllacetlon Operrrtions

EEectivc: Wednesday, Janum O I , 2003
160 Regency Form Drive
Primary Address:
Suite 160
Cary, NC 275 I 1

Comment:

Umlted ORicer

Ted &4brsras
VIce Reidant-TcchnuIa~
ERkctiuc: Wadnefidq, J m r y 01,2003
100 Regonty Fenst Drive
Primary Addraaa:
S ~ x k1160
Comment:

Cary, NC 275 11
Limind Offtc;cr

V i a President-National
Robmt Anderaan
EFFsctiw: Wadntsday, January 01,2003
100 Regancy Fares? Drive
Pi-intary Addraes:

Acrouatt

Rcprasent~t3ve

Suite 160
Comcnan?:

rae..

Cary, NC 2751 1
Limited O f i c c r

Vice PresidanbNstionel Account Repiuentetive
Brian Porter
EfFectivc: Wrdnesdny. January 0 1.2603
1BO Rcgcncy Forest Drive
Primary Address:
Suin, 160
Cary, 1UC 275 1 1
Comment:
Limit4 OfPice:

. ..

Vice Fratidant-National Account Repr~cntatlve

.Ica v. Ricks
Effcctin: Wednesday, J a n r r q 01.2003
Prfmery Address:
N ~ n given
e
Cammenr:
Limited OfFicer

John W, Lynch
Secretftry
Effcczivo: Wednesday, Janujry 0 1,2003
100 Regcney Forest Drive
Primary Address*
Suiac 160

Cornrnant:

Cary, FJC 275 11
Limited Officcr
Director-Collacstiao

Jamra Blnghram

Eective: Wednesday, January 01,2003
Prifna~yAddrest?:

Commenr:

100 Regency Foren Drive
Suite 160
Csry, NC 275 i I
Autllorized Individud

Chkp Carew

Natti~nalDirector alOptimiEPtim

Effective; Wednwday, Jsnuay 01,2005
] 00 Regency Forest Drivc
Primary Address:
Suite 160
I.rr*p;-

.,

Comment:

C q .NC 275 1 1
Aurhorizcd IndhrEdual

S P E G ~ S I T Ec:a m . -SBC

0 2 / 1 4 / 2 ~ 0 3 14:13 FAX 818 851 0'7116
U.

.

.

@ oas

Tower Aasct Sub, Ins.

Rick Foster
IlirsLttos-ProJedManagement
EEoww;: Wtdnmdry, Jarnary 01,2003
Primary Address.
1DO R ~ g t n qFcrcsr b i v c
Suite 16a
Cary, NC 275 1I
Commcn~:
Aurharized Individual
CLevid Piarect
Dfreetor-Ceilucetioa
EfTemive: Wednesday, January O P ,2003
1 00 Regency Foroat briwo
Primary Address:
Suirr: 16Q
Gary. NC 775 1).

Commcni:

A udrorimd 1ndivirtuat

Dirertor-Real Estate O m t i a n s
Xhralei E.Rebear
Effeetlva: Wadncsday. January 0 t, 2003
100 Regency Forest Dl-ivc
Primary Address:
Suite 160
Cary, NC 2751 1

Comment:

-4..X7.'

I,

Authorized Individual

Michael Whitley
Dircctar-Deployment rnltfalltvas
Bffnctivc: Wcdncsday, January 01,2003
100 Regency Fomt Drive
Primary Addnssr
Suite 1-50
C ~ r yNC
, 275 1 1
Camrnont:
Authoriztd lnd ividual
fernes S. Pclmeh

Assiscest Traaauter
ERacrive: Wednesday, fanumy 0 1.2003
Primary Addross:
I Oft Regency Farex Drive
Suite 280
Gary; NC 2751 1
Commant:
Limited OFicec

Steven 1, Reinhard
AaBistent SectetPry
EftWive: Wednesday, f~rtuary01,2003
100 Regency Fores? D r ~ v c
Priinary Addrrrs~:
Suite 160
Cary. NC 2751 1
Carnmcnr:
Limited OfTicu
AsJiSta nt S~erela
ry

Dennis Jay Sargewt, Jr.

ERECT~VE:
Wednesday. fanuarv 0 1.2003
100 Regency Forest Drive
Primary Address:
Suite 160
Car);. NC 275 1 L
Commenr:
Limited Officer

Recalved

02-14-2003

12:14

Frwn-919 851 0795

To-EBERLE BERL l N
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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY

I

OF

TOWER ASSET SUB, INC.
File Number C 747677

I, BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby cerhfy that an
Application for Certificate af Authority, duly executed pursuant to the provisions of the
Idaho Business Corporation Act, has been received In this ofice end is found to

conform to law.
ACCORDINGLY a+ by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, I issue this

* .'

Certificate of Authclrrty to tqnsact buslness in this State and attach hereto a duplicate of

.

the appllcatfon for such certificate.

Dated: I4 February 2003

Lw
SECRETARY OF STATE

-.

I

BY

%?fi;i~d

I

I

565

PAGE
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APPLICATION FOR CERTlFICATE
OF WITHDRAWAL
(Insiructlonson badc of applldlan)
To the Secretary of Stale of ldEIho
Pmuent ta Sectloo 30-1-1520, Maho Code. the undersignedCopratton hersby epplleslor a
certificatedwlthdrawalhornthe Stale of Idaho, and fofttcatpurposesubmlts thefallwvlng statefnent:

1. T b name of the corporation Is:

Tower Aaact Sub,be.

The name whWI H used In ldaho Is:
Tower Assot Sub.Inc.
2. It is lnmrporated uderttPe taws of Delaware
3.

-

It is not transading buslneae h the Slab ofIdaho.

4. It hereby surrenders ~tsauthortty to trar~sedbusiness h said sMe.
5. It revokes the suthor#yaf its reglstared agent tn the,State of Id& to aeceptservlce ofpccass and
uxrssnts that s w b of process tn any adlon, sult orpmedlng based upon any cause dadlon
arising in the State of Idaho duringthe h e It was authorized lo transact bu6lr1asstherein may
themafter be made on It by regislered or cerbf'ed mall to the corpmtkm at the address llsted In item
8.. below.

6. The postofljca addreestowhich process agalnstth6 carporatIan m a y bs malled is:

clo Ctnrtral Camsel, A m d m Tower Cotporatlon, 1 16 Hmtbgm Ave., 1 1th Fbor. Bobtan, MA 02116

7. It agrees to Mtiv m e S6-

Signatue

TYWd

a
Micbsel B.h4ilsorn

Capedty VP k A s a i m S

4

laRl.IlWCTlyw-

oFSbte d t h e Steb of Idaho of any changefothe addmas In Item 6.

e

e

CuaacrAcaf'
m=(rpwa.coaR1)

S~ofS@It0uepatcy
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State of Idaho

I
1

CERTiFlCATE OF WITHDRAWAt
OF

TOWER ASSET SUB, INC.

flle Numbet C 147677

II

I, BEN YSURSA, Secretary d State of the State of idaho, hereby certify that

Application for Certificate of Wimdravval fmm this State, has been received In this ofFice

and is found to conform to lawACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Law, I issue,th$
CerMicate of Withdrawal and attach hereto a duplicate of the Applimtion for such

Certincate.
Dated: March 6,2006

*-';

-

.
SECRETARY OF STATE

r,-
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1, The name of ihe limited liability company is:

I - '

1

Tower b e t Sub, UC

2. If me name of the limited liability company lo not permissible or is not available in Idaho,
the name the breign limited liability company will use in ldaha is:
,

-.--

3. The juriodidon under whose l a w the
~ limjted liabilib company is organized is:

and the date of its fannation was;

4.

8.iZU19-98

me name and address of the registered agent in Idaho is:

-

C T cmpmrion Syskm. d o t T Cmpmtlun S p m ,3WNonh 6th Snmt. R d s c K.83702

5,

me address of the limited liability mmpam's ofliar in (ha jurisdiction under whose laws
it Is organized Is:
d o The Cotpandon Tnai CQ..Cmmmtlon T ~ n C r m c r1209
,
Ormm St.. Wilmrngton

DE 19801

6, The address of the limited liabilily mmpanqs principal ofice. If other than the address
in #5 above, is:
116 Wlmtingrm Avenw. 1 lrh Floor. Boston. MA 02116

7, The address to which correspondence should be a d d m e d Is:

8. Signature of a manager. ifany, of a member
if there are no managers.
d

Signature

-

Typed Name M~ehnclB
Manegar

MibJPb W Of

a Mmmber Cj,

bhUgcf

.

I
B

3

$

!%cmtaryolStara~arly

IDRHD s€cR€TARY OF Slm
83/Cirb/efi386 85aBB
eK: 8436 CTI
ll#1 941413

1 1 11.80 c 1ea.m

1e
r m 3 3 . I W S M C T ~ M ~

ee.m

a

2
a
.
r

4 4

m ~ cn
Bs

PAGE
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2001 WAFt 13 PH 2: 17
(InstNctions on back of application)
,

.

A

,.

1. The name of the foreign Ernited IiaMlity company is:
Toosar Aarrec Sub, LEX:

I

2. The JwIsdlELlonunder whose laws the limited llabillty mmpeny is organized Is:

I
I

DeZawat.6

I

I

3. The forelgn Ilmlted liability company is not transacting buslness h Idaho, and it
hereby surrenders its regismtion tD transact business In idaho.

I

I

4. The toreign limited liability company revoker'the suMorfty of L reeistered agent forservice of process, and corrsents that sem1c.e of process In any actlon which arclee during the

time it was registered In Idaho my hereafbt be made by r6glsteW ar cwtlfied mail

J

,
>

addressed to:

116 Xuntlnqton Avenue, Zlth'Floor
I

aoetan, MA -6

.

A t t n : X,

Anthonsr Lehv, Senior Vies Precridsnt

a

%mtnry d8bb lee ow

w

C W c f b i3eni.o~Vice pnw5Adsnl:

,

mBECmwffmfE

'

.

wI.5-3

8

83/i3/28917 eSsQf8
1w1@6E CTr 71104 BHz -k
L @ 8,086 a
9
8 wtFUWI2
1 P e8.m
g8.m mxn c I a

ma

215i'3%
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State of Idaho
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY
OF

SPECTRASITE COMMUNICATIONS, INC,
File Number C 131950

1I

I PETE T CENARRUSA. Secretary of Stete of the State of idaha, hereby cerii
that an Application for Certificate of Authority, duly executed pursuant to the provisions
of the Idaho Business Corporation Act, has been received in this office and is found to

conform to law.
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authorrty vested in me by law, 1 Issue this
Certificate of Authority to transact business in this State and attach hereto a duplicate
of the ~ p l i c a t l o n
tor such Certificate.
Dated: January 7,2000

SECRETARY OF STATE

11

5.

~ f / b p d ~ ~ & a f f l c100
~

Reuency F o r e s t Drive,

S u i t e 400

Cary, NC 27511
8 . The agdtress ta whlch mmrspondtln5Plahoukf be addmasea. If ditterenttrom h

/I

n S, i s

7. The sraet a d d m s ~ l faghnbred flea In IdzBairr ,1603. Shoreline Driva.

~oine,~Cbh:, 83702

it

n
8. Tha namas end respective bmlws sddresslcaa M Its direuun and o f i i ~ e are:
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Stephen, A. Clark

Primary Address:

*--

.

Director
1 t18 Regenq Foresr Drive
Suite 400
Cary,YC 275 1 1

OFFICERS
T e r q L. Armant
Primary Acidrcss:

Timothy G. 8i1a
Primary Address:

Vice

Cnief Operating OEccr
100 Regency Forest Drive
Suite 400
Cary, NC 2751 1

Vice President

James Bingbarn

Primary Address;

President

I00 Rtg~neyForest Driva
Suite 400
Cary, N C 275 1 1

1Oa Regency Forect Drive
Suite 40@

Cary, PC 275 1 1
Stephen U. Clark
Primary Address:

Primary Addrcss:

Presfdent
101)Regency Fares? Drive
Suite 400
C q ,NC 275 I I

Cttiei Executive Officer
100 Regency Foren Drivc
Suite 400
Cary. NC 275 1 1

-

Vice President Property Management

R rian Dietrich
Primary Addreas:

iCtlagaus F. Fribcrg
Pdmw Address:

100 Regency Forea Drive
Suite 400
Cary.NC 275 1 1
Vlce Rrmldenr -Sales end Marketing

100 Regency Farest Dcive
Suite 400
Cary, NC 275 1 1
As.siatant Secretary

Keliy Getrard

Primary Addrm:

.

309 1 Governors Lakes Drive
Norcross, GA 3007 1

Dove P. Culllcn
Prlmofv Address

cs,+

.

W. Scntl Lbyd
P r t m w Address'

'Jiee President
3OSt 1 Goternoa Lakes Drive
Vorcross, CX 3007i

100 Regency

V Ice Prraldenr- Collocarlon
Fontsr Crr~ve

Suitc dOCl
Cary, i"JC 275 i !

John H, Lynch
Primary Address,

k c President, Gencrsl Counscl
100 Regency Forest Drive
Suitc 400
Cary,NC 275 1i

Fmnk Mnrco
Primary Address:

Calvin J. Peyne
Primary Address:
Leonard Pirklc
Primary Address:

Vice Presldcnt

8735 West Higgins Road
Chisago, Il, 6D63 I

Exccutivc Vicc Prcsidntt - Design and Cvnsrruction
(7886 5.5 th A v e ~ u t
Surrey. B.C. V3A 6CQ Canda
4

Assistant Secretary

2000 Crow Canyon Pfnce
,Can Ramon, CA 94 553

John F.Ricct
Primary Address:

Vice President
2000 Crow Canyon Place

San Ramon. CA 96583
-,

Richard Seiff
Primary Addrcnt:

taah Sell Shaw
Primary Address:

Glen F. Spivak
Primary Address:

hsistant Secrcra~y

3091 Govemars takes Drive
Norcross. G A 30071
v i c e President - Hliman Re?t(r~rrccs

800 Regency Parkway
Suire 500
Cnry, NC 275 1 I

1

-

Vice President Corpomte Stralegy
LOO Regency Fores Drive
Suite A00

Cory, NC 27s 1 1
David P.Tornick

Primary Address:

Secretary
100 Regency Foresr Drive
Suite 400

Casy.NC27511
Primary Address:

.

Chief Pinanrial Qtflnr
LOO ~ c g r n c yForcst Drivc
Suitc 600
Cary, NC 275 1 1

f.P.

Tirdd Vlrstk
Pnmtrzy Address,

Jansc D. W a l k n
Primary Address

Asststant Secretrrp
R'SS Wcst Ftiggin3 Xoad
Chicago. iL 5063 !

Assbtana Secrctai-y
100 Regency Forest Drive
Suite 600
C w .NC 275 1 1
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SLIS,kY P. WEEKS
JAMES, VERVON & WEEKS, P.R.
1626 Lincoln Way
Goeur d'Alene. ID 835 14
Tetepl~one:(208) 657-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
TSB #4255
Attorneys for Pf ainti ff

IN THE DISTRTCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THJZ COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware
corporation,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV 03-4621

MOTION TO CONTTNUE TRJAL

vs.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Defendants.
COMES NOW Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and hereby moves d7.e Court for
continuation of the trid scheduled for December 10,2007. This motion is made upon the

grounds that Defendants have hled two separate motions for disqualification, which have
delayed the Court's consideration of the pending summary judgment motion. Plaintiff i s entitled
to a ruling on the summary judgment proceeding before commencement of trial. Givcn the trial
date, the Court will not have adequate time in which to consider and issue a dccision.an the

pending summary judgment motion.

FURTHER, Defendants have alleged that the lack of a scheduling order has prejudiced
them. Any prejudice is equal to both parties. Therefore, the appropdate remedy is a

MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL: 1

c3 '79
1

continuation of trial with a pretrial scheduling order being issued to provide guidance to both
parties.

DATED Qis 13" hay of November, 2007.
JAMES, V E h l O K & WEEKS, P.A.

c,BY

SUSAN P. WEEKS

CERTIFKATE OF SERVICE
I hereby cedi& that on the 1 3 ' ~day of November, 2007,I caused to be served a m e and
conect copy of the Foregoing document by the method ~ndicatedbelow, and addresscd to the
fc~llowing:

El

U.S. Mail

Cl

Overnight Mail

IJ

Hand Delivered

!Ia"

Telecopy (FAX)

MOTION TO CONTlNUE TRZAL: 2

SUSAN I". WEEKS
JAMES. WRvC)N & WEEKS, P.A.
1 626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Atene, ED 8381 4
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1684
TSB #4255

ITIJ THE DISTRICT COTJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL, DISTRJCT OF Tm
STATE OF IDAHO, I%' AND FOR THE COUT\?TU OF KOOTENAT

TOWER ASSET SUB We., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-4621

h4OTION FOR SUBSTITUTION
OF REAL PARTY IN R\ITEREST
VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J,
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

Defendants.

1

COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, and pursuant to T.R.C.P.17(a) moves the Court
for an order substituting Spectra Site Communications, LLC, a Delaware limited 1iabiliQ

company, as the real party in interest inthe above matter. This motion is made upon the grounds
set forth in the affidavit of Raymond Goodwin, filed concurrently herewith.

DATED this 13&day of Navernber, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

h4OTTON FOR SUBSTITUTXON OF REAL PARTY Xld INTEREST: 1

587

i hereby ccrrti@ that on the 2 3'"day

of November. 2007. T caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing document by the method, indicated below, and addressed to the

folloliving:

u

U.5. &fail

Overnight Majl

61

Hand Def iveted

Telecopy (FAX)

John P. Whelm
2 13 4thStreet
Coeur dxlene. ID 8381 6
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: 2

SGSAB I?, %1;EEKS
IAMES, VERNON iZ: WEEKS, P.A.
I 626 Lincoln ?Yay
C a a r dTAlene,ID 838 14
TeIephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664-1654
ISB ff4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST SEJDTCTAL DTSTRICT OF THE

TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware
corporation,

Case No. CV 03-4621

Plaintiff,

RESPONSE TO SECOND NOTION
TO DISQUALIFY

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J
L A W N G E , husband and wife,

Defendants.

STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DTSQU'ALXFV

Idaho Rules of CiviI Procedure Rule 40(d)f2)(A}(4)"Disqtlalification for cause" provides
that: "(A) Grounds. Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from

presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds: ... [tlhat il~e
judge or magistrate is
biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case in t h action."
~
Orders on motions to
disqualify are evaluated according to abuse-of-discretion rules. Samuel v. Hepworth, fiagester
& Laarniz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000).

ARGUMENT
K\ $:)
dd

RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 1

-q
" -

Defcndmts' counsel claims that the arid jjudgc is prejudiced against Defendants' case

because thew altorney perceives that tthc judge treats him disgarzlt;ely The new facts t11a"couasel
provides in support of the renewed motion are: ( I ) Defendmts counsel has filed a judicial
complaint against thc trial judge based upon actions in the present case; (2) no scheduling order
was issued in either Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence. Kootenni County Case No. CV02-7671 or Tower Asset Sgb v , Law~vence,Qotenai Coul-ttyCase No. CV-03-4621; (3) the judge

allegedly called counsel a liar in fi'ont of his soz-x; and (4) the Court applies a different standard to
plaintiff's counsel based upon an order entered by the Court.
.Although the Court has previously noted that it has made rulings both in favor and
against Defendant's counsel, Defendant's counsel continues to claim that his perception that thc
trial judge has animosity toward him wliich prejudices his client. Plaintiffis not in a position to
look into the subjective mind of the court and answer suc11 allegation. However, from an
objective point of view, plaintiffhas not obsmred those things of which Defendant's couiisel
compla~ns.There was a scheduling order issued in Case No. CV-02-767 1 on Decernber 12,

2003. There was not one issued in Case No. CV-03-4621. Plaintiffs counsel ltas observed this
ovasight in othcr cascs by other judges. Tt has been h a practice to notify the wurt clerk when
there i s wch an oversight. If Defendants felt this oversight in Case No. CV-03-4621prejudiced
them, they certainly were aware of this fact and had every nppoctunity to bring it to the court's

attention. Objectively, an oversight (which may well have occurred long before hlr. Whelm was
the attorney o f record) does not establish prejudice 011 the part of the court.
Defendants are correct that thc order presented by Plaintiff for the Sixth Access
referenced an affidavit when no such affidavit was prcsented and the Court signed it. The order

was modeled after a previous order and should have been modified. The failure to modify it was
the ,Fault of plaintips counsel, not the coui-t. However, this fact alone is not indicative that the
RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 2

584

tour"; is prejudicecl

against Defaldmt or treats thc pl&ntiFs counsel better than defendant. In

fact, thc same siuation occurred when Dcfcndants presented their ordm on judicial notice. The

order presented by Defendants and entered by the court on September 11 , 2007 was not
consistent with the ruling made in court. Plaintiff brought a motion to correct the judment as
allowed by the rules. Defendant is afforded the same opportunity. The mere fact that an order
was presented and subsequmtly entered that was inconsistent with the ruling is not indicative of

prejudice by the Court toward the presenting counsel. If it was, tbe logical conclusion in this
matter is that the tnal court is presudiced against both parties because it has entered orders for

both that were incorrect, which leads to the nonsensical conclusion that this court: will rule in

neither parties favor and both parties favor.
As to the claim that the court called Mr. Whelan a liar, both plaintiff's counsel and the
court disagreed with Mr. Whelan's sl2aracterizatiion of the Supreme Court's opinion. However,
plain.tiF'l's counsel does not recollect the ~ o u rcalling
t
Mr. W ~ e l a na liar. Plaintiff's counsel's
recollect was that the court indicated that Mr. Whelm was not being truthful when he
represented that the Supreme Court reversed the preli~ninaryinjunction when it remanded the
matter. However, the rccord is the better source for reference on this matter.

RESPONSE TO SECOPUD MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 3

COKCLUSION
Perhaps

VJhelan's perceptions are shaped by his o w internal views. Plaintiffs

counsel does not perceive the trmsgressions pmccivtd by Mr. Whelan.

DATED this 2 0 day
~ of November, 2007.
JAMES, \TRP;ON Rt. WEEKS, P.A.

BY

-

SUSAN P. WEEKS

CERTIFICATE 0%SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 20"' day of November, 2007, I caused to be served a true and
conect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

.Following:
Overnight Mail

U.S. Mail

Wand Delivetctd

JoZm P,WeIan
213 4Ih Street
Coeur d' Alcnc, ID 838 16
Facsimile: (208')664-2240

w"

Tclecopy (FAX)
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SUSAN P.WEEKS
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P-A.
1626 Linwln Way
C o r n d'Alme, ID 838 3 4
Telephone: (208j 667-0685
Facsisnilc: (208) 664-1683
ISB M255

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FTRST ,TURICXAL DJSTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
TOWER ASSET SUE3 lNC., a Delaware
corporation,

Plaintiff,
VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,

/

Case No.

CV 03-462 1

PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.
Lawrence argues that Towm on remand continues to seek to establish an easement in

itself across the Lawrence paxcel. To the contrary, Plaintiff seeks to obtain injunctive relief as
allowed by the Supreme Court in T O W ~Asset
F Sub Jnc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 P.3d

AXthaugh Tower's initial brief set forth theories under which Hall had easement rights,
the recitation was not ncccssary. The Idaho Supreme Court on appeal noted that Tower Asset

Sub,hc.on appeal had already established that Hall had the right to use. the easement.
Specifically, the Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that "Tower presented uneontroverted
P"r

PLATNTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM R'I SUPPORT OF MUTTON
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 1

'

ev~dencethat the Hall parcel was intended ta have the bcnefit o f the access road across the

La~vrenccparcel. However. that does not establish an express casement, which must be crcatcd

by a written instmment." Id, at 584.

Lawmce also claims that Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant. This
same argument was argued to the Idaho Supreme Court and disposed of by the appellate court.

The Suprcrne Court in Tower Asset Sub, lnc. v. Lawrence, sldpra, specifically noted that: ''We
hold that Tower, as lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief

preventing the Lawrences fiorn intefiering with its alleged right to use the casemenl." The court
concluded that: "Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an

alleged legal right to benefit Erorn the Blossom Mountain R o d casement." Nothing presented by
Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset Sub has standing.
Thus, the law of the case as cstablished on appeaI is that Tower Asset Sub has standin.gto

to seek indjunctive relief it it can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit from the

Thus, the on1y issue ran and& by the appellate court: was whetller Tower, ns a tenant, has
the lcgal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord, I-InZls.
While a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the owner of the

way, his family, ~.enai?ts,
servants, and guests, as we11 as by persons transacting business with
him, in the absencc of a special agreement to the contrary. 28A C.J.S. Easements

5 164 (1996).

This concept wa$sclearly enunciated by the New Hampsilire appellate wurts in Rrcidi v.
Town ofRyo, 150 N.H. 694,700-701,846 A.2d 535 (N.H.2004), wherein the murt held:
We next look at the dominant estate holder's ri&t to usc an appurtenant easement.
A dominant cstatc:holder is entitled to the reasonable use of an appurtenant
easement. See White v. Hotel Co,,68 N.H. 38,43, 34 A. 672 (1 894) (stating that
easement holders have whatever rights are remonably nmssary to enable them to
enjoy the easement beneficially), in addition, ths dominant estate holder "may

PLAXNTEF'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY mMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF klOTTON
FOR SUMrvWRY JUDGMENT: 2

53

license or atrt'no~zr:t h i d pmsoras to use its right of way" so long as the use i s
reasonable. Henley v, C0ratineni~zl.l
CahlevLisio~a,692 S .W.2d 825, 828 (Mo,Ct*App.
1985)' Reasonable use may ibiclude use by tenm"l, jpestts and invjtees of the
dominant estate balder. Gnwe)z v Cote, 875 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ma-Ct.App..
1 994); Bmce. sldpra 5 8:4,at 8-1 5; see also 28A C.J.S. Eiasemetfls 6 164 ((a 996)
(stagng that an appurtmant caament may be used '%by all persons lawfully going
to or from [the dominant estate]"l.
A copy of the lease bet~veenTower m d I-Tall was included with the affidavit of Robert

Hall. Nothing contained therein dmons&ates a special a g e m m t between WaZl and Tower that
Tower may not use any easmmts for which Halls has the benefit. Therefore, Tower is entitled
to injunctive relief.

La~wencesargument that Tower Asset i s not FTalls' tenant use the easement because

Halls and Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement is
speciaus. Essentially, Lamences argue that Hall may not waive a contract clause. As long as

Hall and TOWM
Asset Sub are in agreement that they share a tenant/landlord relationship
pursuant to the lease, L a m c c s may not challenge that relationship. Na law requires strict

compliance to the terns of the lease ageernent if the parties agree to the waivcr of the tmn.
Lawraces are not in privity and have no standing to enforce strict compliance with the terms,
Thus, Tower Asset has a right to use the wrment.

DATED this 2lStday of November, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

PJ,ATNTIFF'S SUTPLEMENTAL REPLY M E M O W D M IN SUPPORT OF MOTTON
FOR SUMNARY JUDGMENT: 3
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I hereby certify tJ7at on the 21 '' day sf Novanher, 2007, J caused ta bc served a true and
c o r e d copy of the foregoing documeart by the method indicated below, and addmssed to the

following:

a

U.S. Mail

O v m ight Mail

Hand Delivered

Telecopy (FAX)

John P . M e I a n
2 13 4& Street
Coeur d'hlene, ID 83 8 16
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

PLGINTIFF'S SLTPLEMENTAL
FOR SUMR/IARY JUDGMENT: 4

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
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SUSAN P. Q'EEKS
JAMES, "L'EWOY & 'gEEKS. PA..
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeilr drALene,ID 53514
Tclephne: (208) 667-06&5
Facsimile: f2t)gj 664-1684
ISB #4255

Attorneys for Plaintiff

THE DTSTRICT COURT OF TEIE FIRST .TUDICIrJII, DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF TDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB 1CNC., a Delatvare
corporation,

I

Case No. CV 03-4521

WTTNESS LIST

Plaintiff,

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, hiasband and wife,
Defendants.

I

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through its amrneys of record, James, Vernon & Weeks,
P.A. and hereby submits its list o f witllesses to be called at the trial o f this action to commence
December 10, 2007, as foflows:

1. Comad Agte

7. Lisa Holmes

2. JohnRook

8. Kosta Panidis

3. Kelvin Brownsbcrger

9. Kent Abcnclsoth

4. Wynn Wcrker

1 0. Robert Hall

5. John Bedini

I I . Doug Lawrence

6 . Aman Fam~anian

12. Brenda Lawrence

WI'rNESS LIST: 1

13. talilbur Mead

2 1. Bert Rol~rbach

14. dim Van Sky

22.Jim Can

15. J o b Someland

23. John McHugh

1 5. Wes H a i l t o n

24, Barry Pry

17, John Kinney

25. C.P. Mer~man

IS. John CasoriaiTrinity Broadcasting

26. Dwight Ogp

19. Kim Benefield

27. Wynn Wenker

20. Richard Kohles

28. Thomas Loudi n

In addition to the witnesses listed. Plaintic may usc m y witness contained on
Defendants?Witness List.

DATED this 2fithday o f Kovernher, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON I& WEEKS. P.A.

WRJESS LIST: 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 2hthday of Novcmbcr. 2007. I caused to be servcd a true and
correct copy of the foregoing docmlent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

following:
U.S. Mail

Overnight Mail

Wand Delivered

T~lecopy( F a )

John P. \%elan
213 4'h Stred
Coeur d7Alene,ID 838 1 6
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

SUSAN E". WEEKS
JAMES. VEmO'N 6;: WEEKS. P.A.
1626 Lincoln Way
COEWd'hlene. ID 538 1.4
Telephone: (208) 667-0685
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684

XSB iii4255
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, li\J AND 'FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAX

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
corporation.

Case No. CV 03-4621
EXHIBIT LIST

Plaintiff?
VS.

DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J.
LAWRENCE, ht~sbandand wife,
Defendants.
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by 3nd througlt its attorneys of record. James, Vernon & Weeks,

P.A. and hereby submit its Exhibit List as required by the Court's scl~edulingorder in the form
attached hereto. In addition to the exhibits listed, Plai,ntiff may use any exhibit contained on
Defendants' Exhi bit List.

DATED this 2 ~day
' ~of November, 2007.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

EXHIBIT LIST: 1

T hereby certify that on the ?6Lhdiiy o f November. 2007. T caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the: foregoing docmefir by the method indicated below, and addressed to the

d

U.S. Mail

Ci

Overnibt Mail

!ZI

Hand Delivered

0

Telecopy ( F a )

John P.Whelsn
2 I 3 4'h Street
Goeur d' Alene, ID $13816
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240

WX'ITuZSS LIST: 3

CASE NO.:
TRIAL DATE:
CASE TITLE:

CV-03-4621
December 10,2007
T O W R ASSET SUE3 INC. v. L

Plaintiffs Exhibib

(List:nummically)

filed in Book 57, page

hfemnrandum of

National Associated
Properties Mmorandum
of Sale Agreement, filed
October 13, 1987 as

8.

/ H m m Syaergistics to
'

Tof.tnstons/MeH~~ghs

Properties to Farmmians
Deed, filed July 3, 1996
as Instrument No.
11.

National Associated
I Properties to F m a n i a n s
(cakection) Corporation
Deed, filed July 8: 1996

Memorandum of Sale

Lawrences to Lawrences
Quitclaim Deed, filed
April 17,1998 as
Instrument No. 1533768
14.

Lswrences to Lawrences
Quitclaim Deed, filed
June 29,1998 as
Instrument No. 1543875

Nztional Associa~ed
Properties W m a t y

1977, as Instrument No.

1997 as Instrument No.
22.

General Telephone
Company by Warranty
Deed, filed on October
17, 1 966 as Tnstrument
No. 497858

23.

GTG easement recorded
August 3 1, 1966 as
Instrument No. 494343

24.

GTC easement recorded
Aupt31,
1966 as
Instmmcnt No. 494344

I

1

ortbwest v. Lawsnce et

map shawiing the tax
parcels for the Soufieat
Quartcr of Section 21.
Township 50 North,
Rsmge 5 West, Boise
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Quarter of Section 22,

for tax parcels 50N05W-

assessment infomation

31.

TnetmmwtNo. 1462711
filed on September 20,
1996, entitled "Mutual
Agreement Grant of
Easement and Quitclaim
Deed

(
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Lawenct:

Nexkl License
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Stvirter License
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Harold Funk deposi?ion
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEAI

TOWER ASSET SUB, INC,

1

Case No.

j

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE
OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL
PRETRIAL ORDER

t
Plaintiff,
vs.
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE, ET AL,

1
1

CV 2003 4621

)
I

Defendant.

Pursuant to IRCP 16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1.

A JURY trial for 5 day(s) will commence at the KOOTEAI County Courthouse at

900 a.m. on MAY 12, 2008. If possible, cases set for the same day will be tried on a
t o follow basis.

2.

The Court, at its discretion, will set the priority for each of the civil matters set

for trial on the above date. Any party may request a priority setting by filing a request
for Priority Setting, copy to the Court in chambers. The Court will attempt to give
priority to cases where such Request for Priority Setting is filed in the order in which
they are filed. Prior participation in mediation is a factor in granting pr~orrty.Noticeis
hereby given that all civil trial settings are subject to being preempted by the
court's criminal calendar.

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING

In order to assist with the pretrial conference and trial of thls matter IT IS HEREBY
FURTHER ORDERED that:

1.

a. PRETRIAL EVENTS: Before notlclng a deposltlon, hearlng or other pretrlal

event, a lawyer should consult and work with opposlng counsel to accommodate the
needs and reasonable requests of all witnesses and partlclpat~nglawyers
b. MOTION PRACTICE: Before setting a motlon for a hearlng. a lawyer should
make a reasonable effort to resolve the issue without involving the Court A lawyer who
has no valid objection to an opponent's proposed motion should promptly make this
position known to opposing counsel. After a hearing, a lawyer charged with preparing the
proposed order should draft it promptly, striving to fairly and accurately articulate the
Court's ruling. Before submitting the proposed order to the Court, the lawyer should
provide a copy to opposing counsel who should promptly voice any objections. If the
lawyers cannot resolve all objections, the drafting lawyer should promptly submit the
proposed order to the Court, stating any unresolved objections.
c. PRETRIAL MOTIONS: Motions for summary judgment shall be trmely filed
so as to be heard not later than ninety (90) days before trial. The last day for fillng all
other pretrial motions shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial, except for motions in
limine concerning witnesses and exhibits designated pursuant to paragraph Nos. 6 and 7
respectively of this Pretrial Order. Motions in limine concerning designated witnesses and
exhibits shall be submitted in writing at least seven (7) days before trial. Motions in
/;mine concerning any designated exhibit shall attach copies of the exhibit in issue.
Motions in limine regarding designated witnesses shall attach copies of the discovery
requests claimed to require the earlier disclosure and a representation by counsel
regarding the absence of a prior response from the party to whom the discovery was

SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE OF TRIAL SETTING

directed. The fact that a party which has submitted discovery to another party has not
filed motions to compel in advance of trlal does not, In and of rtself warve an objectron by
that party as to the timeliness of disclosure of witnesses and exhrblts by the other party as
required by this order.

2.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: There shall be served and flled wlth

each motion for summary judgment a separate concise statement, together wlth a
reference to the record, of each of the material facts as to whlch the movrng party
contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any party opposing the motion shall,
not later than fourteen (14) days prior to the date of the hearing, serve and file a
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all
material facts as to which it is contended there exist genuine Issues necessary to be
litigated. In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that
the facts as claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except
and to the extent that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by
a statement filed in opposition to the motion.

3.

BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: In addition to any original brief or memorandum

filed with the Clerk of the Court, a chambers' copy shall be provided to the Court. To the
extent counsel rely on legal authorities not contained in the Idaho Reports, a copy of
each case or authority cited shall be attached to the Court's copy of the brief or
memorandum.

4.

DISCOVERY DISPUTES: Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertarn

any discovery motion, except those brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c) by a person who

IS

not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the Court, at the time of filing
the motion, a certification that the lawyer making the motion has in good falth conferred or
<"
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attempted to confer with the opposlng lawyer to reach agreement wlthout court actlon,
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). The motlon shall not refer the Court to other documents In
the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an Interrogatory

IS

In Issue, the

motion shall contain, verbatim, both the Interrogatory and the allegedly lnsufflclent
answer, followed by each party's contentions, separately stated In the absence of a
showing of good cause as to why the discovery was not lnltlated so that tlmely responses
were due at least thirty (30) days before trial, the Court will not hear motlons to compel
discovery after twenty-one (21) days before trial.

5.

EXPERT WITNESSES: Not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before

trial, plaintiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later than one hundred
fifty (150) days before trial, defendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trlal
Such disclosure shall consist of at least the subject matter upon which the expert
expected to testify and the substance of any oplnlons to whlch the expert

IS

IS

expected to

testify. The disclosure shall be contemporaneously filed with the Court
Each party shall, at least twenty-eight (28) days before trial. frle wrth the Court
and serve all parties with a supplemental disclosure for each expert wltness whrch shall
identify the underlying facts and data upon whlch the oplnlons of each expert are based
to the extent such information is required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P.

26(b)(4)(A)(i). Absent good cause, an expert may not testlfy to matters not Included In
the disclosure. A party may comply with the disclosure by referencing expert wltness
depositions, without restating the deposition testimony in the disclosure report.

6.

DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES: Each party shall prepare and exchange

between the parties and file with the Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial a list
of witnesses with current addresses and telephone numbers, settlng forth a brlef
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statement identifying the general subject matter about which the w~tnessmay be asked to
testify (exclusive of impeachment witnesses). Each party shall prov~deopposrng padres
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copres of each l~st
s f witnesses.

7. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: Using the attached form, each party shall
prepare a list of exhibits it expects to offer. Exhibits should be listed in the order that the
party anticipates they will be offered. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits before
trial. After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be
made. Plaintiff's exhibits shall be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits
shall be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the
date of the trial shall also be placed on each of the exhibit labels. Exhibrt lrsts and copres
of exhibits shall be exchanged between parties and the exhibit list filed with the Clerk at
least fourteen (14) days before trial. The original exhibits and a Judge's copy of the
exhibits should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Two copies of the exhibit list are
to be filed with the Clerk. It is expected that each party will have a copy of all exhibits to

be used at trial.
8.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions shall be prepared and exchanged

between the parties and filed with the Clerk (with copies delivered to chambers) at least
seven (7) days before trial. The Court has prepared stock instructions covering the
following Idaho Jury Instructions: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.04, 1.05, 1.09, 1 . 1 1 , 1.13,

1.13.1, 1.I
5.2, 1.20.1, 1.22, 1.24.1 and 9.00. Copies of the Court's stock instructions
may be obtained from the Court, and are available on the Kootenai County website

(www.co.kootenai.id.usldpeartment~districtcouforms.asp).
The parties shall meet in
good faith to agree on a statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the6
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1

Court with the other proposed instructions, Absent agreement, each party shall submit
their own statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in
accordance with I.R.C.P. 51(a). A party objecting to any requested jury instruction shall
file at the time of trial written objections to jury instructions,

9.

TRIAL BRIEFS: Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the

parties and filed with the Clerk (with copies to chambers) at least seven (7) days before
trial.

10.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court, each

party shall at least seven (7) days prior to trial file with the opposing parties and the
Court (with copies to chambers) proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
supporting their position.

11.

TRIAL PRACTICE: At least a week before trial the lawyers shall meet and

confer to discuss any stipulations that can be made at the beginning of trial and what
exhibits can be admitted by stipulation. Following this meeting, the parties shall
immediately alert the Court to any matters that need to be taken up before the t ~ m e
scheduled for trial to begin.

12.

TRIAL DAY: After the first day of trial, all subsequent trial days will likely be on

an 8:30 a.m. t o 1:30 p.m. schedule.

13.

MODIFICATION: This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the

parties upon entry of an order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may,
upon motion and for good cause shown, seek leave of the Court modifying the terms of
this order, upon such terms and conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may
request a pretrial conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 or mediation pursuant to I.R.C.P.
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14.

REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: Any party movlng or stlpulatlng to

vacate a trial settlng shall set forth the reasons for the request and rncluile

,-i

representation by counsel that these reasons have been discussed wtth the cllent and
that the client has no objectton to vacatlng the trlal date. For a continuance to be granted,
the parties shall have already engaged in mediation, or should expect to engage In
mediation at the time originally set for the trtal or shortly thereafter.
Any vacation or continuance of the trial day shall not change or alter the ttme frames
for the deadlines set forth herein, but the dates for such deadlines wlll change to the new
dates as are established by the date of the new trlal settlng Any party may, upon motlon
and for good cause shown, request different discovery and disclosure dates upon
vacation or continuance of the trtal date

15. MEDIATION: Lawyers should educate thetr cllents early tn the legal process
about the various methods of resolving disputes without trtal, lncludlng medlatlon,
arbitration and neutral case evaluation. The parties are encouraged and expected to
mediate as soon as possible. The Court will facilitate medtatlon tf requested The partles
are ordered to report jointly to the Court in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to trial,
setting forth when mediation occurred and the results of mediation. If no mediation has
taken place, the joint report must state the reason the parties are not using mediation.

16. SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE: Failure to ttmely comply In all
respects with the provisions of this order shall subject noncomplying partles to sanctions
pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 76(i), which may include:
(A)

An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose

designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting such party from introducing designated
matters in evidence;
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(B)

An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further

proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;

(C) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating
as contempt of court the failure to comply;

(D)

In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the

party or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless
the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party may rely upon any deadline set forth in
this pretrial order as a reason for failing to timely respond to discovery or to timely
supplement discovery responses pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c).
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l )(G), that
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside in this case. The follow~ngIS a ltst of
potential alternate judges: Hon. James R. Michaud, Hon. John P. Luster, Hon. Fred
Gibler, Hon. Charles W. Hosack, Hon. Steve Verby or Hon. George R. Reinhardt, Ill or
Hon. Lansing L. Haynes.
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause
under Rule 40(d)(l), each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for
disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not later than ten (10) days after
service of this notice.
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17 IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party who br~ngsIn an addttlonal party shall
serve a copy of this "Scheduling Order,

Notlce

of Tr~alSetting ' upon th,-it ac!c!etl gar?) cjl

the time the pleading adding the party is served on the added party, and proof of such
service shall then be given to the Court by the party adding an additional party
DATED this

41
7

day of November, 2007.

BY ORDER OFJOHN T. MITCHELL, District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing have been mailed, postage prepaid or sent by interoffice marl
day of November, 2007, to: If applicable, KOOTEAlCounty Jury Commissioner, Judge Grbler Judge
this
Hosack, Trial Court Administrator .

37

Susan Weeks
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

John P. Whelan
213 N. 4th St
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

~eanne~clausen,
Deputy ClerkiSecretary
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County of K00TENA1

)"

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
Plain tifts,
VS.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,)
a Delaware Corporation,
)

case NO.

CV 2003 4621

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
RENEWED MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12

Case NO.

CV 2002 7671

1
Plaintiffs,

)
)
VS.
)
J
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
)
Defendants.
1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS'
RENEWED MOTION FOR
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12

I. BACKGROUND.
On November 13,2007, Defendants Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Lawrences)
filed a "Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an Interlocutory Order" in each of
the above cases. The interlocutory order sought to be appealed was an interlocutory
order that did not exist as of November 13, 2007. In their motion, Lawrences "request an
Order granting them permission to appeal ifDefendantsl Renewed Motion for

" ' '\

&.-r

:

.J

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
Page I

D~squaltficattonfor Cause

IS

denied " Motion for Permission to Appeal From an

lnterlocutory Order, pp 1-2 (emphasts added). On November 7, 2007, Lawrences filed

a "Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause" in each of the above cases. That
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause was not heard until November 27, 2007.
After oral argument by counsel for all parties on November 27,2007, the Lawrences'
Renewed Motton for Disqualification for Cause was denied on the record, and the
reasons for that denial were stated on the record. After the denial of the Lawrences'
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause, this Court heard oral argument on
Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. That
matter was taken under advisement. Thus, though prematurely filed on November 13,
2007, Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order
is now at issue.
The reason this is Lawrences "Renewed" Motion for Permission to Appeal From an
lnterlocutory Order, is back on July 9, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Permission
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, in which they requested "an Order granting them
permission to appeal the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for
Disqualification for Cause, I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed June 25, 2007." Motion for Permission
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, pp. 1-2. That motion was denied on the record at
oral argument on August 6, 2007.
Since the Lawrences furnished no briefing in support of their Renewed Motion for
Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, the Court took the Lawrences'
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order under advisement
on November 27, 2007, so that it could review the briefing regarding the Lawrences' initial
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. A review of the Court file /j
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shows there was no briefing filed at the earlier motion either. The Court has reviewed the

reasons set forth on the record for the denial of the Lawrences' tnitial Motion for
Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. Those same reasons apply to the
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. Those reasons
are as follows.

I!. ANALYSIS.
ldaho Appellate Rule 12 is a discretionary rule, allowing that permission to appeal
an interlocutory order "may" be granted, but only when certain things exist. ldaho
Appellate Rule 12 requires two things, at least the first of which must exist in order for a
trial court to grant a motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. The order
must first involve "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for
difference of opinion" and second, "an immediate appeal from the order. ..may materially
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). (italics added). This Court
interprets the second criteria as not a requirement, but a factor to be considered by the
trial court in its discretion.
At the August 6, 2007 hearing, this Court commented that there was no issues of
controlling case law that were articulated by the Lawrences in their motion to disqualify.
That is again the case following the November 27,2007 hearing on Lawrences' Renewed
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. The Lawrences furnished
no case law on the issue of disqualification, nor on the issue of permissive appeal. On
the issue of disqualification, the Court cited on the record several cases it had reviewed
as to why it was denying the renewed motion for disqualification. While these cases cited
support both granting and denying a motion for disqualification, the reason is they are
naturally fact driven.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
Page 3

Even if thts Court could get beyond the lack of an issue of controlling case law as
to whtch there

IS

substanttal grounds for dtfference of opinion, from a practical standpotnt,

an tmmedtate appeal from this Court's dectsions on renewed motions for disqualification
would not "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." If this Court later
rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment (both cases now have pending
mottons for summary judgment brought by defendants in each case) in each case, and
the cases proceed to trial, and Lawrences prevail at trial, the Lawrences would be unlikely
to have any incentive to appeal this Court's decisions regarding their motions to
disqualify. If this Court later rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment in both
cases, but against Lawrences at trial in Capstar and a jury rules against Lawrences at trial
in TowerAsset, then the Lawrences could appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify
as well as any other issue they would like, including issues that may arise during the trials
now scheduled about six months from the date of this decision. If this Court later rules
against Lawrences on summary judgment in these cases, then the Lawrences can appeal
that decision and appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify as well as the rulings on
summary judgment.

Ill. ORDER.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in the exercise of this Court's discretion, for the
reasons set forth above, defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an
Interlocutory Order in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and identical motion filed in

TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are DENIED.
Entered this .?O%ay

of November, 2007.

/ T.Dhitchell,
- -- District Judge
I

*-

t;i n

I
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

1
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

)
)

case NO.

CV 2003 4621

1
Plaintiffs,

)

1
)

VS.

t
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
1
)

Defendants.

1

)
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,)
a Delaware Corporation,
1

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT, AND ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO SUBSTITUTE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST

case NO.

CV 2002 7671

1
Plaintiffs,

)
)

1

VS.

)
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. )
1
LAWRENCE, husband and wife,
)
Defendants.
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

I. BACKGROUND.
Although one decision is being filed in each of these two cases, these two cases
are not consolidated. At the November 27, 2007, hearing on various motions in both
cases, counsel for defendants in each of these two cases indicated on the record that he
would be pursuing a motion to consolidate on behalf of his clients. No such motion has
been filed. Although one decision is filed in each of these two cases, this decision will

discuss each case separately.
At the conclusion of the November 27, 2007, hearing, this Court stated that the
ruling on the upcoming summary judgment motion (heard November 28, 2007) would be
taken under advisement and that the decision on summary judgment would not be issued
until after this Court filed its decision on "Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12". This Court entered its "Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from
an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12" on November 30, 2007. On December 17,2007,
defendants in both cases filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with the ldaho Supreme
Court. On January 25, 2008, this Court received notice that on January 17, 2008, the
ldaho Supreme Court denied defendants' Motion for Permissive Appeal in each of these
two cases. Accordingly, summary judgment in each of these two cases is at issue.
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion brought by plaintiffs in both cases
was heard November 28, 2007.
Capstar Radio Operating Company and Tower Sub Asset (collectively the
"Plaintiffs") filed suit to declare the existence of an easement over property owned by
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, the defendants in each of the two cases. Due to a
discovery dispute, summary judgment was limited to only the issue of express
easement. Oral argument on the express easement theory was heard in these two
cases at two different times. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of Tower
Asset Sub against Lawrences on May 27,2005, and this Court granted summary
judgment in favor of Capstar against Lawrences on June 7, 2005. Lawrences appealed
this Court's finding of an express easement in both cases to the ldaho Supreme Court.
On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment in both ;{
J

cases and remanded to this Court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
MFMnpAWnl
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Capstar v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7; TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence,

2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7 . The Supreme Court noted that although the plaintiffs did not
have an express easement, it appeared that the case might have been concluded on
summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs' other theories. The ldaho Supreme Court
wrote in Capstar: "It is unfortunate that the district court confined the summary
judgment proceeding to the express easement issue, as it appears the case might have
been brought to a conclusion based on evidence that was submitted with respect to
Capstar's other theories but not considered on summary judgment." Capstar v.

Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7 . A similar statement was made by the ldaho
Supreme Court in TowerAsset Sub, Inc.:
Final resolution of this case would have been expedited, had the district
court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on
evidence submitted to the court, certain of the other theories showed
greater promise from Tower's standpoint and it is unfortunate that those
theories were not fully developed and decided upon.

TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7 . On May 14, 2007, the
plaintiffs in each case filed a "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", which again
raised for this Court's consideration the other theories of easement advanced in
plaintiffs' previous motions for summary judgment, but not decided upon by this Court in
its initial decisions on summary judgment in 2005.

II. ANALYSIS REGARDING CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING CO. v. LAWRENCE.
A. Facts Pertaining to Capstar Radio Operating Co., v. Lawrence.
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and
Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain. Both the Capstar parcel and
the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were once part of a larger tract held under

6in

common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. The Lawrence parcel was broken o t
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in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Susan Weeks
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 1I .e., Exhibit E), and the Capstar
parcel was broken out in 1989 when Funks sold that parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting,
Inc. (Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5, 13.3,
Exhibit Q). The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and
the Capstar parcel is located to the east of the Lawrences' parcel in the southwest
quarter of Section 22. Section 21 lies directly west of Section 22. Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7, 18, Exhibit Z. There is a
public road in the area known as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally to
the west of the Lawrence parcel, which in turn is west of Capstar's parcel. Capstar
seeks an easement to access its property from Signal Point Road over an unimproved
private road commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. Blossom Mountain Road
crosses through the Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In
litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken September 30,

2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone Corporation (GTC)
obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 over the private road
that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel). Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7,11 5-7, Exhibit W,

X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the
road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast through the southwest portion of
Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the north half of Section 28 were it then
turned northeast and entered the southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and
Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y.
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Capstar and Tower Asset have proven the following chain of title for the parcels
involved in Sections 21 and 22:
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1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974):

Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits A
and D.
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed
August 17, 2004), Exhibits B and C. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits B and C.
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this
case.
Capstar and Tower Asset have established the title chain with respect to what
became the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as:
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992):
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2, 2004), E and I; Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit A and F.
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16,
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H;
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ARidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H.
3 Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July

16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0.

4

N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibits J and K.

5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 1996,
Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, M,
N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P.
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
I . Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits Q and R.

2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S.
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T.
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit U.
Capstar asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences'
parcel from the parent parcel in 1975, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had
been used by the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21
and 22. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 9,
2004), pp. 4-5,

77 7-9.

Capstar asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the

Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel.

Id., pp. 5-6,77 10-12. Capstar argues the road was also later used by Kootenai
Broadcasting, Inc. for access to its segregated parcel in Section 22. This claim is
proven by the Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 9, 2004. John Rook was the President of Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. Rook's
testimony is uncontroverted.
The chain of title as to both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel is set
forth in the Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
March 9, 2004, and attached exhibits thereto. In 1975, the Funks agreed to sell the
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. In 1992, the Funks gave Human
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Synergistics a warranty deed that stated it was "given in fulfillment of those certain
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contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the
conveyance of the above described property ..." This property passed through several
other hands before the Lawrences purchased it in 1996.
When the Lawrences questioned Capstar's right to access its property over the
portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed their property, Capstar filed suit on
November 7, 2002, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tower Asset filed a similar
suit on June 27,2003. Capstar and Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared
based on four theories: express easement, easement by implication, easement by
necessity, and prescriptive easement. On plaintiffs' previous motion for summary
judgment, this court found that plaintiffs held an express easement over the Lawrence
property based on the sale agreement, as well as the deed. The Court did not address
Capstar's other theories. The Lawrences appealed from that decision and the Supreme
Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an express
easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, the plaintiffs renew their motion for
summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously advanced by
Capstar.

B. Easement by Implication from Prior Use.
An easement can be formed by implication from prior use. Creation of
easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the rule that written instruments
speak for themselves, and because implied easements are contrary to that rule, the
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 ldaho 396, 400, 422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966);

Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An
easement is implied because it is presumed that if an access was in use at the time of
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severance it was meant to continue. Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 105 ldaho 535,
542, 681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). Easements by implication rest on the view
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that land should not be rendered unfit for use due to a lack of access. Id.
In order to establish an easement by implication from prior use, the party
attempting to establish such easement must prove: 1) unity of title or ownership and
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; 2) apparent continuous use;
and 3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the
dominant estate. Bear Island Water Association v. Brown, 125 ldaho 717, 725, 874
P.2d 528, 536 (1994); CordweN v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087
(Ct.App. 1983); Close v. Rensick, 95 ldaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972); Davis

v. Gowen, 83 ldaho 204, 210, 360 P.2d. 403, 406-07. See also Phillips Industries, Inc.
v. Firkins, 121 ldaho 693, 698, 827 P.2d 706, 71 1 (Ct. App. 1992); and Davis v.
Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999). Apparent continuous use
refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway
was intended to provide permanent access to the parcels. Cordwell, 105 ldaho at 78,
665 P.2d at 1088. The party seeking to establish the easement has the burden of
providing the facts to establish the easement. Id., 105 ldaho at 77, 665 P.2d at 1087.
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1999), the ldaho
Supreme Court held that successors in interest to the original grantors of property could
assert easement rights by implied or prior use.
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior
use. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 991
P.2d 362 (1999); Thomas v. Madsen, 142 ldaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2006).
Reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for
an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 ldaho at 642. Furthermore, the
easement by implication is not extinguished if the easement no longer exists or is no

f tl
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longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643. The ldaho Supreme Court further noted in
Davis:

This long standing rule is based on the theory that when someone
conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is required for the
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that
is required for the use and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently,
an easement implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent
duration, rather than a temporary easement which exists only as long as
the necessity continues. See, e.g., Norken v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622,
631 (Alaska 1991); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 593 P.2d 1138,
1145 (1979); Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla. 1975). Additionally,
an implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore
passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient
estates. See Hughes v. State, 80 ldaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958); I.C. §
55-603 (stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements
attached to the property).

Id.
There can be no dispute that the first element has been proven. As to use and
reasonable necessity, Harold Funk testified in his affidavit that when he and his wife
Marlene purchased parts of Section 21 and 22 in 1969, there was "an existing private
easement road used for access that crossed the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and
entered into the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and provided access to these two
parcels and access to the General Telephone Company parcel [GTC owned about one
acre in Section 221." Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 2, gg 2-3. This is the same easement road referenced in the Real Estate
Contract between Funks and their predecessor in interest, the Radens, over which
General Telephone Company had a recorded easement for access. Id. p. 2 , 1 3 ,
Exhibit A. This was the Funks only access into Section 21. Id. p. 3, 7 4. When Funks
sold their portion of Section 21 to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor) in
1975, Funks still owned their land in Section 22, and the sales agreement to Human
Synergistics included "Item 5" in the Sales Agreement that "...indicated that the Section
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21 parcel was being sold subject to an ingresslegress easement over the existing road

on the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." Id. p. 3, 7 6. Without
those terms Funks' Section 21 property would have been landlocked, and that was not
t-larold Funk's intent. Id. Harold Funk testified that following the sale [to Human
Synergistics], we continuously utilized the existing road in Section 21 to access Funks'
property in Section 22. Id. p. 4, 1. 6. That Sales Agreement was recorded as well. Id.
In 1989 Funks sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc.,
and Funks knew Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. was going to use that parcel for
construction of a broadcasting tower. Id. p. 4, 1 8 . Rook testified that he used this road
several times to access the Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. Affidavit of John Rook
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 14.
Apparent continuous use from no later than 1975 is also shown by the Affidavit
of Wynn Wenker. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment filed March 9, 2004, Exhibit FF at 110. The Farmanian - Mack Agreement
and Quit Claim Deed attached also infers that there is a road across the Section 21
property, the Farmanian property at that time. Id. Exhibit EE. Harold Funk's Affidavit
indicates that the road subject to this action is the only road onto the property. Affidavit

13, 4. Harold
of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 1
Funk further indicates that it was their intent to include an easement in the transfer to
Human Synergistics so the property in Section 22 would not be landlocked. Id. 16.
Similarly, John Rook's Affidavit states that when Kootenai Broadcasing purchased from
the Funks (at a later time in 1989), this road that is subject of this dispute was the only
access to the property now held by Capstar. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, 16.

Capstar noticed their Motion far Summary Judgment to be heard on April 14,
2004 Just prior to that hearing, Lawrences pro se made discovery motions related to

~nformationRook and Funk had. Because such discovery was not relevant to the
express easement theory, discovery was allowed and Capstar's motion for summary
judgment proceeded on the express easement theory alone. The ldaho Supreme Court
has ruled on that issue. On March 23, 2004, Lawrences pro se filed Defendants
Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. In that
pleading Lawrences claim, with a reference to a Metzker Map, that Capstar has access
to its parcel via Mellick Road. Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to Plaitiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. On April 6, 2004, Capstar filed an Affidavit of
Kelvin Brownsberger, the Road Supervisor for Post Falls Highway District. He testified
in his affidavit that Post Falls Highway District has not constructed and maintained
Mellick Road beyond its entry into Section 15, well short of Section 21 or Section 22.
Even if Lawrences had created an issue of fact as to an alternate route (they have not),
the ldaho Supreme Court in Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367
(1999) held only "reasonable necessity" is needed for an easement by implication, not
strict necessity which is needed in an implied easement by necessity.
Lawrences made one other argument in Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-17. Lawrences claim Wilber Mead
testified he kept his gate locked from1 966 until 1998, that the only party that had a key
to the gate was General Telephone Company, that Mead granted Funks an easement
in 1972 and that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975; thus, Funks could have only
used the property for three years instead of the requisite five. Id. Lawrences cite to the
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences' Reply in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, but no such

document exists. Only the cover page of Douglas Lawrence's Affidavit is filed.
Capstar argues that Mead only stated "to his knowledge" Mr. Funk was not using
the road, that Mead indicates he gave a key to GTE, but Mead has no knowledge as to
whether GTE gave a copy of the key to Funk or any knowledge that Funk did not go
around the gate. Capstar also argues there is no evidence to support Lawrences's
allegation that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975. Plaintiffs Reply Brief in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4.
In Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment filed May 14, 2007, Capstar reiterates the same facts, law and arguments it
made in 2004. Lawrences, through their attorney, filed their "Opposition of Douglas and
Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff' on July 24, 2007. In
that brief, Lawrences essentially argue that since Funks had no right to cross Section
28 (Section 28 lies immediately to the south of Section 22 in which Lawrences' parcel is
contained and Blossom Mountain Road dips from Section 22, down to Section 28,
before reaching Section 21), they have no right to cross Blossom Mountain Road as it
crosses Lawrences' land. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 4-5. Capstar correctly notes that in this lawsuit the
owner of Section 28 is not a party. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Capstar's access, or lack thereof, over the portion of
Blossom Mountain Road as it travels through Section 28 is simply not an issue before
this Court. Finally, Lawrences again argue Capstar and their predecessor Funk had the
ability to access their land via Mellick Road. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 6. On August 2, 2007,
Capstar filed "Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment". Capstar correctly points out that nothing in Bruce Anderson's Affidavit

(Attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence filed July 24, 2007), nothing
in the Viewer's Report and nothlng in Loudin v. Stokes (a 1987 District Court decision

by Distr~ctJudge Gary M. Haman which shows it was related to Section 15 and Mellick
Road, Exhibit C to Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary
Judgment filed July 24, 2007), demonstrate that Funks could access their Section 22
property from Mellick Road because the Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of
Section 21. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p, 3.
After Capstar filed its reply brief on summary judgment, on September 10, 2007,
Lawrences filed yet another brief on summary judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P,
56(c)), this one entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat, word for word the brief
Lawrences filed on July 24, 2007, as it pertains to implied easements from prior use.
No request for a jury trial has ever been made in Capstar v. Lawrence.
Accordingly, "When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court
as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho
354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004).
In the Capstar case, there is unity of title at the time of the severance of the
dominant and servient estate. The road was in use by the Funks at the time of the
severance and served as their sole access to the Section 21 and Section 22 properties
they retained. Thus, it was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the dominant

"q L q

estate, Funk's Section 22 property at the time of severance. Capstar has met its

t-1

burden of proving there is an implied easement by prior use which is appurtenant to the
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property.

C . Easement by Necessity.
Capstar correctly notes that an easement by necessity has some similar
elements to an easement by prior use. Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 13. The elements are: (1) that the dominant parcel and the
servient parcel were once part of a larger tract under common ownership; (2) that the
necessity for the easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the
severance; and (3) the present necessity for the claimed easement is great. Id., citing
B&J Development & Inv. Inc. v. Parsons, 126 ldaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, 52 (Ct.App.
1994), MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 112 ldaho 1115, 1118,739 P.2d 414,417 (Ct.App. 1987);
Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 ldaho 535, 543, 681 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Ct.App
1984). See also, Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d
528, 536 (1994). Capstar added little in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13.
There is no dispute that the first element exists.
As to the second and third elements, Lawrences pro se made an argument
unsupported by the law, that because "Funks and [Capstar] don't have a legal
easement to get to the Lawrence property to cross it", necessity does not exist.
Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 18. This argument was noted by the Court in its analysis of an implied easement
from prior use. Since the owner of Section 28 is not a party to this lawsuit, Lawrences'
argument is without merit.
Capstar claims that Kelvin Brownsberger's affidavit contradicts Lawrences' claim
that there is access via Mellick Road based upon a Metsker's map. Plaintiffs Reply
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Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. Because Brownsberger does
not tell us in his affidavit when he became familiar with Mellick Road, nor does he tell us
when he began working for the Post Falls Highway District, Brownsberger cannot
discuss what existed back in 1969 when Funk's purchased or what existed back in
1975 when Funks sold to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor). What is
pertinent is what existed at severance in 1975. The Metsker's map (at the August 7,
2007 hearing on motions to strike, this Court took judicial notice that Metsker maps
have been relied upon for decades, but not as to their accuracy) is not sufficient to
contradict Howard Funk's testimony. The only competent evidence of what existed in
1975 is from Howard Funk. Funk stated: "The private easement road was the only
existing road providing access to the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and the
Southwest Quarter of Section 22" and when they severed the property in 1975 the sales
agreement referenced that private road and that the Section 21 property being sold to
Human Synergistics, Inc., was being sold subject to an ingress egress easement over
the existing road, and that it was not their intent to landlock the Section 22 property.
Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3, 77 4, 6.
John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later time in 1989 when
Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land. Rook testified in his affidavit that in
1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funks'
parcels in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3 , 7 7 4, 6. Finally, John Mack's affidavit makes it
clear that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks' parcels in 1992 when Mack
purchased. Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants Lawrences Reply in

C,jl

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004.
Lawrences then make the argument that: "Funk obviously had access to his
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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other lands when he severed the parcel sold to Hyman Synergistics in 1975, otherwise
Funk would have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to
Human Synergistics in 1975." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion
for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. The identical argument is made in Opposition
of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1011. This argument by Lawrences actually cuts against Lawrences quite clearly when
one considers the uncontradicted fact that Funks in their Sale Agreement to Human
Synergistics, Inc., stated that "the Section 21 parcel being sold was subject to an
ingress egress easement over the existing road on the property that was being sold to
Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 3,

7 6).

Just as the Lawrences argue, Funks actually did take great care

to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human Synergistics in 1975;
however, they errantly put that language in the Sale Agreement. That is why there is no
express easement. But the reason there is no express easement is perhaps the most
convincing evidence as to the implied easement theories. .. Funks needed to, intended
to, and thought they did reserve an easement across the Human Synergistics land (now
Lawrences land) when they sold to Human Synergistics in 1975. At all times thereafter
Funks used this road as if they had every right in the world to use it. This Court finds
that the second element of easement by necessity exists ...the necessity for the
easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the severance in 1975.
Capstar argues that the third element, present great necessity for the easement,
is supported by the Affidavit of Thomas Mack. Mack's affidavit does indicate Mellick
Road does not pass over Funks' property, and Mack's affidavit indicates that even
Mack had no access to Mellick Road until he made an agreement with Fred Zuber,

,. .I 4
*

owned to the North of Mack, "whereby I agreed to reconstruct the road leading down
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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the north face of Blossom Mountain." Mack also testified "Over the years, the road had

been completely abandoned" and "It did not appear that anyone had used the road for
nearly 20 years." Capstar also argues "As demonstrated on the assessor's map
included as Exhibit 'A' to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence
Affidavit filed 7/24/07, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast Quarter
and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22", and "Funks never owned either of these
parcels." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
p. 13; Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence Testimony, filed
August 4, 2007, Exhibit A.
This Court finds there is no question of fact as to whether the present necessity
for the claimed easement is great. There is no evidence that Capstar has any other
access other than the Blossom Mountain Road access which is the subject of this
litigation.

D. Easement by Prescription.
An easement by prescription was not raised in Capstar's initial Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 9,2004, nor did Lawrences
discuss the theory in their pro se Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. Capstar did not raise
the theory in its Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed
April 6, 2004. The first time the issue of a prescriptive easement was raised was in
Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-

Capstar argues the road was established as early as 1966, and that it is
fC

undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and
Section 22 parcels. Id. p. 12. Capstar argues that when Funks sold the Section 21
m n r a s n n .
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parcel to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales
contract language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for
ingress and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. Id. Capstar argues this
language provided notice to others that they were claiming a right to use the road in the
future far ingress and egress to the lands the Funks retained, and that it is undisputed
that Funks and their predecessors (successors) then proceeded to use the road openly,
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for the statutory period. Id.
Capstar notes the ldaho Supreme Court in Akers v. D. L. White Construction,
Inc., 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (2005) held:
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the
subject property, which is characterized as: 1) open and notorious; (2)
continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4)
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient
tenement (5) for the statutory period." (citation omitted). The statutory
period in question is five years. (citations omitted). A claimant may rely
on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite
five continuous years of use." (citation omitted). Once the claimant
presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the
use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and
under a claim of right. (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the
owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. (citations
omitted).

Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12.

A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by
permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of
the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006).
Lawrences argue that Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive.

c;5n

Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
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Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5, Footnote five of Lawrences7brief cites the Court to the "affidavits of
Daniel Rebor [sic, actually Rebeor] and Douglas Lawrence" to support this claim. There
are several Douglas Lawrence affidavits filed in this matter. The Affidavit of Douglas
Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment filed July 24, 2007, indicates
just the opposite, that Capstar's use of the land at least when Lawrences came into
possession of the land, was anything but permissive:
25. Since taking title to the land, I have worked hard to protect my
private property rights from illegal trespass. I have maintained one or
more locks on my gate, placed no trespass signs at various points on the
property, stopped and turned back people who cannot demonstrate a
legal right to use the road, and have actively attempted to engage the
local Sheriffs office on many occasions to get their support. Between
May 2000, and October 2003, 1 have filed over 10 separate crime reports
with the Kootenai County Sheriffs office for vandalism, trespass,
destruction of personal property, and for leaving my gate open and
unlocked. These Crime Reports are attached and included herein as
Exhibit "I".
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed
July 24, 2007, p. 9 (unnumbered pages), 7 25. Douglas Lawrence's affidavit
contradicts the claim his attorney makes on his behalf. Lawrences' claim that use of
the land has always been permissive flies in the face of the fact that the genesis of this
lawsuit was Lawrences "periodically locked the gate which they placed across the
Blossom Mountain Road in an effort to deny Capstar its right of access over and across
the Blossom Mountain Road." Complaint for Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction, p. 6,

Douglas Lawrence's affidavit claims that prior to 2001, "Capstar's use of the road
as it crosses my land was permissive." Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of
Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24, 2007, p. 14 (unnumbered pages), 7
49, Exhibit M. Douglas Lawrence cites to Capstar's response to Lawrences' Request

53 5

for Admission No. 85 which reads: "Please admit that, prior to 2001, Defendants
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Lawrence did not use any gate to restrict Plaintiff Capstar's Vehicular access", to which
Capstar responded: "Admit that the gate has always been on the road since Capstar's
predecessors in title acquired the Capstar parcel was not locked and did not obstruct
either Capstar or its predecessors in title's access until it was locked by Lawrence." Id.
The fact that the gate is not locked may be evidence of Lawrences' acquiescence of
others, including Capstar, to travel this road, it may be evidence of Lawrences'
indifference of others, including Capstar, travelling this road, and it may be evidence of
Lawrences' ignorance of anyone, including Capstar travelling this road, but it is not
evidence that Lawrences or their predecessors gave Capstar or its predecessors
permission to use this road. "Mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient
basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of
the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 51 1 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973).
Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive"
ignores the fact that Lawrences did not purchase their property until 1996. Thus, in the
years from 1966 to 1996, they are not competent to testify as to anything that occurred
in that period.
Lawrences cite the affidavit of Daniel Rebor [Rebeor] for their claim that
Capstar's use of the road was permissive. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. There is an Affidavit
of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed July 22,
2003. A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he managed the tower site for Capstar, and
that "On November 3, 1997, Nextel West Corp. entered into an "Access License
Agreement" with Douglas and Brenda Lawrence in an effort to avoid litigation regarding

3

access to a leased parcel upon which it was locating a communications tower ..."
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Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor, p. 2, 77 2, 3. On January 13, 2003, Nextel assigned the
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Access License Agreement to Capstar. Id.

v. The uncontroverted evidence is the

license was entered into in 1997 "in an effort to avoid litigation". That certainly is not
evidence that there was permissive use of the road at that time. It is evidence of just
the opposite, that Lawrences were claiming Capstar had no right to use the road.
Certainly the assignment of a license would stop the adverse period from running per
the quoted portion of Akers, but the evidence has not been contradicted by Lawrences
that from 1966 to 2003 Capstar and their predecessors used this road under a claim of
right.
Capstar's uncontradicted evidence is as follows: Harold Funk testified in his
affidavit that: "Following the sale [in 19751, we continuously utilized the existing road in
Section 21 to access our property in Section 22 without interference." Affidavit of
Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 2004, p. 4, 7
6. John Rook testified in his affidavit that when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased
its parcel in 1989:
There were other nearby parcels used for towers further east from
the parcel purchased by Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., including a parcel of
property owned and used by General Telephone Company. At the time
that Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcels, these property
owners and their tenants were using the road to access their parcels, and
continued to do so after Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc, purchased its parcel.
Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9,

The existing private access road was visible and in use by Funks at
the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel. I have personally
driven this road and used it on several occasions to access the Kootenai
Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. The private road was the only road that
provided access to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc.'s parcel of property.

Id. p. 3, 7 4.
#/;

Lawrences make several arguments regarding Capstar's predecessor's (the
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Funks) ability to obtain a prescriptive easement. First, Lawrences claim "In 1975, Funk
moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, Idaho, where he has resided since.
(Funk Deposition, hereinafter 'FD' 28:20 to 28:24.). Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. Lawrences then argue:
"After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom Mountain only two or
three times (FD 30:25 to 31:4)11and "Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land
since 1981 (FD 31 :I 7)." Id., p. 5. What Lawrences omit from that same deposition is
the following:
Q. BY MR. WHELAN: Now between the time you bought the property
and the time you sold it to Human Synergistics, how many times did you
go up to the property?
A. Well, we'd always go up andpick huckleberries and stuff, and target
practice and - I don't know. I would have to guess maybe, I don't know,
20, 30 times.
Q. In the two year period, well three years since 1969. I'm sorry. Sixyear period, from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on top of the
mountain?
A. I would suppose, yeah.

Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit A (August 17, 2007 Deposition of Harold Funk), p. 25, LI. 11-23.
Lawrences fail to realize that Funk's use of his property and the use he made of the
Lawrence property in getting to his property from 1975 to the present is not relevant.
The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk used the property consistently for the sixyear period from the day he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the
area. This is one year more than the five years required for the prescriptive use.
This isn't the type of property of which one would expect daily use. The property is on
top of a mountain. Capstar seeks this easement to maintain its radio equipment on top
of this mountain. The use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funks
made of Lawrences' land for that six-year period from 1969 to 1975.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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It is the long established rule in this jurisdiction [Idaho] that any right gained
by prescription is confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive
period, "It is limited by the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to
which it is put."
ldaho Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed Impon/ement Dist., 112 ldaho 512, 515,

733 P.2d 733, 736 (1987); citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 ldaho
566, 568, 602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979). "[Plresciption acts as a penalty against a landowner
and thus the rights obtained by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by
the courts. Id., citing Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 ldaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977). The
character and extent of a prescriptive easement generally is fixed and determined by the
use under which it was acquired. No different or materially greater use can be made of
such an easement, except by further adverse use for the prescriptive period. 25
Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 81.
The uncontroverted evidence is the road was established as early as 1966, and
it is undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and
Section 22 parcels. It is uncontradicted that when Funks sold the Section 21 parcel to
Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales contract
language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for ingress
and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. It is uncontradicted that Funks in
fact made use of that road. This language in the recorded sales contract provided
notice to others that Funks were claiming a right to use the road in the future for ingress
and egress to the lands the Funks retained. The uncontroverted evidence is that Funks
and their successors relied on that language in the recorded sales contract as it is
undisputed that Funks and their successors then proceeded to use the road openly,
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for much longer than the
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statutory period requires.

E. Lawrences' New Defenses of Laches and Statute of Limitations.
On September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Leave to File Amended
Answer, requesting to add the additional defense of laches. This motion to amend was
granted and an order to that effect was filed on September 26, 2007. Also on
September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed another brief on summary judgment, this one
entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment
of PlaintifT1. In that brief, Lawrences repeat their arguments made in their brief filed July
24, 2007, regarding implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity and
easement by prescription. Lawrences claim additional facts not in dispute. Finally,
Lawrences also added a brief argument on Statute of Limitations and a one paragraph
argument regarding laches. Lawrences also filed on September 10, 2007, an "Affidavit
of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment" and an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Defendants' Opposition to
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants'
Motion for Leave to Amend." On September 17, 2007, Capstar filed "Plaintiff's
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment".

1) Statute of Limitations.
Lawrences argue ldaho Code § 5-203 and 5-204 apply to bar Capstar's claims.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, p. 6. Lawrences provide no legal analysis to support that argument. ldaho
Code § 5-203 is not a statue of limitation. It simply sets forth the number of years a
plaintiff in an action must be in possession of the property in question before filing a
lawsuit to adverse possess that property. ldaho Code § 5-204 is also not a statute of
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limitation, but, simply a statute setting forth the number of years a party must be seize

or be in possession of property following an act of adverse use. It applies to all parties,

not just the plaintiff as in I.C. 3 5-203, and it applies to defenses and to prescriptive
easements, where I.C. 5 5-203 only concerns prescriptive possession of property.
Lawrences argue: "Plaintiffs complaint makes no reference to its predecessors
interest". Id. First, Lawrences completely fail to explain the legal significance of that
claim. There can be no legal basis for this argument, as both I.C. 5 5-203 and § 5-204
specifically mention a party's predecessor. ldaho case law has long since recognized
this fact that a party's predecessor's use of property or time in possession can be
tacked on to the party's use or time in possession to achieve the requisite number of
years. Akers v. D. L. White Construction, Inc., 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206
(2005); Hodgins v, Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 975 (2003); State ex rel.

Haman v. Fox, 100 ldaho 140, 146, 594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1979); Marshall v. Blair, 130
ldaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Second, from a factual standpoint,
Lawrences' claim is false. Capstar's Complaint, p. 6, 7 XVll alleges: "Capstar and its
predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously,
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years."
Lawrences next argue: "Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to
be perfected." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary
Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. Again, there is no explanation as to the legal basis of this
claim. Such argument is squarely contradicted by ldaho Code § 5-203, § 5-204, and
the analysis of Hodgins, Haman, Marshall and Akers.

2) Laches.
Lawrences entire argument on laches is as follows:
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of
fact. Osterlich v.State ofldaho, 100 Idaho 702, 604 P.2d 716. It is
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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beyond question that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged
stale claims which Plaintiff now seeks to enforce. If Plaintiff and its
predecessors truly enjoyed easements by implication, necessity andlor by
prescriptive use, those claims should have been perfected through
litigation. The failure to pursue the claims by Plaintiff's predecessors has
clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and their predecessors to
defend against the claims.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, p. 7. (italics in original). While Lawrences claim it is "beyond question" that
Lawrences have been prejudiced, there is not one fact alleged, not one bit of argument
stating why this is so. Similarly, there is no factual or legal argument made why
Capstar's claims or Capstar's predecessor's "claims should have been perfected
through litigation." The obvious flaw to Lawrences' unsupported argument is prior to
Lawrences purchasing their property and subsequently denying Capstar access, there
was no need to litigate! Every indication is that as soon as Lawrences prohibited

Capstar's access, Capstar took action. Capstar simply is not "guilty of laches."
There is absolutely no merit to either of Lawrences' defenses of statute of
limitations or laches.

II. ANALYSIS REGARDING TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. v. LAWRENCE.
A. Facts Pertaining to Tower Asset Sub, Inc., v. Lawrence.
As a preliminary matter, on November 13, 2007, Tower Asset filed a "Motion for
Substitution of Real Party in Interest." The basis for this motion is Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. became Tower Asset Sub, L.L.C., and on February 23, 2007, Tower Asset Sub,
L.L.C. merged into Spectra Site, L.L.C., a different Deleware Corporation. Affidavit of
Raymond W. Goodwin in Support of Substitution of Real Party in Interest. This motion
was heard on November 28, 2007, just prior to oral argument on Capstar's summary
judgment motion. At the end of oral argument on the Motion for Substitution of Real
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Party in interest, the Court granted the motion and directed counsel for Tower Asset to
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prepare an order No order has been prepared to date Slnce no order has been
entered until thls decision and order, the Court will continue to refer to the plaintiff in this
action as Tower Asset Sub, Inc., (Tower Asset) even though the Court has granted the
motion to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest.
Tower Asset has made it clear that it is only seeking injunctive relief in this case,
and that Tower Asset is not making any claim to title over Lawrences' land. PlaintifTs
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1.
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and the
Halls (through whom Tower Asset claims its right) own parcels of property on Blossom
Mountain. Both the Halls' parcel and the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were
once part of a larger tract held under common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk.
The Lawrence parcel was broken out in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human
Synergistics. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset Case filed August 17, 2004), p. 2, 7 2.e., Exhibit E. The Halls' parcel was
broken out in 1996 when Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen. Id., Exhibit Q. The
Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Halls' parcel
is located to the east in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Id. Section 21 lies directly
west of Section 22. Id., p. 6, 7 8, Exhibit Z. There is a public road in the area known
as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally West of the Lawrence parcel,
which in turn is west of Hall's parcel. Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an
easement to access its equipment located on Halls' property which Tower Asset leases
from the Halls. The easement is located on an unimproved private road commonly
known as Blossom Mountain Road as Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the
Lawrence parcel. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition
taken September 30, 2003, recognized the right-of-way easement General Telephone
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences'
parcel) Id., pp. 6-7, 77 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road
prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then
travels southeast through the southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then
enters the North Half of Section 28 where it then turned northeast and entered the
southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y.
Tower Asset asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' parcel
from the parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by
the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 and 22.
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (field August 17, 2004), pp.

4-5, 77 7-9. Tower Asset asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel.

Id., pp. 5-6, 77 10-1I .
Capstar and Tower Asset prove the following chain of title for the parcels
involved in Sections 21 and 22:

1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D.

2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed
August 17, 2004), Exhibits B and C.
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this
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case.
Capstar and Tower Asset establish the title chain with respect to what became
-

. ..- ----- ---..-...- -. ....-.--.- ..--.-..--- -.,.....-.,.,.--..-..-

. ....

the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as:

I. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992):
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case .filed November 2,2004), E and I; Affidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibit A and F.
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16,
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H.
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July

16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0 ;
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0,
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Afidavit of
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,
2004), Exhibits J and K.
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5 Farman~anto Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12,
1996, Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L,
M, N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P.
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of

Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibit Exhibits Q and R.

2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S.

3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T.

4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9,

2004), Exhibit U.
Tower Asset establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Hall property in
the southwest corner of Section 22 as:

I . Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August
):{

17, 2004), Exhibit Q.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Page 31

5

2. Rasmussen to VanSky (Deed September 29, 1978): Affidavit of Susan

Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case
filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit R.
3. VanSky to Switzer Communications, Inc. (Deed December 1 1, 1981):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit S.
4. Switzer Communications, Inc. to Term Corp. (Deed December 8, 1982):
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit T.
5. Term Corp. to Mark E. Hall and Robert A. Hall (Deed April 16, 1997);
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit U.
6. Spectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest with Mark Hall and Robert
Hall in a Parcel of property situated in the Southwest quarter of Section
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Mer4idian, Kootenai
County, Idaho. Affidavit of Dan Rebeor (Tower Asset case filed July 22,
2003).
When the Lawrences questioned Tower Asset's right to access the property it
leases from the Halls over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed
Lawrences', Tower Asset filed suit on June 27, 2003, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief. Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared based on four theories:
express easement, easement by implication, easement by necessity, and prescriptive
easement. On Tower Asset's previous motion for summary judgment, this court found
that Tower Asset held an express easement over the Lawrence property based on the
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sale agreement, as well as the deed. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment
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and Enter~ngDecree of Qu~etTitle, filed May 27, 2005 The Court did not address
Tower Asset's other theories raised in its Complaint due to a discovery issue at the
time. Accordingly, Tower Asset and Lawrences in that initial motion for summary

judgment did not address theories of easement by implication, easement by necessity
and prescriptive easement. The Lawrences appealed from that decision, and the
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an
express easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, Tower Asset renews its
motion for summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously
raised in their complaint.
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc., while
retaining the southwest quarter of Section 22. Tower Asset asserts that although its
origins are unknown, it is apparent that an easement over the road existed as early as
1966. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken
September 30, 2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone
Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences'
parcel). Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 67, 77 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's
engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast
through the Southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the North
Half of Section 28 were it then turned northeast and entered the Southeast quarter of
Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y
Tower Asset claims that prior to the separation of the Lawrence parcel from the
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by the
Funks as an exclusive means to access their property. That same road was later used
by t-iall for access to their segregated parcel in Section 22. Affidavit of Robert Hall in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 77 7, 8. In 1992, the Funks executed
and delivered a warranty deed conveying the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics.
The warranty deed stated that the deed was given "in fulfillment of those certain
contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the
conveyance of the above described property." In 1996, after a number of other
intermediate conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their parcel.
The ldaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right to
use the easement. The ldaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v.

Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4.
Lawrences also claim Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant and
that Tower Asset has no standing to seek to quiet title across Lawrences' land.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of
Plaintiff, pp. 1, 2, 9, 10. A copy of the lease between Nextel Communications and Hall
is included with the Affidavit of Robert Hall. Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 77 3, 4, Exhibit A. Hall received notice that this lease was
assigned to Tower Parent Corp., and Tower Asset Sub, Inc., and that Tower Asset Sub,
Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Id. p. 2, 77 4, 5. Additionally, the Supreme
Court in TowerAsset, Inc., v. Lawrence, supra, noted that: "We hold that Tower, as
lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief preventing
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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the Lawrence's from ~nterfer~ng
with ~ t sright to sue the easement

"

TowerAsset Sub.

Inc v Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No 14, p. 4. The ldaho Supreme Court also held:

"Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if ~tcan establish it has an alleged
legal r~ghtto benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement." Id. Lawrences'
argument that Tower Asset lacks standlng to pursue easement theories of implication
or necessity (Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 6-7) is without merit. Lawrences admit Tower Asset
has standing to prove an easement by prescription. Id., p. 7.
Lawrences next argue that Hall has no easement by necessity or implication and
thus has nothing to assign to Tower Asset, and that the only theory available to Tower
Asset is easement by prescription. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1-3, 8. Tower Asset now argues that
nothing presented by the Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset
has standing as a lessee of the dominant estate. Tower Asset correctly argues "the
only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower
Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road
easement of its landlord, Halls." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 2. (emphasis added). This is because the ldaho Supreme
Court noted in Footnote 1 that: "Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall
parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrence
parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4.
In accordance with 28A C.J.S. Easements 5 164 (1996), Tower Asset argues
that while a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the
owner of the way, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as well as by persons

6:

5

- 6 9
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transact~ngbusiness with him, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary.
Plaint~ff'sReply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2.
Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there is nothing contained in the copy of the
lease between Tower Asset and Hall that demonstrates a special agreement between
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may not use an easement for which the Halls
have the benefit. Id. at p. 3. Hence, Tower Asset argues they are entitled to injunctive
relief. Id.
Lawrences argue that Tower Asset is not the Halls' tenant since the Halls and
Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement.
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, p. 10. The lease between Nextel and the Halls has a provision that reads:
"Lessee may not assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest in this
Agreement or in the Premises without the prior written consent of Lessors

...I1

Affidavit

of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f/ 14. Tower
Asset re-characterizes Lawrences argument as follows: "Essentially, Lawrences argue
that Hall may not waive a contract clause." Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Tower Asset correctly
states that as long as the Halls and Tower Asset are in agreement that they share a
tenantllandlord relationship pursuant to the lease, Lawrences may not challenge that
relationship. Id. The uncontroverted evidence by Robert Hall is ". . .that Tower Asset
Sub, Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 77 4, 5, Exhibit A. This Court finds the
uncontroverted evidence shows that Hall and Tower Asset are in agreement that they
share a landlord and tenant relationship. As noted by Tower Asset, "No law requires

6 I. 1

strict compliance to the terms of the lease agreement if the parties agree to the waiver"
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of the term

"

Plainti'ffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support: of Motion for

Summary Judgment, p. 3. Obviously, Hall and Nextel either agreed to waive the
assignment term, or they simply are not concerned with that provision. There is no
assignment issue at issue here. Quite simply, the Lawrences are not in privity to the
leasing agreement between Nextel and the Halls, or the agreement between Nextel's
assignee, Tower Asset, and the Halls. Therefore, Tower Asset is correct in asserting its
right to use the Halls' easement over Lawrences' land. Tower Asset is entitled to
injunctive relief,
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, "Tower presented uncontroverted
evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road
across the Lawrence parcel." TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No.
14, p. 4. Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstar's easement by implication from
prior use, easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls.
The only additional argument made by Lawrences as to an easement by prescription is
.that Lawrences argue that Tower Asset itself makes no claim that it has used the
Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously, and in a hostile manner for the
statutory period. Lawrences' argument continues that since no prescriptive claim has
been established by Tower.Asset and since Tower Asset's use of the road has always
been permissive, a prescriptive easement cannot exist. The Court's analysis above
explains why these arguments have no merit. The only additional argument made by
Lawrences as to an implied easement by prior use is Lawrences assert that the parcel
at issue in the Tower Asset case was not created or severed from the Funks' other
lands until 1977 (as opposed to 1975 in the Capstar case) when Funk conveyed the
property to RasmussenlChamberlain. Lawrences argue that because there was no
easement in 1975 when the servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, and
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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therefore no prior use, Tower Asset has failed to meet the second element of an
implied easement. This Court has already explained why there was an easement by
~mplication,from prior use and by prescription in 1975.
As lessee from Halls, Tower Asset is entitled to injunctive relief against
Lawrences as to use of this easement across Lawrences' land for use of this road
known as Signal Point Road.
Just as in the Capstar case, Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the
arguments of statute of limitations and laches. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 8-9. The analysis
above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case. Lawrences cannot avail
themselves of those defenses for the reasons stated above.
Ill. ORDER.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed
by Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judmgnet
filed in Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are GRANTED. In the

Capstar case, Capstar has proven they have an implied easement by prior use, an
easement by necessity, and an easement by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to
establish a material fact as to any other these theories. In the Capstar case,
Lawrences have failed to establish a material fact in dispute as to any of these theories.
The defenses of laches and statute of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in
the Capstar case.
In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to injunctive
relief, as their landlord, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences land established
by prior use, by necessity and by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to establish a

,. --,
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material fact in dispute as to any of these theories. The defenses of laches and statute
of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in the TowerAsset case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in the Tower Asset case, that Tower Asset's motion
to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest is GRANTED.
Entered this 6thday of February, 2008.
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JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
21 3 N. 4" Street
Coeur dlAlene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
ISB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV-03-04621
VS.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

Defendants.
TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Tower Asset Sub Inc., and its attorney,
Susan P. Weeks, and t o the Clerk of the above-entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J.

Lawrence, appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the aboveentitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and

the Orders described in paragraph one (1) above are appealable Orders under
and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a) of the ldaho Appellate Rules.

3.
Several primary orders are appealed in this appeal, including the
February 6, 2008 order granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary
judgment, together with the trial court order denying Defendants renewed
motion for disqualification for cause.
4.

The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not

limited to, the following:
(a)

Was the alleged landlord of Tower Asset Sub, Inc. a necessary
and/or indispensable party to the litigation?

(b)

Did Tower have standing to seek to establish easements by
prescription, necessity and/or by implication?

(c)

Was it an abuse of discretion to permit Tower to substitute
Spectracite as the real party in interest?

(d)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself
for cause?

(e)

In granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, are the
findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent
evidence?

(f)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff
prejudgment access to Defendants land without first requiring a
bond or undertaking?

(g)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only
two weeks to complete their discovery?

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

&"-I

".;

,i

(h)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting
affidavits in their entirety over Defendants' objections?

(i)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendants'

plaintiff"^

affidavits?
A reporter's transcript has been requested and the required
(a)
fees will be paid on determination of an estimated cost.

5.

(b) The Defendants request the preparation of any untranscribed
transcripts of the hearings before the Court.

6.
The Defendants request that the Clerk's record include the
documents specified in subsection (b)(l) of Rule 2 8 of the Idaho Appellate Rules
as well as the following documents:
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for
(a)
summary judgment together with all affidavits submitted in support of the
motion.
Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary
(b)
judgment and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of the opposition.
(c)
Defendants' renewed motion to disqualify for cause and all
supporting briefs and affidavits.
(d)
Defendants' original
supporting briefs and affidavits.

motion to disqualify

for

cause and all

(e)
Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and
affidavits in support.
Plaintiffs motion to substitute real party in interest, together with
all briefs and affidavits in support.

(f)
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Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party
(g)
in interest together with all briefs and affidavits in support.
7.

I hereby certify:

That a copy of this Notice o f Appeal has been served on the
(a)
Clerk of the District Court.
That a request has been made with the Clerk o f the District
(b)
Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost.
(c)

Said fee will be paid upon determination of the appropriate

amount.
Service has been made on all parties required to be served
(d)
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this

day of March, 2008.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

if

day of March, 2008 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

Via:

Mail, postage prepaid
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
Personally served

JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.
2 1 3 N. 4thStreet
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4
Tele.: (208) 664-5891
Fax: (208) 664-2240
lSB# 6083
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,

Plaintiff,
CASE NO. CV-03-04621
VS.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,

Defendants.

I

TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Tower Asset Sub lnc., and its attorney,
Susan P. Weeks, and to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J.
Lawrence, appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the aboveentitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding.
1.

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and
the Orders described in paragraph one (1) above are appealable Orders under
and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

3.

Several primary orders are appealed in this appeal, including the
February 6, 2008 order granting Plaintiffs renewed motion for summary
judgment, together with the trial court order denying Defendants renewed
motion for disqualification for cause.
The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not
limited to, the following:
4.

(a)

Was the alleged landlord of Tower Asset Sub, lnc. a necessary
and/or indispensable party to the litigation?

(b)

Did Tower have standing to seek to establish easements by
prescription, necessity and/or by implication?

(c)

Was it an abuse of discretion to permit Tower to substitute
Spectracite as the real party in interest?

(d)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself
for cause?

(e)

In granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, are the
findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent
evidence?

(f)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff
prejudgment access to Defendants land without first requiring a
bond or undertaking?

(g)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only
two weeks to complete their discovery?
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(h)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting Plaintiff's
affidavits in their entirety over Defendants' objections?

(i)

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendants'
affidavits?

A reporter's transcript has been requested and the required
(a)
fees will be paid on determination of an estimated cost.

5.

(b)
The Defendants request the preparation of the following
transcripts of hearings before the Court from Court Reporter, Julie Foland:
-

June 13, 2007:

Hearing re:

Renewed Motion

for Summary Judgment; Motion
for Enlargement of Time;
Application
for
Order
Shortening Time; Motion for
Disqualification for Cause;
Motion to Strike Portions of
Affidavit Douglas Lawrence;
Motion to Strike Affidavit of
John Mack
-

August 6, 2007:

Hearing
re:
Motion for
Reconsideration; Motion for
Permission to Appeal from an
Interlocutory Order

-

August 7, 2007:

Hearing
re:
Motion f o r
Summary Judgment; Motion for
Enlargement of Time; Motion
to strike; Request for Judicial
Notice; Motion to Strike All
Whelan's Motions
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November 27, 2007:

Hearing re: Renewed Notion
for Disqualification for Cause;
Motion to Substitute Real Party
in Interest; Renewed Motion to
Appeal from an Interlocutory
Order; Motion to Continue Trial

November 2 8 , 2007:

Hearing
re: Motion for
Summary Judgment; Motion to
Substitute Real Party in Interest

6.
The Defendants request that the Clerk's record include the
documents specified in subsection (b)(l) of Rule 2 8 of the Idaho Appellate Rules
as well as the following documents:
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for
(a)
summary judgment together with all affidavits submitted in support of the
motion.
Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary
(b)
judgment and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of the opposition.
(c)
Defendants' renewed mdtion to disqualify for cause and all
supporting briefs and affidavits.
(d)
Defendants' original
supporting briefs and affidavits.

motion to disqualify for

cause and all

(e)
Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and
affidavits in support.
Plaintiffs motion to substitute real party in interest, together with
all briefs and affidavits in support.

(f)
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Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party
(g)
in interest together with all briefs and affidavits in support.
7.
Defendants further request that the District Court Clerk forward all
exhibits that have been offered in the course of the various motions before the

District Court that are, in whole or part, the subject of the instant appeal.
Defendants further request that any exhibits forwarded to the Supreme Court be
identified in a Clerk's certificate accompanying the Clerk's record.

8.

lherebycertify:

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the
(a)
Clerk of the District Court.
That a request has been made with the Clerk o f the District
(b)
Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost.
(c)

Said fee will be paid upon determination of the appropriate

amount.
Service has been made on all parties required to be served
(d)
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED this

7%

day of April, 2008.
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C.

J $ ~ P . Whelan
Attorney for Defendants
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day of April, 2008 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon & Weeks
Attorneys at Law
1 626 Lincoln Way

Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4

Via:

d.S

Mail, postage prepaid

Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684
Personally served

Julie Foland
Court Reporter
324 West Garden Ave.
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 6-9000

Via:

/US.

Mail, postage prepaid

Facsimile:
Personally served
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~ f h n Whelan
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I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
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Attorney at Law
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